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INTRODUCTION 
·There was listed on the New York Stock Exchange, as or 
January 1, 1939, a total or 582 issues of domestic operating 
railroad bonds of $10,106,892,000 par value. Some 26'( or 
these railroad bond issues, amounting in par value to 
$3,922,000,000 are obligations of railroads in bankruptcy . 
It was with this huge amount of approximately four billion 
defaulted railroad bonds in mind that I have undertaken to 
write this thesis on Railroad Reorganization. 
More than one-half of all the interest paid by railroads 
goes to insurance companies, mutual savings banks, educational 
and charitable institutions and the like. The real benefici-
aries of these payments are the tens of millions of policy 
holders and depositors, and the millions of persons served 
by endowed institutions. In other words, the real losers, 
when railroad interest can no longer be paid, are you and I. 
On January 1,1939, 118 railroad companies were in the 
hands of receivers or trustees--bankrupt. 
This startling statement at once brought the following 
questions to mind, and as a result I proceeded to investigate 
all sources of availab~e information relative to ways and 
means of bringing these railroads out of bankruptcy through 
successful reorganizations. 
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Is this situation caused by railroad over-capitalization? 
In his first report to Congress in 1934, the Federal Co-(l) 
ordinator of Transportation stated: 
"Contrary to much popular impression, the rai~roads are 
not in the aggregate over-capitalized, in the sense that 
the par value of outstanding securities exceeds the money 
invested in the properties." 
Is this situation caused by excessive dividend payments ? 
During the course of the depression a steadily increasing 
number of railroad companies suspended antirely the payment 
of dividends. Even in 1937, when conditions were far better 
than they were in 1939, dividend payments showed a reduction 
of bb.2 per cent below the 1930 level, and for the industry 
as a whole amounted to an average of only 2.1 per cent on the 
total outstanding cap ital stock of all railroads. 
Is this situation caused by excessive fixed charges ? 
Railroad fixed charges represent, principally, interest 
paid by the carriers upon money borrowed by them, and rentals 
paid for the use of leased lines. Discussing these fixed 
charges, a special committee composed of three members of the 
( 2) 
Interstate Commerce Co~nission reported to President Roosevelt: 
"There is some misunderstanding of the fixed charge 
situation and its significance. Many seem to think tnat 
these charges represent ;:1r, un just burden, and tbat if it 
1. Senate Document 119, 73rd.Congress, 2nd,Session , p3,1934. 
2. House Document 583, 75th.Cong ress,3rd.Session,p43. 
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c ou~d be removed, a~~ woul d be we~l. The fact is t hat 
these charges constitute a comparative~y modest return 
on onl y a part of the legitimate investment in railroad 
property. There is nothing unjust about this return. 11 
Is this situation caused by the salaries paid to rail-
road officers ? 
The total amount paid in salaries to railroad executives, 
general officers and assistants in the entire year 1937 
amounted to only one and one- tenth per cent of railroad 
operating revenues in that year and to only one and four - tent.t1s 
(1) 
per cent of railroad operating expenses. 
What, then, are the causes or· the present railroad 
situation ? 
Chief among the causes of the pre.sent railroad situation 
are de c r eased ~raffle v olume caused i n par t by the bus i ness 
r ecession and in part by the loss o f traffic to competitors 
favored in var i ous ways by federal and state governments; the 
low level of freight r a tes a nd passenger fares; increased 
prices of materials and supplies used in railroad operati on; 
(2) 
high and increasing taxation; and high wage rates. 
Are there any possible solutions to this railroad problem ? 
Less Government Interference.- - The railroads are sound, 
virile,progressive public servants, g iving the American people 
t he best and cheapest freight and pa ssenger service in the 
l.Surnmers,H. B.& R.E.,"The Railroad Problem, 11 p78,1939. 
2. "Railroads a nd 1.1\la ges, "Association of American Railroads,p27,1938. 
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world. They d o not n eed rehabi lita tion, h owever t~e word 
may be . d ef:.ned; t hes need only two t hlngs--a s quare deal and 
( 1) 
a s quare meal. One fo llows t h e o t her . 
Sound Busin es s Meth ods Need ed.-- Railroads, over a p eriod 
of y e ar s, have borrov1ed t bree i ssue s of lon g-term, supposedly 
gi lt-edged, bonds, to cove r l osses they refu sed t o for get ab ou t. 
Th ey h ave capita l ize d t h eir losses, instead of writing down 
( 2) 
their capita l for t h em. 
A Nati onal Tra ns portat ion PolicyT-The railroads sh ou l d 
be pu t on an e qual footint; with oth er a g en c i es of tran s port a tion 
' both a s to governmental re gulati on and subsidizati on. 'rhi s 
presupposes the a dop ti on , i n the first ins tance, of a n at i onal 
tra ns p ortation policy by t h e government , to provi d e equal op -
p ortunity for each o f the severa l forms of transporta tion a nd 
s p ec ial favors fo r n one. An essential corolla r y of the equal -
ization of re gulation and promotion of tra ns porta tion by the 
g overnment is the centraliza tion of a dministra tive f unc tions, 
relating pri~ar i ly t o t h e d evelopment of a well - bal a r, ced 
tra nsporta tion sy stem_ . Th ese duties mi ght well b e brought 
togeth er i n a n i n d e p endent transporta tion board, wi t h t h e Inter-
s t ate Commerce Comml s s ion exerc ising ra t e control in e a c h f orm 
( 3 ) 
of transportation. 
1. Pelley , J,J. , A 0 qLmre Deal,with No Favoritism, The Forum, 
Vo l u me 1 0 3 , March,l9 39 , ppl31-l32. 
2 . Janeway , E., Risk s and Profits i 'or Investors, ;l'he Fornm, 
Ma rch ,l9 39 , ppl 33-1 35 . 
3 . Harris on , G. lVI ., A Nati onal Pro gram o f Rehabilita tion, The 
Forum , Volume l Ol, Iil Brch , 1 9 39 , ppl 3 2 -133 . 
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Sound Reorganization Plans.--In order to prevent the 
recurrence of railroad failures every time this country ex-
periences a panic or an industrial depression the present 
bankrupt railroads should formulate reorganization plans, as 
drastic as those of the Union Pacific; Atchinson; and Norfolk 
and Western, which have stood the test of time since the late 
nineties. 
The object of this thesis is to give the reader a more 
complete understanding of railroad reorganizations. A treatise 
such as this is naturally limited in scope, but there are sever-
al important divisiotis to this subject which must be treated. 
The origin and early history of railroads is the logical start-
ing point in this study. It will furnish a complete background 
for the possible causes of the present railroad situation and 
the necessity for reorganization. 
In this field of railroad reorganization Professor w.z. 
Ripley of Harvard has made a notable reputation. Stuart 
Daggett, Edward s. Meade and Simon Sterne have been most help-
ful in tracing the earlier reorganizations. Also in connection 
with thi s subject much useful information has been found in 
the many Poor's Manuals, as far back as 1893· Of course, 
in citing the above sources of information we must not under-
estimate the value of the other work done in this field, which 
will be noted in the bibliography. Many of these authors have 
contributed interesting and highly i mportant information which 
will be noted throughout the text in footnotes. 
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CHAPTER I 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
To England t h e world owes the railway. In the coal 
districts of the north of England, rails of wood were laid 
during t h e seventeenth century for the purpose of reducing 
t he friction caused by pulling the coal cart from the workings 
to the mouth of the pit. About 1767, cast-iron rails were 
introduced. The modern railway, both by con~on consent and 
a s the verdict of engineering specialists, owes its origin, 
as a success in transportation, to George Stephenson, who 
built the first engine for the Stockton & Darlington Railway 
and acted as the engineer on the pening of the steam railroad 
•• line in the Autumn of t h e year 1825. 
The success of the Stockton & Darlington experiment pro-
duced i n the United States a greater effect than it c1id in 
England. Before t h e Liverpool & Manchester line was built in 
1 830, many lines of rail were already projected in the United 
States, and as early as 1 825 what is now the New York Central 
sys tem was begun t o be built under the Charter of t h e Mohawk 
& Hudson Rai lroad. In 1 830 and 1831, the Boston & Worcester 
and the Boston & Providence companies were chartered. Pem1-
sylvania started its railway system in 1827, and Mary land 
and South Carolina in 1 828 . The Baltimore & Oh io sy stem 
was cow~enced in 1828. 
Railway development took its ori gin in both England and 
in t his country contemporaneously with the growth of t he 
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democratic s pirit, and with the dissemination of politico-
economic ideas. The democratic spirit was jealous of gover n-
mental power, and aimed at its reduction and decentrali zation. 
Political economy asserted the proposition that competition 
was productive of unmixed goN1 ; · that it was universally 
applicable; t hat governmental r egulation and i n terference 
tended to diminish or destroy competition; that it would 
subserve the best interests of mankind if government would 
let things in con~ercial and i ndustrial enterprise work out 
their own salvation.(l)Thus, t h e railways were placed in the 
hands of corporations with all the freedom of management. 
SPECULATION 
One of the first pathological symptoms that the railroad 
industry produced was the speculative s pirit t hat it promoted 
and fed. The era of s peculation, however, does not begin 
with the development of the railway. Great speculative mania s, 
destructive i n their con sequences, and of as far reaching and 
disastrous r e sults, form part of the history of trade and 
commerce of the past two hundred years. The Mississippi bubble, 
under Law, the tulip mania in ,Amsterdam and the South Sea 
bubble in England were eras of a s wild speculation as the 
railway mania and were much more disastrous in their consequences. 
vVhen the shares of Law's bank declined and the South Sea bubble 
burst all money values represented in those elements of 
s peculation were destroyed beyond repair. Wild as was the 
l. Si mon Sterne,Railway s in the United States,l912 pp .3Q- 35 
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railway speculation, the railway, the subject matter of 
the 13peculation, still remained. 
Every country which has allowed the railway to be built 
by private enterprise has had its share of speculative ventures 
and speculative prices. Railway building has certainly 
fostered a class of unscrupulous operators as well as tricky 
and reckless railway officials, who found larger profits in 
the share market, and more rapid means of achieving great 
fortunes, than in finding capital for railwayc construction, 
or honestly and efficiently administering the railway properties 
and trusts in their hands. Absence of governmental supervision 
as to stock capital of railways has caused the placing on the 
money markets of the world of a vast quantity of fictitious 
values, not representing actual construction in money value, 
but possible value to result from the development of traffic 
and anticipated profits in the way of dividends. This 
condition invited governmental supervision. 
It must be admitted that, but for the inducement held 
out of very large profits through the instrumentality of 
fictitious capi talization, many of the newer territories of 
the United States would have been unsupplied by railways. 
However, that was no justification for fictitious capitaliza-
tion , which is an evil of such great and wide-bearing 
consequence that it were better if railway building were 
somewhat delayed than to allow it to come into existence under 
such conditions. The absence of governmental supervision 
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over capitalization allows individuals or corporations to 
devise whatever scheme t h ey may think best to enhance 
profits in conducting doubtful enterprises, and results 
inevitably in railway management r egarding no interest 
except that of the promoters and capitalists. 
MANAGEMENT_ 
Cornelius Vanderbilt was t h e first of the great s pecialists 
in American transpor tation. There is no adequate biography 
of this striking fi gure but he is generally pictured as a 
somewhat vulgar i ndividualist who recognized no law and no 
right but his own. Throughout his life he followed his 
custom of doing, in s pite of all obstacles, whatever he had 
set out to do. Before entering i nto t he railroad field he was 
engaged in coastal shipping . To indicate the type of business 
man he was when he found himself i n trouble with the Nice.ragua 
Transit Company in 1853 is best illustrated i n the letter he 
(1) 
wrote to them: 
"Gentlemen:- You have undertaken to cheat me. I won't 
sue you, for law is too slow. I will ruin you. 
Yours truly, 
Cornelius Van Derbilt 11 
Putting another fleet of steamers to work , in t wo years he 
had the opposi.ng lin e in a bankrupt condition. 
So this is the type of man who became interested in the 
Harlem Railroad in 1862,buying the common stock all the way 
1. Grass and Larson,Casebook in American Business History,l939 ,p.363 
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from ten dollars up to par. Some New York Aldermen and 
I 
their supporters who believed t hat they were "in the lcnow" 
sold this stock 11 short 11 • Vande~bilt kept on buying Harlem 
I 
stock until he owned the entire l 110,000 shares. He forced 
settlement at $179. a share, thu/s making millions while· the 
politicians and their associate:s were ruined. 
I ( 1) 
Vanderbilt's rules for man'aging a railroad were: 
I 
1. Buy y our railroad I 
2. Stop the stealing that went on under the other 
man · I 
3. Improve the road ih every practicable way within 
a reasonable expen~iture 
I 4. Consolid~te it wit~ any other road that can be 
run with it economically 
5. Water its stock 
1 6. Make it pay a lar§e dividend 
In the f all of 1863, Vandejrbil t began to buy Hudson I. 
River Railroad common stock at ~;25.a share and within six 
months time he was forcing the 11 shorts 11 to settle at ~t2 85. a 
share. He then put ~l>2,000,000 1of this money into the New York 
Central and soon obtained contl ol of that road. 
i In 1867 Vanderbilt turned his attention to the Erie 
Railroad, wh ich was largely con trolled by Daniel Drew, who used 
I his position as treasurer to ex,ploit the road. It was not 
I 
I 
long before Vanderbilt had a virtual corner on t his stock. 
Drew, Gould and Fisk had sold 111short "· To ward off ruin, 
I 
I 
100,000 shares of new stock wer,e signed in blank and deposited 
in Drew's offi ce. Then Drew ordered an employee to transfer 
I 
the books of stock to another o'fflce. On the way he was way-
laid by Fisk, and the stock was: taken and thrown on the market. 
1. Gras and Larson, Casebook in American Business Hi story,l939 ,p.363 
-6-
Vanderbilt and his supporters kept on buying. Fisk remarked, 
"if this printing press don't breakdown, I'll give the old 
hog all he wants of Erie." When things had somewhat settled, 
Vanderbilt though still solvent was behind six or seven 
millions. The conspirators, Drew, Gould and Fisk were arrested 
and later compelled to pay ~~9,000,000 to the Erie as restitution 
for the amount their activities had cost the road. 
Then Vanderbilt hastened to dilute the capital of all 
his roads, thereby almost doubling his previous wealth. Eighty 
per cent was added to the estimated value of the Hudson River 
( 1) 
Railroad and 107 per cent to that of the Central. . He continued 
to extend his railroad empire by taking over the Lake Shore 
and the Michigan Southern in 1873. At the same time he obtained 
a charter from the legislature authorizing the erection of a 
Union Depot at 4th.Avenue and 42nd.Street,New York City,giving 
him the use of the avenue thence to Harlem for a series of 
underground or viaduct tracks conducting into the heart of the 
city the trains of the Central,Hudson River, Harlem, New Haven 
and Boston lines. 
In the ten years from 1863 to 1873,Vanderbilt thus pieced 
together many independent lines into one continuous system 
from Chicago to New York City. Vanderbilt, the Caesar of 
railroads, can best be pictured by the following remarks at a 
director's meeting. Once, observing that a Central director 
had not voted for a certain proposition which had been under 
l.:McClure 1 s Magazine, November,l908,pp.46-62 
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considerati on, he asked the reason why . 11 Don't you know, 
Commodore," hi s friend replied, 11 that each and ever y one of 
t hese transactions is absolutely forbidden by the statutes 
of the State of New York?" My GodJJohn, 11 said Vanderbilt," 
y ou don't suppose y ou can run a railroad in accordance with 
(1) 
the statutes of the State of New York,.do y ou?" 
CAPITALIZATION 
The relative scarcity of capital in the United States, 
i n face of the stupendous task of opening up a continent to 
settlement, has always affected both the development of 
transportation enterprises and the method by which they have 
been financed. European capital has consequently been of the 
utmost importance in the creation of the American railway net. 
The dearth of domestic fur1ds i n the early days and the phenome-
nally rapid growth of 0 1.1.r transportation system rendered us 
peculiarly dependent upon foreign markets for many years. 
The demand for capital after the close of the war of 1812 
was very great. This capital was obtainable from two distinct 
{2 ) 
sources, domestic and foreign. Approximately one half of the 
capital of the Camden & Amboy, the ·first railroad monopoly 
in the United States, seems to have been obtained from En glish 
sources. According to the message of President Van Buren in 
1840, some two hundred million dollars in all was borrowed 
from abroad. 
1. Gras and Lerson, Casebookin .t\merican Business His t ory 7 1939 , p .368 
2. Quarterly J ournal of Economics,Vol.XVlll,l902pp.lll-163 
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A new period of British and :B.uropean interests in American 
railroads followed the discovery of gold in California in 1849. 
Mr. John M. Forbes of Milton, Massachusetts writes in 1854 
that four-fifths of western railroads, begun since that date, 
were directly due to that event. Eastern financiers promptly 
took advantage of this encouragement and appealed to Europe 
(1) 
fo1 ... money. 
The Illinois Central Railroad is unique, perhaps, in 
the continued interest of foreign capitalists. This road, 
from its inception in 1851, was for rnany years actually controll-
ed abroad. In 1876 not less than 86 per cent of its stock was 
thus held. So much Dutch capital was invested in the Chicago & 
Northwestern Railroad in 1869 that a foreign representation 
of two directors was given on its board. Amsterdrun was quite 
heavily interested in parts of the Northern Pacific. Many 
bonds of the Erie Railroad were also held in Europe. But the 
excesses of Jay Gould and his followers in this road undoubtedly 
con tributed to the sharp check upon investments from abroad 
(2) 
in- American railroads in the early '70s. 
As indicating the predmninance of European capital in 
the •90s and the extent to which it had dropped by 1905, 
the followin g table is significant; 
1. Oberholtzer,Jay Cooke-On t he Northern Pacific,Vol.llpp.l83,343,378. 
2. Yale Review, Vol.lll,l898,p.324. 
Illinois Central 
Pennsylva nia 
Louisville & Nashville 
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New York , Ontario & Western 
New York Central & Hudson H.ive r 
Reading 
Great Northern 
l3al timore & Oh io 
Ch icago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Per cent of Foreign Stock 
1890-1896 1905 
65 
52 
75 
58 
37 
52 
33 
21 
21 
21 
19 
7 
12 
9 
3 
2 
17 
6 
Th e acuteness of t h e panic of 1893 and its protracted 
after effects were considerably accentuated by these foreign 
(1) 
investments in American railroads. Liquidation from abroad, 
both of stocks and bonds, assumed enormous proportions during 
1 893. However, the phenomenal outbreak of prosperity in t h e 
United States in 1 898 mark ed a turning point both in our 
financial and railroad history. Within comparatively few years, 
a larg e proportion of our American railroad securities were 
repurch ased from abroad. 
The first railroads ln the United States were b u ilt from 
t h e proceeds of subscriptions to capital stock. All of the 
s maller roads radiating from Boston were thus financed. The 
Boston & Lowell issued no b onds for twenty years. The Boston 
& Providence, constructed in 1 84 9 , issued bonds after a time 
a g gregating about one-fourth of its capital structure, but 
by 1 8 65 had practically extinguish ed t h is mortgage i n debtedn ess. 
Nearly t h ree-fourths of the entire capitalization of the Boston 
& Al bany u p to 1908 was still stock. These conditions are all 
vesti g es of t h e earlist prac t ice in railroad fi n ancing i n t h is 
1. Yale Review, November,l900. 
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part of the country. Elsewhere nru.ch the same policy prevailed 
at the outset. The Baltimore & Ohio was largely financed by 
stock issues. The share capital of the Lackawanna road in 
1854 was double its mortgage bonds. In the United States in 
1855 the capital stock of all its railroads exceeded the bonded 
(1) 
indebtedness by forty two per cent. 
OPERATION 
The House of Morgan's first large operation in railroad 
finance was in the sale of New York Central stock in 1879. 
They arrru1ged for the underwriting of 250,000 shares of the 
stock by a syndicate composed of J. S. Morgan & Company, 
August Belmont & Company, Morton, Bliss & Company, and Jay Gould. 
Th e shares were purchased from Wi lliam n. Vanderbilt at 120 
and were sold in London at 130. The affair was re garded as a 
11 grand financial operation11 and it gave J. Pierpont Morgan 
and the Morgan houses a strong position of leadersh i p in 
railroad finance. 
The next big operation of the Morgans was in the Northern 
Pacific Railraod. This road turned to New York for funds to 
build its line from the Missouri to the Pacific Coast. ·The 
result can best be shown by quoting from a statement of 
(2) 
Drexel, Morgan & Company .: 
"The largest transaction i n railroad bonds ever made in 
the United States has just been closed by Messer. Drexel, Morgan 
& Compan~,Winslow, Lanier & Company,and August Belmont Company, 
l. Gephart,Columbia University Studies,Vol.XXX1V,l909,p.l68 
2.Commercial & Financial Chronicle, December 4,1880 
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they having made a contract with the Northern Pacific 
Railroad Company for $40,000,000 6% gold bonds having forty 
years to run." 
].iorgan 's next step was to take the leading hand in 
reorganizing and refinancing some of the tottering railroads. 
These were the Reading, the Baltimore & Ohio, and the Chesapeake 
& Ohio. The reorganization of the Philadelphia and Reading 
came in 1886-1887. Thus was put together, through these 
transactions, a strong system of roads which reached from 
Ch icago to Newport News. 
By t hi s time the Morgans were recognized far and wide as 
conservative forces working for peace and harmony and i n creased 
(1) 
confidence. These early Morgan recapitalizations did not 
necessarily mean a great scaling-down of the capital or even 
of the fixed capital charges; they generally simplified the 
capital structure, however, increased the stock as compared 
with t he bonded obligations, funded the floating obligations, 
and provided work ing capital and reserves. Morgan reorganiza-
tion plans also worked in general for more efficient management 
and for the establishment of better relations with competitors. 
Beginnine in 1888, with the necessity of reorganizing 
many bankrupt roads, Morgan followed the policy of securing a 
strong influence in the administra tion of the roads, or as it 
was then called, through Morganization. (2 )The first attack was 
on the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul by the London Morgan 
L.Commercial & Financial Chronicle, February 11, 1888 
2.Carl Hovey:The Life Story of J. Pierpont Morgan:l912, p .l39 
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house which received de posits of the shares of English 
stockholders i n order to concentrate in themselves repre-
sentation on the board, for the control of the property in 
the interest of h onest and eff icien t railway management .. 
That wa s i mportant to the Morgans, whose clients were 
heavily i nvested i n t he Mi ddle West where t here was a constant 
( 1) 
sta te of railway war; 
The situation among western roads in 1888 was well 
described by Charles Francis Adams, then president of the 
(2) 
Uni on Pacifi.c: 
''The railroad system of this country, especially of the 
re gion west of Chicago, is today managed on principles 
which unless a change of heart occurs, and that soon, 
must i nevitably lead to financial disaster of the most 
serious kind. There is among the lines compos i ng that 
sy stem an utter disregard of those fundamental ideas· 
of. truth, fair play and fair dealing, which lie at the 
foundation not only of the Christian faith, but of 
civilization itself. Great corpor~tions, 6ne aft er 
t h e other, have contracted the madness, and have built 
hundreds of mile s of road, almost paralleling ea ch other. 
In many cases they have actually paralleled each other 
a cross wide tracts of country in which no human being 
lived. This is true in Vfisc onsin, Minnesota, 1Jebrask a 
and Kansas. Then followed a depth of railroad morals 
among frei ght ·agents lower t han had even previou sly 
existed, and t hat is s ay ing much. The dishonest methods 
of rate-cutting, the secret systems of rebates, the 
indirect and hidden payments made to influence the 
course of traffic, resorted to o~ devised during the 
last two years, I do not h esitate to s ay are unprecedent-
ed in the whole bad record of the past. 11 
Mr. Adams advocated s e tting up group responsibility 
throu gh t h e action of t h e railroads t hemselves, but public 
opinion def initely stood in the way . The next move, he 
t hou ght, would be the formation of railroad systems of 
20,000 miles each, under one common mana gement. 
-----------------------------------l.Cow~ercial & Financi al Chronicle, October 6 , 1888,p.401 
2 . Address on the Interstate Commer ce Law, December 15,1888 
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Under J. P. Morgan's leadership, Drexel, Morgan & Company, 
Brovm Brothers; and Kidder, Peabody &: Company late in 1889 
issued a circular invitation for a conference of railroad 
presidents to form an association for enforcing the Interstate 
Commerce Act and maintaining rates. However, the first effort 
on the part of the bankers to secure coordination on a large 
scale failed. Then :Morgan 1 s opportunity came with the panic 
of 1893, which precipitated the failure of many railroads 
inherently weak from the results of bad management and 
destructive competition. Morgan had charge of or was concerned 
in the reorganization at the time of the following roads: 
Richmond & West Point Terminal 
Reading Railroad 
Erie Railroad 
North ern Pacific Railroad 
Balt imore & Ohio Railroad 
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad 
Th e Morgan reorganizations followed a general pattern~ 
1. The finances of the road were put on a sound basis, 
with lower fixed charges and a capital stock large 
in relation to bonded indebtedness. 
2. The structure of the roads was greatly simplified by 
consolidation. 
3. By means of voting trusts the Morgans retained control 
for sometime after reorganization, and after the voting 
trusts had expired Morgan representatives were usually 
found on the boards. 
4. With a nucleus of the roads in which he had a powerful 
influence, Morgan extended cooperation based on 
community of interest. 
The first of Morgan 1 s reorganizations at this time led 
to the organization of the Southern Railway. The addition of 
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the Central of Geor gia and the placing of the ~~nagement 
under Samuel Spencer made the Southern the strongest system 
in the South. One commentator, whose judgment has wei ght, 
(1) 
stated: 
"The welding of such unpromising railroad material, 
built . to sell rather t han to operate, in the most 
unpromising territory in the country for a railroad 
was one of t h e noteworthy achievements of .American 
railroad h istory." 
While participating in these reorganizations. rtor c;an 
became strongly interested in the New Haven road in New Engl and. 
He had been elected i n. 1891 to the road's board, \'lhich already 
had as members such strong representatives of New York interests 
as Chauncey Depew and William Rockefeller. It was a t this 
time t h e New Haven began to absorb other New England railroads, 
steamship and trolley lines. This was undoubtedly More;an•s 
greatest mistake. The Morgans felt t hat the policy ori ginally 
outlined by Charles Mellen, whom they nominated head of the 
system, was primarily at fault, and Mellen blamed himself 
for doi ng (as he claimed) as he was bidden by Morgan. It 
may be pert inent to note that the theory behind the New Haven 
sy stem was that New England was, in terms of transportation, 
a region not of long hauls but of short hauls, and t herefore 
almost completely a t er minal proposition. Obviously, high 
prices were paid for many purchases, but Morgan expected 
the profits of the combination to carry h i gh fixed charges. 
l. E.G. Campbell, 11 The Reorganization of' the .American Railroad 
Sy stem, 11 pp .149-150. 
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Though Morgan was strong in his own field of f inance, 
he had a weakness which reacted against him. He had ne glected 
public relations. Like most business men of his generation 
he considered business simply as private enterprise, and he 
did not have the temperament to see -that in a democracy business 
must have re gard for the voter. Before he died in 1913 he did 
make the remark that American business must henceforth be done 
in glass pockets. 
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F'RAUD 
The i mmi n ence of financi a l abuse i n connection with c on-
stru c tion by inter-re lated corp ora tions is well illu strated 
by the unllapp · experience of the Hampden Hai lroa d i r;. 1 913 in 
( l ) 
Massachuset t s. A short c onne c ting link between t h e Boston 
& i'Jain e system and the New Ha v en l ines to New York for summ.er 
passenge r traffi c to s e a s h ore r e s orts i n north ern l\}"ew Engl a nd 
was desired . Po r this pur p ose about fif teen miles o f road 
was built out of Springfield. '11hi s work was d on e for the so-
c a lled Hampden Railroad b y the Woronoco Constructi ?n Company , 
t he Boston & biaine p lann ing to guarantee the i n terest on t h e 
bonds and 5 per cent on whatever C8.pi t a l stock it was necessary 
for the Hampden Railroad to issue in order to finance the 
enterpri s e. 
One Gillette, ch osen by t h e president of t h e New Haven 
road, which the n controlled the Bo ston & Maine, was selected 
to put through the pr o ject. He first organized the Ha mpden 
Investreent Company , whi ch took t h e entire cap:l tal stock of 
t h e railroad corp ora tion of t he same name. This c oncer n t hen 
n e gotia t ed loan s upon t h e deposit of t h is rai lroad s t ock as 
collateral. The same individual 11 who w9, s t h e Hampde n Ra i lroad 
c orporation '' t h e reupon entered in to an a gre ement with hi s own 
personally c onducted c on struction c ompany t o d o · the work . 
This con c ern was t o be ~aid u~on t he c os t · p lus -10 per c ~nt 
I:Eaiiway Age, December 23, I939. 
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cominission as profit for its services. Eo adequate super-
vision was apparently exercised by the principal railroads, 
either as to the conduct of the work or its ultimate cost. 
The c onstruction c omp any i mmediate l y sublet the contracts 
for building the road for about two-th irds of t he price 
generally a greed upon with t h e Boston & Maine. Its a ctual 
service c onsi sted l ar gely i n securing the right of way, 
profits ran as h i gh as 40 per cent in addition to its 
guaranteed 10 per cent. Obvious l y under this general arrang e -
ri1ent the gr e ater t h e a ctual outlay , the greater the profit 
to t h e construction company . 
No better premium on reckless expenditure or downri ght 
fraud could wel l h ave been devised . The final result is 
significant . Des p ite the fact t~at t h is was a single-track 
line with no equi pment and n o terrninals , the outlay was a pproxi-
n ateiy $ 2 50 , 00 0 per mile . The averag e capitalizati on for t h e 
railroads in the Bnited S tates and even the other roads in 
JV!assachusett was a b out ::;;60 , 000 . Ot h er railroads built about 
t h e same t ime for the heaviest traffic t hr ou gh rug ged country 
and in the most perfect way, including al l appurtenances, t lle 
Virginian and the Ce.rolina, Clinchfield & Ohio , for example, 
( 1) 
cost only around ;(;;120, 000 per mile. 
Th e vvh ole e p isode illustrates t h e dan ger incident to inter-
locki ng directorates . 
1. Railway Age, December 23, 1939. 
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CHAPTER II 
CAUSES OF RAILROAD FAILURES 
SUPERFICIAL CAUSES 
One of the most significant criticisms advanced by 
the Austrian school against the classical economic theories 
of Mill and Cairns was that economic values cannot be isolated 
from their setting, but on the contrary, are superimposed on 
psychological values. Nowhere is this truer than in the 
matter of business success and failure, for, after t he most 
exhaustive and illuminating analysis of economic causes, there 
must stand out always the fact that a business fails because 
the managers do not possess t he necessary intuitive skill, 
foresight, initiative, perseverance, and intellectual power 
t o compe~ its success. Any discussion of economic advantages 
or disadvantages must be subordinate to the conscious recogni-
tion of personal characteristics. 
FUNDM~ENTAL CAUSES 
Yet, recognizing fully these psychological conditions 
leading to failure, one may still speak of fundamental economic 
causes, in the sense of economic conditions which will, under 
the leadership of any but a business genius, ~ead to failure. 
These four are: excessive competition, unprofitable expansion, 
a change in the public demand for the commodity, and the 
distribution of capital as ostensib~e profit. 
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REASON FOR RAILWAY FAILURE 
1. Overexpansion 
2. Overcapita~ization 
3· Fraud 
4. Internal dissention (l) 
In a remarkably keen analysis of the Rock Island 
Railroad 1 s financial dis tress, wri t .ten when its reorganization 
was a matter of pub~ic discussion, Theodore Prince states 
four causes for the bankruptcy of railroads: 
l.Decrease in earnings owing to decreased efficiency 
or decreased business. 
2.Increase of fixed charges at a rate more rapid 
than the increase of earnings. 
3. Undermaintenance. ( 2 ) 4.Unfortunate investments. 
The rates a railroad may collect bear no immediate 
relation to cost. Social and economic conditions require 
that the road be operated even though there is no return on 
tne investment. As far back as 1915 a large proportion of 
the passenger trains operated by the New Haven did not pay 
their expenses. Their cost, in 1915, per train-mile for all 
trains, was $2.07, without taxes or fixed charges. At that 
time only 15 % of all their passenger trains paid their pro-
portion of the total operating costs of the road, provided 
that it may be assumed that train operating costs may be 
evenly distributed. Even if' this is not accepted and the 
train-mile costs for the frei ght and passenger services are 
separately computed, it is improbable that half the passenger 
trains on any large, widely extended road pay tno direct costs 
(3) 
of operation. 
l.Ripley,W.Z. Railroad Finance & Organization p172, 1915 
2.Moody's Magazine, August 19lb 
3.Statistics from an address by Howard Elliott at Norwick, 
Connecticut, April 8,1915 
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In a careful study of the causes of the railroad 
failures of 1893, Simon Sterne mentions as particularly 
important the inability of the country to develop sufficient 
railroad entrepreneurs to manage the large number of roads. 
UNPROFITABLE EXPANSION IN RAILROADING 
The influence of' unwise expansion was more potent 
than that of keen competition even during the decade before 
the panic of 1893. When the Northern Pacific passed into 
the hands of receivers, the 'road was facing an annual loss 
of over $1,500,000, caused very largely by its unprofitable 
branch extensions. It has been suggested that these unpro-
fitable branch lines are necessary for a large railway in 
order to develop traffic. This is nonsense. 
The Atchinson, in its foolish 'expansion from 18~4 
to 18~8, illustrates the principle clearly. In the former 
year with 2,800 miles of line, the road made net earnings of 
$2 ,600 a mile; in the latter year with 7,000 miles of line, 
it earned only $700 a mile. It earned bi % on its total 
outstanding bonds and stocks in 1884, only 2i % in 1888. 
The failure of the Reading in 1880 was due directly 
to the purchase, at a cost of $'(3,000,000, of coal lands 
valued at the time at$30,0UO,OOO, and the receivership of 
1884 to the lease of the Central Railroad of New Jersey, 
which guaranteed a dividend of b% on its stock when the 
interest on its bonds was not earned. Subsequent events 
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have shown that the Reading's coal lands are of almost incal-
culable value, but the point is, the Reading could then ill 
afford the capital expenditure, no matter what the real value. 
The Reading's failure of 1e93 can be traced to the burdens 
of the Central New Jersey and Lehigh Valley leases, together 
with wild speculations in the stocks of New England railroads;. 
so that each of the three failures of the Reading can be 
attributed, unhesitatingly and without a sus picion of doubt, 
to unprofitable expansion. 
The most conspicuous railway failure around 1914 due 
to unprofitable expansion was that of the New Haven system. 
Brushing aside for the moment all the secondary causes that 
led to one of the most unfortunate and unnecessary failure 
of railroads, the primary fact stands out that the New Haven 
Railroad itself was ruined by the insane craze of' its bankers 
and directors so to extend its sphere of control as to embrace 
a monopolistic system of transportation covering all of New 
England. 
Much has been written by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, by bankers, and by railway experts concerning the 
causes of the plight into which the New Haven system was 
driven in 1914. The whole case resolves itself, in the 
opinion of Mr. Dewing, into very simple terms. Prompted by 
the apparent success which the Reading and other railroads 
had attained in securing to themselves a form of transportation 
monopoly, the director s and bankers saw in the compact area 
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of New England 3.n opportunity to create a monopoly of a very 
hig h degree of organization. No price was too heavy to pay 
if the object could be attained, no temporary sacrifice, too 
great. Monopoly, however, could not be obtained. Economic 
laws could not be set aside. As a result, the integrated 
parts, which could produce a revenue on their purchase price 
only on the basis of' a monopoly, became burdens ratner than 
sources of revenue. 
Sustained by the hope of ultimately securing monopoly 
profits and thereby justifying the outlay, stimulated b y the 
surreptitious profits obtained by its directors, and oy the 
ease with which it received credit from New England investors, 
the road plunged headlong into a series of expenditures which 
embraced tra ction companies, steamsh ip lines, connecting rail-
roads, even gas, light, and water companies, until the leg iti-
mate profits from the railroad were more than offset by the 
losses on the outside enterprises. Thus in 1899, on a total 
cap italization of $80,000,000 including bonds and stocks, the 
com pany earned, above operating expenses and taxes, almost 
$10,000,000 or a pproximately 12 % on the capitalization. 
Tn is was be fore any outside operations were undertaken. 
In 1914 after the completion of the policy of expansion, 
the total outstanding cap italization had increased to i 417,000,000 
--not including over ~ 20,000,000 subscribed to cap ital as stock 
premium-- while the railroad mileage stood at exactly the same 
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figure. the net income available for interest and di vi.dends 
on capital had increased to ~~21,500,000, but that was only 
· on the outstanding stock and debt-- less than half what it 
was before the period of outside speculations. 
In brief, during the 15 years between 1899 and 1914 , the 
railroad mileage of the New Haven system was not increased. 
Yet during t hat period, invested capital became five times as 
great, and the net earning s only .twice as great. 
The year 1892 was one of the most disastrous in railroad 
h istory, and roads alt over the country were approach ing fail-
ure. Yet , the New Haven , with t h e possible exception of the 
Pennsylvania, was in the strongest financial position of any 
i mportant railroad in the country. In that year the New Raven's 
net earning s after taxes were ~!i 3, 000,000 on a total capi taliza-
tion of just $25,000,000 --th ink · of . it, 12 ')b on the capitalization • . 
The law of diminish ing returns finds a clear illustration 
( 1) 
i n t h e following table: 
1892 1 899 
After Completion of 
Railroad System 
1 91 4 
Before 
Extensive 
Leases 
but Before out sid e Completed 
Mileag e 
Stock 
Bonds 
Total cap ital 
Total net earning s after 
taxes 
Percentag e e arning s on 
capitalization 
~~>2 3' 37 5 ' 000 
2, 000,000 
25,375,000 
3 , 223,965 
12;t 
I~terest ch arges $ 80 , 000 
Rentals and losses on 
leases and guarantees . 
Surplus ava ilable to stock 
Pe~centage earned on stock 
981,684 
2,162,281 
g al ;O 
Expansion s Structure 
2 ,TT47 2, o46 -· 
~54 , 641, 400 ~180, 017 ,000 
25,836 ,200 237 , 2 9 5 , 254 
80,477;600 417,529 ,186 
10,014, 817 21 , 529 ,186 
12% 5 -·f (.:, 
.!L 1,111,071 ;H; 11,839,722 
4,537 , 875 9,420, 802 
4 , 465, 971 
8/~ 
268,862 
1/10 of l Jb 
l. Dewi ng, A., f~inancial Policy of Corporations . . Third Edltion, P .l092 . 
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A remarkable analysis of the causes of a railroad 
failure is contained i n the summary of the Heport of the 
Interstate ConMerce Conwission to the Senate on the last 
I 
receivership of the St. Louis and San Francisco Rai lroad: 
11Y'i11.i le the Frisco was . compelled to borrow funds from 
every available source, it continued the policy of 
advancing money to companies in Texas. The difficulties 
of the Frisco were of a financial and not of an operating 
character. Its troubles may be attribu ted to dispro-
portionate capitalization; acquisition of new lines; 
financing by Frisco of the New Orleans, Texas and Mexico 
:i~ailroad and other south Texas lines; assumption of 
h eavy fixed char ges in the acquis i tion of the stock of 
t he Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad; t he sale of 
its securities at prices so low a s to i ndicate a deplor-
able weak ened credit or an extravagant arrangement 
with blli~kers to whom large profits accrued i n the 
purchase of the b onds and the subsequent sale of the 
same to the public; miscellaneous causes, among which 
are the payment of dividends upon t h e preferred stock 
in spite of its weak ened credit and need of money, poor 
investments and expensive rentals which are t he invest-
ment in the New Orleans Ter minal Company stocl{ , in the 
Terminal LQmber Company and rental paid the Crawford 
:Mining Company. It appears of record, through state-
ment s secured from the St. Louis Union Trust Company, 
s yndicate manager for the syndicates that financed the 
c onstruction . of a number of properties which were sub-
sequently sold to the Frisco, and which statements were 
in part supported by the testimony of witnesses, that 
a number of lines acquired by the Prisco were purchased 
by t hat company at prices which afforded large profits 
to the syndi cate subscribers and trust companies. Arnong 
the subscribers to t h ose syndicates were various officials 
of t he ' Frisco, including B. F . Yoalnrr.1, Chairman of the 
Board of Directors, as well a s officers of t he St . Louis 
Union Trust C or.1pany . 11 
Mr. B.F. Yoakum defended his position by s aying 11 I have 
endeavored t o be a builder, and to aid in the creation of 
wealth for the country into which the Frisco lines have been 
pro 4ected. Land values along the line from Houston to Brm'l.rns-
ville have increased from about $2 an acre in 1901 to from 
Interstate Com .. merce Com.rr.Li s si on , R~port to Senate , ppl 7 -1 8 , 
October .1938. 
- 25-
•"' 25 t 
·9 0 $150 per acre in 1913. The same can be said of 
Okl ahoma. 11 Al l t h is was true enough, but nei ther Mr. Yoakum, 
nor anybody else, can bu ild r ailroads for t he sweet char ity 
of boosting land va l u es and have t h e roads remain out of b:==mk-
ruptcy . 
EXCESS PAYMENTS OP CAPI 'l~AL CHAl}_GES 
The fourth of t h e group of f undamenta l economic causes 
of f a ilure is entirely f i nancial. I t is t h e payment of ex ces s ive 
i n terest or di vidends due, sometimes, to a mi staken belief in 
t h e profitableness of t h e enterprise. At other t imes, the 
payment of i nterest or dividends in excess of profits cannot 
be j ustified by any theory, and can be called no t hing short 
of fraud. The most obvious k i nd of misrepresent a tion is the 
overs tatement of earnings i n order to present an accounting 
j ustifi cation for t h e payment of unearned dividends. The rea l 
justif ica t i on is some ulterior motive, such as a vindication 
of a ba d mana gement, t he maintenance of the market price of 
a company 's stock , t h e maintenance of the legality of t he 
company 's b onds among s avings banks, or t he sale of b onds at 
a h i gher pr i ce t han actual earnings would justify. The New 
Haven and Bos t on and Ma i ne have both been guilty of pay ing 
unearned dividends because a suspension of dividends would 
debar further issues of their bonds from Massachusetts savings 
banks. The Chicago, MilwmllHo; e and St. Paul Ra ilway, in order 
to market its securitie s in 1911, under favorable earnings 
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records, fictitiously increased its earnings for t h e previous 
year, jQst a matter of bookkeeping . Another case, that of 
t h e old Erie Railroad back in 1872-1875 earned $1,008,775, 
but its directors represented the profit to be ~~ 5 ,352,573, 
on the basis of which dividends were paid on t he preferred 
and cornrnon stock s. :Meanwh ile, :;jj6, 000,000 of bonds were sold. 
The same story could be told a b ou t the Baltimore & Oh io from 
1888 to 1 895. 
Alth ough the failure of the St. Louis and San Francisco 
Railroad in 1913 was due primarily to unprofitable extensions, 
it wa s a ggravat ed, in no s mall measure, by the payment of 
excessive charges on the securities of the Chicago and Eastern 
Illinois. Th e weakness of the Toledo, St.Louis and Western 
Railroad, which passed i n to t he hands of receivers ir1 October, 
1 914, was due to t h e excessive capital charges resulting from 
t h e burdensome charges of the Chicago and Alton Railroad. 
No doubt the New Haven 1 s plight was a ggravated by the 
fact that from 1910 to 1915 t h e dividend payments every year 
e~ceeded the profits available. No sufficient excuse for the 
mi stake can be found in the desire to protect the small investor 
or in t h e h ope of: maintaining the company's credi t among saving s 
banks. Continual payment of interest or dividends in excess 
of earnings can h ave only one outcome, however successful 
t h e policy may a ppear to be for a sh ort period. 
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WHY RAILROJI..DS GO BR OKE 
In 1916, American railroads employed 1,600,000 persons. 
In 1 938 , that n~~ber h a d shruruc to 9 00,000. But in 1 9 38 the 
total pa y roll of the roads was ~~2 9 4, 000,000 more than it was 
22 years a go. Hi g..11.er scales a ccoun.ted for the greater portion 
of t h is charge, but penalty wages for work not done at all 
was responsible for a large part of it; 
The records of the Interstate Commerce Commission s h ow 
t h at last year the roads paid $120,000,000 for 17,000,000 
days on wh ich no work was done. Most of this went to the 
train and engine men who belong to the labor unions which 
have t h e power to enforce t h eir demands. Their numbers last 
y ear averaged 220,000. The roads paid t h e m $. 86,000,000 for 
days on which they did nothing . 
To illustrate how the se things are done would require 
detailed and rath er dreary exp l a nations of h ow t h e complicated 
r u les would op erate. Two instances may be cited. A road 
a b olished a switch ing yard as no longer needed. The yard 
crew went elsewhere. In 1936 t h e unions came before the 
railroad adj u stment board with a claim for penalty dama ges 
to be paid t hat non-existent yard crew for six years of time 
not worked. For this"deprivation" t h ey claimed pay for 
125,000 day s. In the end, the _ case was settled for $200,000. 
A pi•inciple was established wh ich has compelled many roads to 
continue to operate obsolete yards. 
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Again, there are the starting time cases so-called. 
If a crew is called for duty an hour in advan ce of the usual 
tLrce, the men must be paid on the basis ,o f a minimum day at 
time and one-half rates. Thus an engineer on a western road 
was paid full wages for 485 days and then collected penalty 
time so that he actually received in the wages for 1212~ days. 
Ridiculous, of course, but it's all regular under the 
rules and the decisions of the adjustment board. Thi s is called 
a court in the law. It consists in equal numbers of represen-
t atives of the roads and the workers, and a referee is called 
in when they are deadlocked, as is very often t h e case. The 
proceedings are held in privacy. 1rhe public are taboo, says 
Garet Garrett in his informative article in the Saturday Eve-
nin g Post, and he finds t hat with amazing regularity the referee 
decides for labor. 
Vvhy should not the roads appeal to the ordinary courts? 
If an award calls for a money payment, why not refuse to pay 
(l) 
and let the unions sue. They simply threaten to strikel 
APPEALING TO SELFISH. IHTEREST 
The management of the raiLroad industry has failed in 
almost every effort it has made for years to improve the con-
ditions and results of the industry • . The s pecific objective 
of such effort has been maintenance or increase of net earnings, 
but net earnings have steadily continued their generally down-
ward trend~ They have been much smaller during the decade of 
l.The Boston Herald, September 8 , 1939. 
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the depression than during the preceding decade; smaller 
during t h e second five years of the depression t han during 
the first five years of it; and smaller thus far in 1939 t han 
in any preceding year of the depression excepting 1 932 and 1 9 38. 
The average price of industrial stocks as reported by Dow-Jones 
is 65 ;6 lower than ten years a go; but the average of railroad 
stocks, according to the same authority, is 86 % less. 
Defensive Measures alone will never win a war. 
Such a record of failure in any industry, business or 
activity obviously calls for changes in personnel or meth ods 
or both. If methods, the use of which persistently results 
in failure, are not 'changed, that proves t h ere is something 
wrong with personnel. , Vfuat, then, is wrong with the methods 
of the railroad industry that chronically causes them to result 
in failure? It is primarily the job of management to e;et t h e. 
answer to that question, because it is the job of management 
to manage, and ascertaining the rea·sons for failure is always 
an i mportant part of managing. However, I venture to hazard 
the view t hat the methods and policies of the industry in deal-
ing with the public and labor have b een so ineffective princi-
pally because, first, t h e industry has not appea1ed often and 
effectively enough to the selfish interest of those people who 
should have supported it, and, second, its policies have been 
too largely defensive and not largely enough offensive. It 
has not initiated enough demands or fought hard enough for 
t hose it has made. 
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It is inconceivable that the American people would 
permit present conditions to continue in transportation if 
they realized the harm these conditions are causing t o their 
well-being. Railroad people have s pent too much time talk ing 
about the injustices done to the railroads and not enough 
sh owing specifically how these inju stices to the railroads 
injure former railroad employees, the farmer, the small business-
man and others not connected with the railroads. 
~1~en people hear the story as it usually has been told, 
they say: 11 V:Jha t a shameJ 11 and i mmediately revert to t h inking 
about their own troubles. Nor is the public's action surpris-
ing or blameworthy, because most of them have plenty of troubles 
of their own~ Besides, if they have s pare t ime or emotion to 
devote to oth er people 's worries , it is not l ikely that t h ey 
will be d irected to the plight of the railroads as long as 
the country has millions of unemployed. It must, by now, be 
clear that the political evils ~l. ich beset the railroads are 
not going to be righted unless and until a substantial majority 
of the American people are brought around to the view that the 
present conditions are hurting t hem and, once realizing t his 
factor, bend every effort to correct these conditions. 
\Vhen the public realizes railroad situation hurts t hem, 
they will correct it. 
Over 150 years a go, Adam Smith vvrote that it was not the 
benevolence of the butcher and the baker to which we look for 
-31-
ton i ght's supper, but to t heir regard for their ovm selfish 
i n t er e.st. That obs ervation amounts to an economic law. If 
we want people to act to our econ omic adv~Dtage, we have to 
show t hem t hat such action will be helpful to t hem. Just on e 
more generality , but an i mport ant one. Your individual farmer 
or sh i pper or school teacher does not respond as quickly when 
you a ddress your sales talk to farmers-in - general or s h ippers-
i n - general or school teachers-in-general. You have to get in 
to his mind a conviction that he as an individual has a vital 
interest at stake in t he situation you are t alking about. 
For example, suppose you say:"Mr.Vfueat Farmer, we rail-
roads are charging you more than we want to for taking your 
wheat to mar ket. We don't like charging you so much, any more 
t han y ou like to pay it---because, quite apart from t he f eel-
ing of neighborly good-will, we realize that the h i gher the rates 
are on your basic cr op, the less mon ey you will have l eft to 
spend; and when you spend less money, f ewer goo ds move into 
your local stores and f ewer purchases from your stores me fu~ 
less frei ght traffic f or us. You ought to h ave lower rates--
but there are several serious obst acles which prevent our 
giving them to you. We cannot r emove these obstacles, but 
you can." Then suppose you go on from there stating i n t h e 
simplest possible terms two or three specific points about 
government subsidization and. what Mr. Farme r can do toward 
its removal. 
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I am citing the foregoing, of course, merely as an 
example and am not thereby expressing the opinion either that 
wheat rates actually are too high or that they should be re-
duced, even if the railroads could afford to reduce them. 
But I do believe that an appeal just as direct as that can 
be made in all honesty to every occupational class in this 
country in behalf of removal of the handicap which now besets 
the railroads. 
Take this matter of government ovmership, for instance. 
It is usually mentioned in an angry tone, llke"Comrnunistl"--
and it has a certain superficial unpopularity. But, actually, 
do most Americans now have any really deep feelings on the 
subject--deep enough to cause them to do something drastic 
to prevent it? There are many people who are too intelligent 
to be taken in by mere umpopular labels--people who ask what, 
after all, is really so terrible about government ownership. 
Of' course, they don't think much of the idea--but how disastrous 
would it be, after all, to them? Other countries, they say, 
have it without going to rack and ruin. 
Vfuo are the present enemies of government ownership? 
Signif'i6antly enough, the most important body of public 
opinion outside the railroad industry in this country which 
is deeply and irreconcilably opposed to government ovmership 
is composed of i ndustrial traffic managers. Most of' them do 
not oppose government ovmer·ship from lofty principle, but 
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from the purely selfish desire to contin ue playing off one 
railroad ag ai nst another to win concessions for which they 
will get credit. r.rhese same men oppose wholesale consolida-
tions just as vehemently and for the same r eason. 
In short, the only real die-hard enemies of g over nment 
ownersh i p are and will be persons who are fully awake to the 
i nportant selfish interest the y have in the main tenance of 
private ovmershi p . If t his observation is accurate, t hen the 
only way to arrest the present swift drift toward government 
ownersh ip is to awaken the recognition of a sel f ish i n t er est 
in private o1vnership, and in policies necessary to pres e rving 
it, in the minds of all who actually have such an i nt er est but 
do not know it. 
I ma not here suggesting dishonest propaganda, but simply 
a presentation of the facts r egarding the different way s in 
which the various classes of the people would be affecte d by 
government ovmership . Aft er all, it is no diss ervice to a 
man to t ell him t hat his house is on fire when it is on fire. 
The flrst job to be done, however, before people can h e 
shovm h ow govermaent o~mership is going to hurt them, is to 
convin ce t hem that the threat of such an event is serious. 
Govern.111ent ownersh i p to most people is a hobgoblin who has 
been talked about fearfully for so long that the scare has 
worn pretty t h in, and many are beginning to refuse to be 
frightened at the mention of his n~1e because they doubt his 
existence. This hobgoblin must be turned into a re al live 
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person who can be seen and heard before most people are going 
to be convinced that he can harm them. 
Public favors private ovmership but not the means for 
preserving it • 
. The American peoj_)le have willed in favor of prl vate 
ownersh ip of railroads, but they have not willed the r.1eans by 
which private ovmership may be maintained. The one and only 
means by which private ovmership of railroads or any other 
private business can be maintained is profits adequate to 
a t tract private investment capital and the railroads can-
n ot make adequate profits under the competitive and labor 
c onditions to whi ch they are now subject. Consequently , t h e 
railroads have n ot for more t han ei g',ht years been able, excep t 
in a few isolated cases, to attract any such capi tal,except 
for rolling stock which remains the property of the lenders 
until it is paid for; and their physical p lant is steadily 
wearing out n ore rapidly than it is being replaced. 
Government ovmersh ip ~nay come much s ooner than anybody 
now anticj_ pates unless prompt and realistic steps are taken to 
avert it. The first of t h6 se steps should be to arouse all 
p ersons wh o would be victimized by such a development to a 
r ealization of cond itions. But t h is is not s oing to be done 
by t h e railroad industry c ontinuing a publicity policy of 
telling the b old truth about t h e c onditions with wh ich it is 
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confronted, de:oanding t he improvement of these conditions and 
proving to the most concerned classes of the people th~t it 
is to their selfish interest to help railroad management im-
prove these conditions. 
Government operation in t he last Wf:'.r: 
Already there is s ome talk in Washington to the effect 
that government operation may have to be adopted. r:J:lhe plain 
fact is that there cannot develop any good reason for it; 
that there was not a sol.Uld reason for its adoption during the 
last war; and that , in fact, its adoption proved one of the 
worst mistakes made by the Wilson administration. It caused 
no increase in the traffic handled, or improvement in the way 
it 'Nas handled , that could not have been better accomplished 
under continued private operation; and it caused much lar8er 
increases i n operating expenses and larger deficits than 
probably would have be en incurred under private operation. 
In the year 1917, during which this country was in the 
great war, but the railways . were still privately operated, 
our railways handled 37 ~S more freie;b.t traffic than the three 
years b efore in the year ended June 30, 1914--just before the 
war began in Europe-- with an increase in operating expenses 
over 1914 of only 38 %. In 1917, they handled 8 %more traffic 
than in 1916--their previous record year--with an increase in 
operating expenses of 20 % . But in 1918, the first year of 
government operation, while they i n creased their freight 
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traffic that they handled only 2 %, they increased their 
t . 41 d opera 1ng expenses ~ · Under continued g<;>vernment operation 
in 1919, after the war had stopped, they actually furth er 
increased their operating expenses 417 million dollars, al-
( 1) 
though the tr•affic handled by them declined 10 ~~- . 
One more illus t ration: The amount of traffic the rail-
ways handled under government operations in 1 919, t h e year 
after t h e W[).r ended, was almost exactly t he same as t h ey han-
dled under private oper ation in 1 916, the year before this 
country entered the vmr, but their operating expenses in 1919 
were 87 ~~ ' or over 2 b illion dollars, tu.ore t h an in 1916. With 
t hese facts re garding t heir wartime experience with government 
railway oper ation staring t hem in the face, it is plainly 
in t he i n terest of the American people for them to be on the 
alert to oppose any tendency toward even consideration of 
government operation and to insist that everything necesss.ry 
to prevent it shall be done and done promptly. 
l. Boston Herald -.,September 8 , 1939. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEM OF REORGANIZATION 
The Courts take the attitude t hat a railroad, an electric 
ligh t plant, or a gas plant supplies a public necessity, and 
that the rights of the public come before the wishes of the 
stockholders or even the debts of the creditors. 
The Court may even issue securities in t he name of its 
receiver whi ch take precedence over the claims of every cred-
itor. It may decide which creditors' claims shall be paid 
and wh ich shall not if it is necessary to safeguard the inter-
ests of the puhlic. 
Reorganization may be said to consist of the rehabilita-
tion of an insolvent business through the adoption of a new 
financial plan. W • . z. Ripley describes reorganization as "the 
financial readju stment or settlen1ent necessary for the restora-
tion of peace and order, generally through the re-establish-
ment of a proper eauilibrium between income and outgo. 11 
A. S . Dewing says that a definition of railroad reorganization 
is:"A comprehensive change of the financial plan, necessitated 
by impendingor a ctual failure, such that the fixed char ges are 
reduced and new money supplied through the sacrifices of 
security l1.olders. 11 In c ommon usage the term i mplies a redraw-
ing of the financial structure of a corporation in consequence 
of threatened or actual i n solvency. 
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TRE REORGANIZAT I ON OF RAILROADS 
The practices, conventions, and guiding princip les, 
both le gal and financial, governing the reorganization of 
railroads have been more firmly and definitely established 
t h an. t ho se c ontrolling the reorganization of any oth er t y pe 
of corporation. VJhen t h e government assumed control of the 
rallvvays of the country, January 1,1918, both the theory and 
the detailed working out of the financial rehabilitation of a 
bankrupt railroad were clearly understood. 
Con temporar y practice covering the reor ganizati on of 
both s raall and large railways has grown u p in direct res p onse 
to t l:1e needs of a rap idly building national railway s y stem, 
not always balanced and n ot alway s financially sound in parts. 
Moreover, lik e the railway net itself, the present p r a ctices 
c oncerning financial reorganization pertain to the period of 
construction and development, the p eriod of the gradual dawn 
u p on our intelli gence of the i mportance of railway transporta -
tion, vvi th the accompanying pangs of our political and social 
consciousness in adjusting themselves to the rapidly ch anging 
economic organization that t h is i mportance demanded. Our 
financiers h ave had no h istorical or transatlantic precedents 
to guide them; h owever t h e development of the theory and 
practice of railroad reor ~anization is one of the mos t 
- ~ 
ori ginal and remark a b le achievements of American bu~iness 
genius. 
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TWO STAGES I N REORGANIZATI ON 
Alth ough the period of r eorganization is frequently 
long extended, it is usually possible to distinguish two 
distinct stages. The first is the diagnosis of t he cor-
porate malady, represented by t h e period req·uired for t h e 
investiga'tion and isola tion of the causes that led to the 
financial disaster. The second is the reorganization proper , 
i n which some pl an is a greed u pon and finally carried into 
execution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCEDURE OF RAILHOAD R80RGA1UZATI ON 
MOTIVES GOVErlNING THE PROCEDURE IN Rli'ORGA!HZATIONS 
Three separate and often antagonistic sets of motives 
govern the procedure to be followed in rallroad reorganizations . 
The most i mportant and usually tlJ.e least a pparent is concerned 
with the human or psychological elements. Most people over-
look the interplay of human motives, ambitions, antat:;onisn s 
and friends hips that underlie every fina,ncial e pi ,sode of 
importanc e . Financial philosophies of all philosophies are 
leas t amenable to matters of human emotion or sentiment . Like 
economic laws they are ruthless and immutable . In the sou nd 
r e organization of a railroad system, cert a in general principles 
are to be borne in mj_nd and adherence to them can s afely 
( 1) 
disregard all matters of personal motive or ulterior objects. 
A corporation is r eorganized by men, not pur.~pets; its 
office rs, its c reditors, its s e curity ho lders, the attorneys 
and judges are not mere think ing ma ch ines, but ordinary men, 
subject to human emoti ons and weaknesses. First then, the 
p rocedure must be such as to allay, not a ggrava te, the friction 
incident to the conflict of personaliti e s. The second set of 
motives governing r eorganization procedure is economi c. Leases 
must b e continued or abrogated, contracts rewritten, rights 
enforced or surrendered, in accordance with the s ingle questi on--
Is it p rofitable? No railroad can be permanently successful 
and serve the public well which does not pay its opera ting 
l.Frince, T. ,, Moody 1 s i\1agazine Au gust 1916 p.409 
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expenses, including fair wg.ges to its employees, with ade.quate 
u pkeep of its road and equipment, and in addition a fair rate 
of return on the invested capital. The reor ganization proce-
dure must recogniz.e this simple economic i mperative. The third 
set of controlling motives is legal and judicial. Lawyers are 
apt to exaggerate their own i mportance and the significance 
of their legal machinery in determining the form and details 
of reorganization procedure, forgetful that a reorganization 
is primarily an adjustment of human motives and economic condi-
tions, circumscribed rather than determined by the law. 
EVENTS I MMEDI ATELY PRECEDING FAILUHE 
A railroad failure, invariably due to deep-seated, slow-
acting causes, may often be postponed or qu ickened at the 
discretion of the people in i mmediate control. At all events, 
when the financial and operating conditions of the railroad 
reach such a pass t h a t a crisis seemsinevitable to the manage-
ment, it tak es one or both of two steps-- the organization 
of protective committee s and the petition for the a ppointment 
of a receiver. 
FORTviATION OJ:t' COiviiviiTTEES 
The organization of protective committees is more i mpor-
tant t han t he receivership proceedings, representing an objec-
tive confession of underlying and controlling economic and 
financial troubles. The committees arise from two different 
sources-th e stockholders and the creditors. Invariably t here i s a·t 
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lea st one stockholders' committee, usually dominated by the 
old dire ctors of the corporation. This connnittee acts on the 
d efensive. Throughout the whole course of the r eorganizati on 
proce edings the s tockholde.rs 1 connni t t ee nms t explain and justi fy 
the pas t management and haggle with the otner cormni ttees in 
re gard to the extent of the s acrifies whi ch the old s t ockholders 
must undergo in order t o r: r eserve an interest in the pro posed 
reorganization or even r egain control of t he railroad. 
Simultaneously with the failure of the Chi cago, Hock Island 
and Paci f ic Railroad in June, 1933 , t he directors, wno re pres ent-
ed directly upwards of 50 % of t he con~on stock , au t hor ized the 
formation of a stockholders 1 prot ective com ..'Tii ttee to proc e ed 
with t he f ormulation of a plan of readjustment. 
There may be comt"'11i tte es of the jtmior bondholders , of the 
senior bondholders, of the branch and divisional line bondholders, 
and of t he bondholders of subsidiary lines or term1nal propert i es 
con trolled t hrough leases or operating contracts . The committees 
of the holders of t:qe floating deb t a re usuall.Y formed and dominat-
ed by the large bank creditors. The co~nittees of bondholders 
are f ormed and dominated by the investment bank1ng houses whi ctl 
were responsible f or the ori ginal sale of the bonds to the publi c. 
If t he bonds were distributed long ago, prominent trust compani es 
or life insurance companies may assume the guiding role. 
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The committ e e or committees representing the floating 
debt , the junior bonds, the notes and debentures inva riably 
stand antagonistic to the committee of stockh ol ders. They 
i n sist that the junior creditors endure as little sacrifice 
as possible, a n d that t h e .full brunt of the burden or re-
or ganization fall on the stockholders . If the lin es covered 
by the senior liens are strategically i mportant for the unity 
of the railway system, t h ese committees will be C8lled u pon 
to t ake little part i n the reor ganization. If they a re re-
quired to fund t he ir bonds u nder new first and genera l mort-
gages, they will be in a position to prescribe the condi tions 
which the j un ior bondholders must accept. 
In the older reorganizations, there were more committees 
than at the present time. Before the Union Pacific reorganiza-
tion had been accomplished back in 1 895, no less t h a n fifteen 
committees had been formed. There were committees representing 
t h e first mortgage bonds, the consolidated mortgage bonds, the 
collateral trust 5s , t h e collateral trust 4i s, t h e Oregon Rail -
way and Navi ga tion consolidated bonds, the Dutch bondh olders, 
t wo committees each for the Kansas Pacific c onsolida ted bonds 
and the Denver extensi on bonds, a joint committee of foreign 
bondh olders 3 and variou,s c ommittees representing branch l i ne (1) 
bonds. The tendency now is to have few con~ittees but to 
have t h ese few representative and responsible and to endow 
them with considerable p ower. The various classes of h old ers 
l. Daggett , s., Railroad Reorganization, Chapter VII,l908 . 
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of debts and securities nm'l organiz e themselves into as many 
conuni t te es as there a re substantial equitable inter es ts in 
the r ai lroads, but no mo re. A duplicat ion of conuni ttees , 
representing t h e same i nt erests and differin g only in personnel, 
is frowned u pon by the courts and a cts 'merely as a brake on 
t h e c ourse of the reorganizati on . Duplication invari ably adds 
to the cost of t he r eorganizati on, as one or anothe r corr.uni tte e 
will wi th-draw only if its expenses 81d liberal fees are assumed 
as reorganization expenses~ The effectiveness and res ponsibility 
of coumilttees will vary directly as t h e runount of autho r ity 
vested in them. 
It facilitates matters very much if the i mportant comrni ttees 
agree among t hemselves to permit the f ormation of a general 
reorgani zation conwit tee upon which re presentatives of the 
different committees serve . Rot onl y does such a general 
c ommittee tend to ease t he tension and remove misunderstandings, 
but also it mruces possible a unified and broad policy of investi ga -
tion du ring the period i mmediately f ollowing t he fai l ure , and 
it . does away with unnecessary public discu ssi on and .wrangling 
over succ essive p lans of r eorganization. Such a general con1mlttee 
assumes the burden of prepari ng a pl ruL of r eorganization in t e e 
i n t erest, ostensibly at least, of i mpartial justice. 
There are v ery distinc t res ponsibilities atta ched to 
memberstlip on important reorganization committees, even though 
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their f'orn1ation is entirely a matte r of i nvitation and a utual 
a greement. These res ponsibili ties have been di stinctly 
increased by the implications, at l east, of' the Secur iti e s Act 
of 1933. During t h e earl :i..e r periods of reorgani zation history 
membersr1ip on protective conm1i t t ees wa s a p rivi lege att a ch ing 
itself to the ownershi p oi' a considerable block of securities, 
the value of wt1i ch had been placed in jeopardy by the financial 
cris :i. s. In consequence,important committee s were often made 
up of men of little i n telli gence or familiarity with .finance . 
At the present time, however, the custom is to have well k nown, 
hi ghly r e s ponsible men chosen more bec ause of t heir n a ti onal 
reput a tion , t heir acknovvl ed ged integrity, proved wisdom and 
financial exp erience, than because they own or control a c onsijer-
able amount of' securities. In the bondholdcr·z prot ective 
committees of the largG railroads which have failed since 1933, 
rep resentatives of' lif"e insurance companies have been dominant 
(1) 
rather than representatives of bank ing houses. The plan of' 
r e organization finally agreed u pon by men of acknowled ged 
res ponsib i lity and expertness will receive public a pproval 
much more readily than a plan advanced by men of little prominence . 
As soon as each committe e is formed, it organizes itself, 
selecting one member to act as chairman . Great care must be 
taken that the conm1it t e e members, particularly the chairman, 
s hall b e fre e fr om part i ality, else the court may permit a 
duplication of commit t e es, thus impeding the reorganization . 
I n the negotiations preceding the reorg~'1.ization of the 
-------- ---l. Douglas.w. O. l';r;ot ective Committees in Railroad. . Reorganizations, 
ZJ:' Harvard Law He vi e ',; 565 February 193<±. 
-46-
Ch icago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, the president of 
the trust company, who was trustee of the . bonds upon wh ich 
the foreclosure suit was based, had been chairman of the 
bondholders' committee. The court cons idered this a dual 
position, and permitted a minority bondh olders' committee 
(1) 
to intervene, thus creat:Lng unfortunate complications. 
A legal counsel is also chosen by the committee and some trust 
coupany is asked to receive t h e deposits of securities under 
a g eneral a greement according to t h e terms of which the committee 
is emp owered by those de positing their securities to act for 
them and in their stead. The powers conferred on the committee 
by this deposit a greement are very general, and the tendency 
of recent y ears is to enlarge them. In fact, the committees 
are trustees for the de positors under their a greement, acting 
with all t h e p owers p ossessed by the owners separately and 
with the additional p owers that their majority control involves. 
REORGANIZATI ONS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING 'rO LEGAL PROCEDURE 
The chara cter and the significance of the legal aspects 
of a reore anization depend, very largely, on wheth er or n ot 
a receiver is a ppointed to administer the affairs of the 
railroad during the period between the financial crisis and 
t h e final consumatlon of t h e reorganization. This, in turn, 
dep ends on wheth er or not there ls lil{ely to be prolonged 
disputes among the various security h olders, and wheth er or 
n ot a recalcitrant group of security h olders ' is likely to try 
l.Central Trust Co., V.C. R.I. & P.R.Co., P21 8 Fed.336 1 914. 
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to impede or even frustrate an amicable settlement of 
conflicting i n terests. Since large railways embody many 
conflicting interests and usually have burdensome lea ses 
and contracts which must be abrogated at all hazards, then 
receivership or baru{ruptcy proceedings are necessary in most 
cases. 
The following classification, depending on legal sanctions, 
is possible for reorganization: 
1. Voluntary, without receivership. It is rare for large 
railway systems. The Atchison reorganization of 1889 is one 
of the infrequent cases of a voluntary thorough going reorganiz a -
tion of a large railway system consumated without receiversh i p . 
In 1925 there was a reorganization of the Boston and Maine 
Railroad of this type, qui te :unusual in recent railroad financ ial 
history. rorthermore, in January 1940 this same Boston and 
Maine Railroad is attempting to establish a precedent in re-
organizations by offering a new plan for voluntary action. 
2. Voluntary, with receivership. This t ype has been the 
usual form of voluntary reorganization runong railroads. The 
Baltimore and Ohio reorganization of 1899 is a good illustrati on . 
3. Involuntary, with rec ei vership , the ordinary form. 
This type has been t he accepted· one in the past f or not only 
the railroaU..::; b'J.lt also industrials and local public utilities. 
4. Involuntary, vdth trustee in bankruptcy. With the 
a pproval of t he holders of a t_ leas t two-thirds of the creditors 
a plan devised or approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
may be i mposed on a non-assenting minority. Through a series 
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of decisions the practice of the equity courts was leading in 
this direction before the passage of the enabling act of 1933. 
The advantages of a voluntary reorganization of a railroad 
over one following a foreclosure and termination of the old 
railroad corporation, aside from the greater economy, lie 
chiefly in the preservation of the intangible values of the 
old charter. The ori ginal railroad was incorporated years 
b efore, when railroads were e iven more liberal charters and 
before restrictive le gislation had curtailed their corporate 
powers. An old and liberal charter, or merely a specially 
useful provision for one, has often been considered so valuable 
that it has appeared cheaper in the end to pay off a recalcitrant 
group of minority security holders than to eliminate them 
through a foreclosure sale involving the forfeiture of the 
charter. 
PROCEDURJ~ PRIOR TO SECTI ON 77 
Formerly, that is pr :l. or to the enactment of section 77, 
when railroads fell into financial difficulties, the procedure 
was somewll.a t along the following lines. A general creditor, 
at the suggestion of a railroad company, filed a bill on behalf 
of himself and all other c r editors a gainst the company in the 
proper United States Circuit Court, praying t hat for reasons 
alleged in his bill the Court should aruninister the assets of 
the defendant and appoint a receiver pending the suit. The 
company simultaneously filed an answer alli~tting the allegations 
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and joined in the request for a receiver, which the courts 
practically always granted. 
Since many railroads operated through several State 
and Federal Jurisdictions, the necessary preparations were 
always made to ask that the same receivers be appoint ed in 
these other di stricts under ancillary suits. The purpos e of 
such suits wa s to bring all the mortgaged and unmortgaged 
property of the company, wherever l ocated, 1-mder the protection 
of t he court in order to prevent creditors from seizing some 
of t he property in pursuing t heir legal remedies. When t h e 
interests of c r editors and stockholders really require a 
receiversni p , it is of t he utmos t importance , in order to 
prevent unfair preferences or interference with the operation 
of the road by seizure under attachments of rolling stock , 
that all necessary applications to the courts should be made 
as quickly and quietly as possible. 
"It is doubtless because of the doc t rine of Booth v Clark 
that t he practice has become general in the courts of the United 
States, where the pro perty of a corporation is situated in 
more t han one jurisdiction, to appoint ancillary receivers of 
the property in such separate jurisdictions. It is true that 
the ancillary receiverslups are generally conducted i n harmony 
wi t.tr t he court of ori ginal jurisdiction, but such receivers 
are appointed with a view of vesting control of p roperty rights 
( 1) 
in t he court in whose jurisdiction they are l ocated.'' 
l.The Supreme Court, U. S. 198 -561, 1905 
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vVhile formerly such proceedings were taken as a matter 
of course, the changing attitude toward the banking and legal 
profession tended to question t he morali~J of this me thod. 
Such actions were frequently described as collusion or even 
consp iracy. However, irrespective of t his collusion method 
which had b een disliked there was the distinct evil that the 
opera ting management in substantially all cases, and the 
financial mana gement at times, succeeded i n perpetuating 
itself through the receivership and beyond. This brought 
about the suspicion that management was endeavoring to en-
trench itself in order to cover up its past misdeeds, although 
in nearly all cases it was merely the customary desire in all 
walks of lii'e for continuity of salaries. Furthermore, most 
people think well of themselves, and are quite honestly con-
vinced that few others could fill their particular positions 
as well as they do themselves. Possibly this applies even 
more to positions which men have attained after decades of 
slow promotiop. 
As a matter of fact, disregarding financial problems 
entirely, the. operation .or· a railroad requires tb.a. t its 
operating head should have at least a superficial knowledge 
of the immense multiplicity of details pertaining to the 
physical condition of thousands of miles of track, repair and 
yard facilities, type and condition of equipment, personalities, 
strength and weakness of scores o f subordinate off icials, 
nature or traffic, personnel of large sh ippers, competitive 
conditions and many other similar facts. No doubt a very 
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efficient new executive cannot show any satisfactory improve-
ment over a mediocre one 1..1.ntil his second or third year in 
charge. 
The appointment of a receiver to conserve property is 
one of the s o-called "extraordinary remedies 11 allotted by our 
Anglo-Saxon law to th~ equity cour'ts. Such courts 11 will not 
lend their aid by the appointment of receivers when the persons 
seeking the relief have ample redress by the usual course of 
proceedings at law, or when the law affords any other safe or 
( 1) 
exp.edien t remedy~ 
The position of a receiver is very concisely described, 
"by means of the appointment of a receiver, a Court of Equity 
takes possession of the property which is the subject of the 
suit, preserves it from waste or destruction, secures and collects 
the proceeds or profits, and ultimately disposes of them accord-
ing to the ri ghts and priorities of those entitled. The 
receiver appointed is the officer and representative of the 
Court, subject to its orde~s, accountable in such manner and 
to such persons as the Court may direct, and having in his 
character of receiver no personal interest but that arising 
out of his responsibility for the correct and faithful discharge 
( 2) 
of his duties." 
In the early years before the panic of 1873, corporate 
mortgages were construed literally. In case of a default in 
bond interest, the trustee of the mortgage might acquire 
possession and management of the railway property, a s the 
l.High,J. L. A Treatise ~n the Law of Receivers, 16 
2. Beverl~y v.Brooke,4 Gratt 187,at 208,1847 
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strict construction of the mortgage instrument permitted, or 
a receiver might be requested at the instance of an antagonistic 
creditor. The details of the procedure were distinctly matters 
of accident, the only certain thing being a variety of suits 
and counter suits, all based on the desire of some faction to 
gain a temporary advantage through legal process. 
The old Hartford .and Connecticut Valley, in financial 
straits, was operated from July, 1876 to January,l878 , by the 
trustee of the second mortga ge bonds, and from January,l878, 
to July, 1880, by t he trustee of the first mortgage bonds. 
Another notable case was the Hartford, Providence and Fishkill 
Railroad. A transitional form between trustee management and 
court management of an embarrased corporation is the management 
by some public official. It is rare, but it has occured in 
New England. The Connecticut Central Railroad was surrendered 
to the State Treasurer of Connecticut in April, 1880. 
Crowell calls the transition from trustee management to 
receivership in cases of financial distress 11 the history of 
the evolution of responsible management in an entirely new 
species of corporate enterprise, involving a unique complex 
(1) 
of interests individual and social." In these early railroad 
receiverships,there was invariably an actual, not merely 
fictitious,oyposition between the parties praying for the 
appointment of a receiver and the answer by the railroad's 
attorneys. The action was then, as now, usually initiated 
1. Crowell, J. F. Railway Hecei verships, Yale Revievvp330 1898. 
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by a creditor's bill, claiming that the means f or satisfy ing 
the creditor's claim was in j eopar dy . 
The early period ended, and what mi ght be called the 
strictly modern period of receiversh i p procedure be gan following 
the failure of the Waba sh Railway in 1884. As a result of 
the procedure in t h is connection t h ere was definitely established 
t h e pr a ctice of t h e so-called "friendly" or consent receiver-
sh ips for large railway corporations. Apparently well-establish -
ed principles of law, based on economic and social expediency , 
enable every company in O.ifficulty, which can find a non-
resident creditor, willing to act, to place itself in the 
(1) 
possession of a federal court receiver whenever it pleases. 
However, during 1932 when all corporations were finding grea t 
di fficulty in renewing or extending t h eir funded obligations, 
numerous cases occurred in which a single bondholder who had 
refused to consent to some plan of bond ex tension petiti oned 
a court for the appointment of a receiver, Almost i nvariably 
the court refused on the ground t h at j u stice to all required 
t ha t t h e corporation continue unembarrassed during the period 
of the emergency. 
The usual prac t ice in the con sent receiverships may be 
very briefly stated. The necessity or desirability of a 
rec eiversh ip having been a greed upon by the directors, usually 
in a secret meeting , some friendly general creditor, with a 
claim in excess of three tl1ousand dollars, not residing in the 
s ame state as that in which the corporation has its main office, 
l. Joline, A. H. Lectures, Harvard Graduate Sch ool of Business 
Administration,l909. 
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is asked to allow his name to be used in the receiversh ip 
proceedings. The receivers for the old New York and New 
En gland Railroad were obtained at two o'clock in t he morning 
for fear that a'ttachments would be placed on the company 1 s 
property the following day. The receivership proceedings of 
t he Ch icago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway, in April, 1915 
came suddenly and as a distinct shock to the business community. 
Th e contemplated action was known a pparently only to t h e i~Der 
circle of directors, one director going so far as to say that 
h e had been unaware t hat a receivershi p was being considered. 
There had been manipulation of the price of the stock irmnediately 
before t h e receiversh i p , and t h e price declined abruptly as 
(1) 
soon as t he failure became known. 
The attorneys for the corporation prepare the necessary 
bill of complaint to which the creditor complacently signs his 
name. At the same time, the attorney s prepare the corporation's 
answer which admits the allegations of the creditor's bill and 
prays for t he appointment of a receiver. The court grants 
the prayer and a ppoints one or more receivers. Subsequently, 
t h e trustee of t h e general junior mortga ge brings a foreclosure 
bill in t h e court of primary jurisdiction and the same receivers 
(2) 
are appointed as under the creditor's bill. One of the receivers 
may be an old official of the corporation familiar with the 
routine a dmi nistration whose name is suggested to the court 
at the time. The other receiver is a lawyer in wh om t he court 
has explicit confidence. For a statistical study of the 
1. Dewing, A.S. Financial Policies of Corporations, 1119 . 
2. Hi gh , J. L. A Treatise of the Law of Receivers, 73, 
Muller v. Dows, 94 u.s. 444,1876. 
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relative fr e quency of such appointments Swain considered 
approximately 150 receiversh ips, from 1867 to 1897. These 
covered the following appointments: old presidents, 80 cases; 
genera l managers, 25 cases; superin tendents, 17 cases; vice-
( 1) 
presidents, 16 cases. Beginning in 1933 a novel practice 
was adopted by the Federal Court of the District of New York, 
a ppointing the Irving Trust Company as receiver. This practice 
has everything to recommend it, because a large metropolita n 
trust company can easily develop a department admirably suited 
to carry on the business of receivership. The practice, however, 
did not become general, for the very simp le r eason that it 
eliminated the legal brethren from some of their most lucra t ive 
business. At all events, the court in its ownipotence is 
presuraed to supply through its a gent, the receiver, the omniscience 
to ma k e profitable a bus iness which has proved unprofitable. 
The recently established practice of having large railroad 
failures administered through trustee appointed by the bankruptcy 
court is hardly likely to establish a new order of business 
intelligence. 
In the receiversh ip of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific 
Railway in April,l915, Judge Carpentor of the Federal Court 
appointed two receivers. One was H.U. Mudge, former president 
of the road and an appointee of the Heed-Moore group, who 
were responsible for the mis f ortunes of the road; the other was 
J. !/I .Dickinson, a disti nguished lawyer, in whom the court had 
justif i able confi dence. The decre e provided that Mr.Dickinson 
· l. Swain, H.H., Economic As pects of Railroad Recc-ivers~1ip s, 
3 Economic Studies, p 53,1~9~ . 
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should have the deciding voice in case of any difference of 
o p inion. Sterne, an astute student of railroad finance, 
remark ed many years ago. "A railroad official, in c onsequence 
of his incapacity or mi sfortune or as the victim of a vicious 
system is a ppointed receiver by the courts a nd continues to 
earn probably a larger s a l a ry then he did as president. This 
( l) 
evil is a monst:cous one." Ripley remarked, twenty years later . 
"The anomaly of reha bilitation entrusted to the very same persons 
( 2) 
who had brought a bout the failure is d ifficult to defend. 11 
In Metrop olitan Railway Receiversh ip , 2oe u.s. 90,1908, the 
Supreme Court s ou ght to absolve the equity courts from any 
accusation of collusion. But the reasoning hides an obvious 
fact behind legal verbiage. 
As soon as the receiver of a railroad h as been appointed, 
he assumes the m~nagement o f the company. For permission to 
enter into or cancel i mportant contra cts, a receiver will 
usually seek the consent of the court; he must also obtain 
permission of the court in order to issue receiver's certificates 
and to expend larg e sums for the i mprovement of the property. 
PROCEDURE UNDER 77 
The enactment of Secti on 77 to the Bankruptcy Act aims: 
To place the Interstate Commerce Commission in a position to 
approve or to prepare a plan; to provide hearing s before it 
and the Court; to accelerate compositi on a mong security holders 
without permitting the collusion of management with creditors 
l.Sterne,S. ,Recent Rail r oad Failures and Their Lessons, 
17 Forum 31,1894. 
2.Ripley,W.Z.,Railroads, Finance and Organization,387,1915. 
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for purpose, and without going through the fiction of forec l osure 
and the expense of self-appointed bondholders' committees and 
control of or by such committees. 
Section 77 provides that the debtor corporation itself, 
or 5 % of the creditors, may come into court and ask for the 
appointment of a trustee or trustees, and that in the ca se of 
a Class I carrier, there must be either one trustee who has 
not had any previous connection with the management; or if 
there is more than one trustee, only one of the gr-oup may have 
been connected with the corporation within a year. The debtor 
must file a reorganization plan with the court of proper 
jurisdiction and the Interstate Commerce Commission within 
six months after the appointment of trustees, with authority 
to the court to extend this from time to time for periods not 
exceeding six months. Under this section, several plans have 
· been filed by debtors which have every appearance of being merely 
a perfunctory, although necessary, compliance with the law, 
without serious expectation of be coming effective. 
Reorganization plans may also be filed by the trustee or 
trustees or by or on behalf of not less than 10 % in amount 
of any class of creditors or by or on behalf of any class of 
stockholders~ being not less than 10 % in am9unt of any such 
class, or with the consent of the Commission by any party in 
interest. The Interstate Commerce Commission must then hold 
public hearings on any plan which may be submitted and report 
an order by which it shall approve a plan which may be different 
I 
-58-
from any which has been prop osed, which will meet witn the 
various requirements a nd be compatible with the publ ic interest, 
or it may refuse to approve a ny plan. 
Subsection D .of the Act, requires t hat any plan "be 
compatible with the publ ic interest," but fails to define what 
is me ant by pu blic interest. Heretofore t h is phra se in connec-
tion with a ny railroad meant t hat it should at all times be 
able to render efficient and economic s e rvice. Applying t h is 
well established principle to the public interest in a railroad 
reorgani zation plan, it should mean t hat the reorganized 
corporation should have a capita l structure with obligatory 
interest cha r ges so low that it is never likely to be compelled 
to let its property dete riorate by skimp ing its maintenance in 
order to meet obligatory interest charges, and that it should 
a lso be able to obtain additional capital to enable it to expand 
or modernize its property in order to c ontinue to g ive such 
efficient and economic service as may be justi f ied by a reasonable 
demand or made necessary by competitive conditi ons. Th is 
definition of public interest appears to be thoroughl y c onfirmed 
by the languag e of Subsection B. 
"A p l a n of reorgani zation within the meaning of t h is 
section ••• (4)shall provide for fixed charges (incl uding 
fi xed interest on funded debt, interest on unfunded debt, 
amortization of discount on funded debt and rent for leased 
railroads) in such an a mount that, after due cons ideration 
of the probable prospe ctive earning s of the property in 
light of its e a rning s experience and all other releva nt 
facts, there shall be adequate coverage of such f ixed 
charges by t J:'l o oroba ble e a rning s availa ble for the payment 
thereof. 11 \ l) 
l.Railroad Reorga n i zations and Section 77,Harvard Business 
Review, Auturnn,l9 37 p.31 
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At present, there is a strong tendency to widen the 
concept of "public interest" to cover a number of other 
t hings. Por example, in t his particular situation it appears 
to be i mplied that public interest refers to the interest of 
the scattered security holders, who have in the past in some 
isolated cases been badly represented by their protective 
committees or have not been adequately protected at al l , par-
tially owing to their own inertia or ignorance. The possibili-
ty of direct representation of the scattered small security 
holders, however, has been substantially annihilated by Sub-
section P of the Act, which makes it not only difficult to 
form protective commi ttees, but takes away the incentive to 
do so by making remuneration for any work accomplished extremely 
uncertain and very moderate at best. 
The actual result of this legislation is to encourage the 
accumulation at bargain prices of the securities of banlrrupt 
coinpanies by some investment trusts, private holding compani·es, 
and wealthy individuals who do not need the income. Such 
buyers can afford to pay for i nvesti gations on their own behalf, 
and, if necessary, to carry on prolonged litigation to protect 
t h eir own interest. In the meanwhile the small bona fide 
investor, and even the small speculator, becomes discouraged 
and sells. In the lingo of Wall Street, he is 11 shaken out." 
Comrni ttees have been 11 smearedli J to such an extent by the 
one-sided publicity in government investigations and publica-
tions, t hat even if they organize in accordance with Sub section 
P , t h ey cannot obtain the adequate public support to carry on 
effectively. No self-respecting persons of the kind required 
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for good committee work are willing to serve or assume any 
responsibility when they know they cannot do effective work. 
Nearly two-thirds of all railroad bonds outstanding, 
aggregating over $ll,OOO,OOO,OOO, are held by life insurance 
companies, saving s banks, hospitals, universities, foundations, 
etc. The sixty odd million owners of life insurance policies, 
the million of holders of fire and other types of insurance 
policies, t .he twenty odd million depositors in saving s b-anks, 
and those millions interested in other institutions as p ossible 
beneficiaries of hospital s e rvice, colleg e tra ining, scientific 
development, etc., never think of themselves as being interested 
in railroad securities, and therefore are completely dormant, 
i n sensible, and inert. They are permitted to be, and largely 
are, r epresented by the cooperati on permitted under Subsection P, 
(1) 
which reads that: 
"Nothing contained in this section •. should be construed ••. 
to prohibit groups of not more than 25 bona fide holders of 
securities or claims or groups of mutual institutions from acting 
together for their own interest and not for others through 
representatives or otherwise or from authorizing representatives 
of such groups to act for them in respect to any of the foregoing 
matters. 11 But the p lans put forward by groups of mutual. institu-
tions mostly .life insurance companies and saving s banks which, 
in many instances, r e present from 25 % to over ~0 % of entire 
issues have not thus far in a single case had the approval of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose o1"f1cials have insisted 
l.Railroad Reorganizations and Section 77,Harvard Busine.~~c 
Review, Autumn,l937,p 32. 
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on changing their status from .creditors to equity owners to 
a very much larger extent than the bondholders considered 
justified. · 
The interest ot the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
in many reorgani zations only changes the status of the matter 
in so far as this corporation, like other government bodies, 
is not in any particular hurry tor repayment and is very 
completely equipped with a legal staff. On the whole, it 
has shown a desire to be cooperative. 
The provisions of "the law which require the judge to direct 
trustees to investigate possible past dishonesty or mismanagement 
have thus far accomplished nothing other than to cause the 
bankrupt corporation and its former officials to incur a thus 
far undetermined but surely very large amount. for legal expense. 
There has been one recovery. In the case of the St.Louis- -
San Francisco a .large sum had been voted by the company before 
receivers.nip to the reorganization managers for expenses to oe 
incurred in soliciting support tor a reorganization plan which, 
however, did not become effective. Tne trustee obtained a 
refund of $1 '(5,000 on this account after some negotiations. 
Inasmuch as this was unquestiona bly i n the nature or a trust 
fund, recovery should have been certain even without Section 77. 
DELAYS I N RE ORGANI ZATI ON 
It was clearly the intent o1· Congress to expedite composition 
or prompt compromises among security holders, but by compelling 
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the filing of plans by debtors uefore there .was any meeting 
of minds among the various classes of security holders, it 
actually encouraged delays. Then the customary higgl ing among 
various interests is forced into open public hearings, with 
lawyers filling the record with their quite naturally-customarily 
one-sided arguments, with others hoping to benefit by strife 
beine permi tted to intervene, with competitors and labor unions 
being admitted on the highly elastic construction of the theory 
of public interest, the hearings and the record stretch out 
beyond any reasonable limit with consequent increased delay, 
costs, and disgust, without anything substa ntial being accomplished. 
Congress provided that after due hearings a reorganization 
plan shall be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
then referred to the court who is also to hold hearings; if 
and when confirmed by the court, the securities provided for 
and all the other provisions of the plan shall be authorized 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It necessarily was 
forced to tie in the Commission because of its relation to and 
experience with railroad affairs. But this bill tends to delay 
matters unnecessarily by shuttling creditors and stockholders 
to the Commission, then to the co urts, and then to the Commission, 
with ample time for notice of hearings c:md the customary adjourn-
ments. In the meantime, while situations are being dragged 
out, i mportant matters are not having due attention of either 
trustees, the court, or the Interstate Commerce Cownission. 
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A fair example is the issue of $2,736,000 Chicago & 
Eastern Illinois First 6s, which came due on October 1,1934. 
This issue is unquestionably good, and up to the date of 
maturity, interest was promptly paid. At about t~e date of 
the issue's maturity,a plan was promulgated before the Commis-
sion and the .trustee was somewhat short of cash; therefore 
the necessary order to pay interest on these bonds after their 
maturity was not entered. It was stated that the courtfelt 
that this whole situation was then up to the Interstate · Commerce 
Commission, while the latter claimed the payment of interest 
is a matter to be dealt with by the tr~stee and the court. In 
the meantime, the bondholders are not getting any interest at 
all, although the company during 1936 earned about ten times 
the required amount. Surely this particular issue, on account 
of the enormous equity back of it, was entitled to payment of 
cash at maturity. Under the former customary proceedings, when 
bondholders were in a stronger position to exercise their legal 
rights of foreclosure, the court would have autnorized the 
issue of receiver's certificates to replace them, or would 
have extended the bonds for a few years at a fair rate of interest 
with an option to the holders to get cash instead of the extended 
bonds. The fact that bondholders, no matter how g ood their 
security is, are not in- position to enforce t heir lien is 
certainly jeopardizing railroad credit and discouraging invest-
ment in railroad securities. 
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Quite recently, after the hearings on the Chicago & 
Eastern Illinois plan had closed, the Commission opened them 
again in order to admit a brief by a new government body 
The Bituminous Coal Commission. This brief alleges that the 
Chi.cag o & Eastern Illinois should not be part of the Chesapeake& 
Ohio System, although the bondholders consider it in their 
interest that this should be the case. It is claimed that if 
the road were independent it would ask that the rates on Illinois 
coal be lowered in competition with West Virginia and Kentucky 
coal located on the Chesapeake & Ohio. 
Other large carriers of Illinois coal into the Chicago 
market--the Illinois Central and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy--
undoubtedly would urge lower rates if they thought that their 
net earnings could be increased thereby, but thus far they have 
not been hea rd from. The matter of adjustment of coal rates 
between different coal producing districts has been a sore 
point which apparently never will or can be solved to the 
satisfaction of all parties concerned, although it has been a 
political issue in the states of West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, causing the defeat of one United States 
Senator at an election, the refusal to confirm a Pennsylvania 
man nominated to the Interstate Commerce Commission by the 
senators who were opposed to lowering coal rates from Pennsyl-
vania to the Great Lakes, and many other p olitical consequences. 
It i s part of the responsibilities of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to supervise the rate structure, but it 
seems quite puzzling why the security holders of the Chicago & 
Eastern Illinois should await the outcome of a battle over 
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coal rates which may last for years, if ever settled. The 
law reads: 
"After the filing of such a p lan the Commission, unless 
such plan be considered by it to b~ prima facie impracticable, 
shal l, after due notice to all stockholders and creditors, 
hold public hearings a t which opportunity shall be g iven to 
any interested party to be heard, and f ollowing which the (1) 
Comm ission shall' r ender a report." 
It seems to be a question of the interpretation of' the 
words, "interested party~ 11 The context would indica te that 
they refer to stockholders and creditors, but the words "interested 
pa rty" and ''public interest "seem to be capable of most indefinite 
stretching. 
Thus far, the only railroad which has been reorganized 
under 77 is the Chicag o, South Shore & South Bend Railroad, an 
unimportant interurban electric line, a nd tne Copper Rang e 
Railroad, a short line, owned by a copper mining company. In 
four ca ses--the Louisia na & North West; the Spokane International, 
and the Western Paci f ic-- the Bureau of Finance of the Inter-
state Cornmerce Commission has formula ted plans which are entirely 
unacceptable to the holders of the first mortg a ge bonds. In 
the meanwhile, the holders of the junior bonds and equities 
are hiding behind the Commission's skirts, trusting that more 
favorable terms may be wrangled out for t heir benefit. Whether 
the Commission will be more helpf ul than a de fi nite t h reat of 
l.Railroad Reorga nizations and Section 77, Harvard Business 
Review, Autumn,l937,p 35. 
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foreclosure at a fixed d a te in protecting the legal rights of 
holders of mortgage bonds in their respective order as a gainst 
each other and the holders of equities, remains to be learned. 
In view of t :1e imp roving earnings subsequent to 1932 
the holde~s of first mortgage bond issues of large systems 
like the Northwestern, Milwaukee, Rock Island, etc., were 
not desirous of forcing the situation but preferred to await 
hopefully further improvement of e a rning s, especially as in 
the meanwhile a larg e amount of deferred maintenance h a s been 
or is being made good. With the present outlook for increased 
operating costs, further increases in net earnings cannot be 
expected unless there is a chang e in the rate structure. 
I NTERSTATE COMMERCE C·JMiviiSSI ON CON'I'ROL OF REORGANI ZATION AND RATES 
If the Interstate Commerce Commission itself promulgates 
plans which are not acce p table to the requisite two-thirds of 
voting creditors and a majority of voting stockholders, its 
constitutionally doubtful power of forcing through a p lan with 
the cooperation of the court will be barren of resul ts, because 
such action would merely prolong litiga tion. However, it is 
very doubtful indeed whether the Intersta te Commerce Commission, 
as constituted a t present, with the high sense of responsibility 
of its individual members, would ever use this theoretical power 
of 11 force majeur"even i f a court should cooperate, which is 
equally improbable. 
The method of higgling between various committees and 
groups may not be ideal, but they have accomplished results in 
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this imperfect world more satisfactory than can be accomplished 
by compulsory government interference. On the other hand, it 
is quite true that a compromise which accomplishes its purpose 
need not necessarily be quite log ical, but such illogical 
solUtions by outsiders are always resented ·by squabbling 
mSmbers of a family or of a corporation. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission or its Bureau of Finance, 
in the documents thus far published in connection with 7'7 
proceedings, necessarily sustains and procla ims the seniori ty 
rights as to principal a nd interest of the va rious classes of 
creditors and equity owners, while it wabbles when it comes 
to the distribution of securities among tne parties entitled 
to them, as for instance in its treatment of the unsecured claim 
of the government against the Spokane International. 
The r a te structure and the financial structure of railroads 
are so interwoven that a few remarks on the former would appear 
to be pertinent here. While the Commission's prognostications 
as to future business and the necessity for rate increases may 
have averaged better than the prognostications of other govern-
ment bureaus, its average ha s not been good over the last 30 
years-- certainly no better than that of private corporations. 
Whenever railroads need a rate increase, the Commission 
seems inclined to l ook upon the future as hopeful. This may 
be due to the larger quantity of testimony by shippers or the 
poorer quality of testimony by the railroads, but the facts 
should l a r gely s peak for t hemselves. The Commission certainly 
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is in possession of all the income statements and balance 
sneets or t .ue railroads, with analyses of their accounts 
to the last moment. It also knows t .tmt all shippers are 
at all times opposed to rate advances. These long he arings 
in connection with rate changes witn the piling up of tens 
and hundreds of thousands of pages of testimony seem to the 
innocent observer grossly overdone. In 1912 the Commission 
guessed business was going to be better and the railroads 
would not need rate increases; however, they did. In 1920 
the Commission guessed that the western lines did not need 
as much of a rate increase as the eastern lines; time has 
shown this conclusion to have been grossly erroneous. 
Early in 1920, with tremendously increasing wages, it was 
known that rate advances would be necessary; however, t hese 
advances did not become effective until six mon ths later. 
When private management guesses wrong , it is at the expense 
of the stockholders who hold tne management respon sible. 
When the Commission guesses wrong, or delays unduly, it seems 
just too bad, but there is nothing anybody can do about it. 
When it is said that most of the securities which 
have "gone wrong" have been duly authorized by the Commission, 
it should also be kept in mind that such action was taken in 
many cases simply because the Commission felt it should not 
(l) 
interfere with the discretion of management. 
l.Railroad Reorganizations and Section 77,Harvard Business 
Review, Autumn,l937.pp.29-37 
-69-
I NVESTIGATI ONS SUCCEEDING RECEIVERSHIP . 
During this period, while the receiver is in actual 
control of the property, the various committees are at work 
seeking to find a substantial basis upon which to establish 
their plan of reorganization. This requires a knowledge of 
at least three sets of facts. First, they must ascertain 
by competent auditors whether or not the published re ports 
of the railroad in the years preceding the failure were 
approximately true. The audit must not only verify the 
technical correctness of the books, but it must also deter:-
mine whether or not all the equipment and rolling stock, 
claimed to . be in fit, usable condition, is actually in use 
or in fit condition. Expert traffic or operating men must 
study the traffic and operating conditions of the property 
su·bject to · the mortgages. The second set of facts is 
supplied by the attorneys, acting for the reorganization 
committee. They have to do with the countless legal matters 
resulting from the general tangle;what contracts may be 
safely abrogated a nd what contracts must be fulfil.led even 
at temporary losses, the amounts required to settle with 
parties holding contingent claims in order to forestall 
troublesome delays, the probable outcome of pending suits 
and the approximate expenses of the receiversh ip and reorgan-
ization. The reorganization committees must supply themselves 
with a third set of facts, and since among their members 
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are distinguished bankers, the members require no independent 
advice. These facts cover the general probability for the 
successful negotiation and sale of the securities of the 
reorganized company. The committees must assess accurately 
the predictable eff ect of the various provisions of their 
reorganization plan on the interests of the various p a rties 
involved. Sometimes the investigations of the reorganization 
committee involve the time element,and it is necessary to 
wait until the earning c apacity of the railroad, under the 
receiversh ip, h a s b e en fully t es ted. 
FORlVIATI ON OF THE REORGANI ZATI ON PLAN 
From the results of careful investigations the er.eneral 
committee works out a single reorganization plan which is 
based on the most accurate and comp rehensive knowledge avail -
able. No definite plan is advanced in haste. This calmness 
did · not a.lways prevail, for in connection with the three 
r e organizations of the Philadelphia a nd Reading Railroad 
there were no less than seventeen separate plans advanced : 
"Reorganization of lol::$2--6 plans 
Reorganization of 11::$1::$7--6 plans 
Reorganization of 11::$ 96--5 plans." 
The almost hopeless confusion of conflicting com-
mittees and conflicting plans which existed a t the time of 
these reorganizations were typical of the older railroad 
reorganizati ons. Since 190 0, however, the contemporary 
practice has been to leng then the period of preliminary 
investigation a nd adjus t.iilent, during wh ich time no reorganiza-
tion plan is published,and,so far as p ossible, to s h orten 
-?1-
the period of public discussion over the plan through a 
preliminary agreement on the part of a~l the influential 
interests to support the final plan as soon as it is publish-
ed. The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific, the St. Louis and 
San Francisco, the Pere Marquette--all of them reorganizations 
of railroads involving a multitude of conflicting interests--
were consummated ;·,i thout a pparent external friction once a 
definite and final plan had been agreed to secretly by the 
·v8 rious committees which represented the i mportant securities. 
(1) 
The most difficult and important step in the reorganiza-
tion procedure is to secure a complete outward harmony of 
all i mportant interests, so that all may work f'or the success 
of a common plan. All must make some sacrifices, except 
perhaps the senior bond holders. The determining power lies 
usually with the committee representing those securities, 
usually the junior mortgage bonds or debentures, of which 
some sacrifice is required, but which is, nevertheless, in 
a relatively secure position as compared with the holders of 
the floating debt and the stocks. In other words, the deter-
minati on of the plan is likely to be left to the factions 
wh ich must make sacrifices. Of these, the party makiP~ the 
least sacrifice will probably have the deciding voice. 
Out of the conflict of opinions and interests, a 
plan of reorganization is evolved which has the acknowledged 
support of' a~l the committees representing the conflicting 
interests. This plan is jpublished before the receiver 
l.The Boston Evening Transcript, September 24,1919. 
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surrenders the property, or even before the foreclosure sale. 
It is published with the recommendation of all the committees 
that it be accepted by the various groups of security holders. 
The latter are asked to become parties to the reorga nization 
agreement, which is the formal legal document that invariably 
accompanies the plan. The reorganization plan is the short, 
comprehensive statement of the financial side of the reorgani za-
tion; it is an easily understood document, free from legal 
verbiage, and intended for wide distribution. The reorganiza-
tion a g reement, on the other hand, is an elaborate le gal 
document. It covers the details of the plan, together with 
a full and exhaustive statement of the powers a nd limitations 
of the committee or c ommittees which will carry out the p~an, 
the rights of the assenting security holders, and a detailed 
account of t he machinery by which it is proposed to consummate 
the reorganization. 
The plan havinb been declared operative, t ,h e various 
contracts of security holders, syndicate subscribers, and 
debt claimants become binding. But the p~an may be subse-
quently modified, provided always that the modifications are 
acceptable to the c ontracting parties, and it may even be 
set aside entirely and a new plan adopted. Generally, when 
the plan h a s been declared operative, it indicates that the 
main adjustments have been accompLished and only the loose 
ends remain unfinished. These may require con siderable time, 
as the wheels of equity procedure move slowly, but to all 
outward intents and purposes the r e organization has been 
(l) 
consummated. 
l.Stetson, F.L.,Editor, Some Legal Phases of Finan cing, 
Reorganization a nd Re gulation, Pl7b,l9l7 
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The legal formalities · in regard to the execution 
of the reorganization plan are often very perplexing and 
depend largely on the attitude of the old security holders. 
If practically all the security holders accept t he plan, 
surrendering their old stoclcs a nd bonds, then no p ressure 
upon a recalcitrant minority need be exerted. There need 
be no judicial sale of the old corp oration's property, and 
no surrender of its cha rter. That was what happened in the 
(1) 
reorganization of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad i n 1e99. 
A complete adjustment with all the claimants and security 
holders is usually imp ossible. There are always strikers 
who will seek to impede the progress and try to create for 
. themselves a nuisance value,in hopes that the reorganization 
managers will buy them off at some f a ctitious price. To 
carry out the obvious will of the great majority of assent i n :_. 
claimants and security holders, Uill reorganization must be 
forced t.nroug.i:l and the dissenting minority settled wi ttl in 
a just and open manner fully approved by the court. This is 
accomplished by the judicial sale of the old corp oration's 
( 2) 
property through a decree of' foreclosure. 
The court, by approving of the c cnditions or the 
judicia l sale, may indirectl y force the dissenting minority 
to accept the plan of reorganization a p proved by the majority 
of security holders. But the court c a nnot directly force a 
security holder to accept a plan. This was t r : ed in one 
notable c a se , but the Urrited States Circuit Court of Appeals 
l. Moody's Railroad J.YUO 
2. Stets on, F. L., Editor, Some Legal ? nases o1· Corpora l,e Financing , 
Reorganization a n d Regulation, p 139 , 1917 
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(Supreme Court Justice Brewer rending t .ne op i n ion) declared 
a g ainst any sucn use o1· the court's p ower on the g round t hat: 
"There is no wide discretion vested i n the chanceLlor 
wh ich permits him t o disturb c ontract rights-- the 
rights o f p roperty. It is not for the court to 
assume the p ower to c ompe l oeca use i t believes it 
wise and g ood business. Every man in this countr y 
decides questions in res pect to h is own p rop erty 
for himself." 
FORECLOSURE SAlE 
In theory, at least, the foreclosure of a mortgage 
on any p rope rty, h owever extensive, is similar to that of 
the foreclosure of a mortgage on a h ouse, but in actual 
pra ctice the doctrine ha s been modified so far as it c oncerns 
the properties of r a ilway systems. It i s the customary 
p ractice for the trustee of one of the junior mortga g es just 
(l) 
above those underlying mortgages wh ich are not to be disturbed 
in the reorganization to move f or a judicia l sale of the 
corporate property of the railroad. This p osition is usually 
( 2) 
unopposed by the railroad. 
The nex t step is the decree of s a le, a ccording to 
which the court p reserves the outward form of a foreclosure 
sale. Owing to the fact tha t the foreclosure of the p roperty 
of a railroad requ ires far more ca pital t h an a single man 
or g roup of men can command, the court r e cognizes t hat t h ere 
will be no competition at the forec l osure sale o:f:' the p roperty. 
In order to p r e ven t the v a rious parties who have a greed among 
themselves upon a workable pl an of r e orga niza tion from con-
s p iring together to purcha se the p ro perty for little or nothing 
l. Merchants Loan a nd 'I'rust Co. v.Chicago Railway Co . ,Federal 9 23.1907 
2. Byrne,J.,"Foreclosure of Railroad Mortga ges 11 ,pp217 - 240,1917 
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and thus defeat the just claims of other creditors who have 
not pooled their interests, the court ordinarily fixes a 
(l) 
minimum or upset price. It is the amount which the receivers 
must realize from the property in order that the court shall 
confirm the sale. It amounts, practically, to the determina-
tion by the court of the p rice at which the reorganization 
committee may acquire the property of the old corporation at 
a public sale, and also of the conditions und~r which the 
committee must settle with the creditors who have not consente d 
to its plan. 
It must not be asswned that there does not ever occur 
competitive bidding , for there have been many cases in which 
t wo or more i n terested parties are opposed to each other in 
a reorganization and each appears at the sale and bids on the 
property. 
Many courts, particularly those of New Jersey, to 
avoid the expense and notoriety connected with a public sale, 
authorize the receivers to g ive notice that they propose to 
sell at p rivate sale the property of the railroad to the 
reorganization committee in furtherance of their prearranged 
plan or reorganization. If anyone objects or can guarantee 
that a larg er sum will be obtained at a public offering , the 
court will a u thorize it. Ordinarily no one objects , and t he 
p lan is carried out at a distinct saving of expense. 
T:~i~tson, F. L., Editor , Some Le gal Phases of Corporate 
Financing ,Reorganization and Regulation, 
p 139,1917. 
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AD,JUSTivlEN'I' OF I NTERES'l'S--NON-ASSEN'l' I NG BONDHOLDt.RS 
The most difficult p roblem remaining to the 
reorganization c ommittee after the sale is that of the final 
adjustment of conflicting interests. If the upset price 
exceeds that face value o f one or more issues of underly ing 
bonds, these bonds are not affected, in other words they 
are undisturbed. If the upset price does not equal the face 
value of a bond issue, some adjustment is necessary with 
those bondholders who have not consented to enter the reorganiza-
tion and they are invaribly paid off in money raised by the 
reorganization committee as part of their p lan. The amount 
each non-assenting bondholder receives is the proportional 
part of the sum rece ived by the court from the sale of the 
actual p rope rty securing them, ·which the face value of his 
bonds be a rs to the face value of the total issue. 
TREATMENT OF STRIKERS 
Some kind of settlement must be made with other 
creditors who refuse to consent to the plan . These· active 
and latent objectors are known as strikers and may be divided 
into two groups . First, there are the genera l creditors of 
the corporation who have furnished it witn labor and materials 
before the failure and who , being relatively few in number, 
have neither organized nor otherwise intervened in the pro-
ceedings. They ...;an not be ne glected, a nd provision is made 
that their claims may be pa id entirely or partially out of 
the money subscribed at the time of the reorganization. 
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The other class of' strik ers is composed of the security 
holders who object to the c onditions of the plan or t h e 
general procedure connected with the sale of the property, 
or even the execution of the r e organization agreement. They 
are in a p osition to delay the reorganization oy litigation. 
Sometimes these strikers have a real grievance . In the 
Philadelph ia a nd Reading reorganization of' UH57 the majority 
of a junior issue of bonds formulated a plan in opposition 
to that adopted, and agreed among themselves not to comply 
(1) 
singly with the provisions of the operative plan. Ultimately 
the c ommittee felt compelled to pay them the par value of 
their b onds. 
There are s peculators in New York who make it their 
business to hold up reorganization committees, and such is 
the impatience of business men , such the possible delays in 
litiga tion, and such the expenses ofa p rolonged r eceivership , 
that strikers a re ordinarly bought off. This practice only 
aggravates the evil. 
It · is necessary to remember in considering t h e 
fundamental justice of the claims of a few, that such h a s been 
the depletion of the railroads property, due to its misfortunes, 
that no one can claim the fulfillment, to the last letter, 
of his strict legal and equitable rights. To some extent, 
at least temporary losses must be borne by all concerned. 
If there existb .a ~qssibility of recovering these losses, the 
new corp oration should be p laced on its feet at t h e earliest 
possible moment . This is the tacit assumption behind all the 
procedure of reorganization. 
l.Cleveland and Powell, Railroad Finance, p 254 , 1912. 
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COURT RULING FAVORS DEFAULTED BONDS 
In effect, the Court held that stocks had no equity 
in a corporation unless there were assets over and above 
that necessary to satisfy the creditors. The point may well 
be raised by equity counsel that the majority of bankrupt 
railroads have ample property value to justify the participa-
tion to stockholders in reorganization. 
If that property fails to provide adequate earning 
power, however, their case would seem to be weak in the light 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission's stand in reorganiza-
tion plans thus far written. The Commission has taken the 
realistic attitude that capitalization should be supported 
• 
by earning power, almost regardless of book value of assets. 
The Court had no ob jection to participation of 
stockholders (even if no equity were found) by making a fresh 
contribution and receiving in return a participation reason-
ably equivalent to their contribution. It is surprising 
that the Interstate Commerce Commiss i on has not followed this 
course of allotting ri ghts to purchase new stock, the proceeds 
to be used for working capital or the payment of Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation or other debt. Such provisions would be 
less brutal than merely declaring stocks to be without value 
and barring them from part icipa tion; it would have no adverse 
effect upon the position of the bondholders. 
Another aspect of the decision merits attention. The 
plan of the lumber products c~mpany was upset even though it 
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had been approved by 92.tn % of the face amount of the bonds, 
99.75 % of the class A stock and 90 % of the Class B stock. 
This phase of the ruling will obviously be interpreted as 
meaning that security holders' approval is secondary to the 
court's opinion that a plan is fair and equitable. Minority 
bondholders' suits to upset plans on this ground may be 
numerous. 
From an investment standpoint, the ruling should 
tend to suppress obstructionist tactics by stockholders, which 
might otherwise be strengthened by the recent rise .in railroad 
tra ffic and earnings. While it may encourage minority bond-
holders to object, their objections would logically be on the 
(1) 
constructive side fro~n the point of view of bond values. 
l.Standard Statistics Company,Inc.,November 30,1939 
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CHAPTER V 
PERIODS IN HISTOHY OF RAILWAY REORGA1'JIZATIONS 
Railroad reorganization has been essentially an .l1.merican 
problem. Our financiers have had no historical or European 
precedents to guide them. The development of the theory and 
practice of railroad reorganization is one of the most original 
( 1) 
and remarkable achievements of American business genius. 
It is noteworthy not merely in the amount of securities involved 
but on account of the excellence of the principles which have 
guided its managers in their actions . 
The purpose of every railroad reorganization has been to 
effect suc:h changes in the financial structure that new money 
might be subscribed to . rehabilitate a failed road. Tnese 
changes usually involve the reduction of fixed charges. This 
has been the fundamental purpose throughout the history of 
railroad reorganizations, but the means taken and the practices 
followed have varied greatly. The panic and depression years 
have served as modal points for the development of railway 
finance. Weak railroads have failed in great numbers during 
those years. 
'l1he first period, 1827-1857, comprises all the attempts 
to r ehabilitate the earlier, distinctly local railroads. It 
extends down to the railway failures followin g the punic of 
1857 but not inch1.ding them. Failures during this period vvere 
the failures of promoters as well as the failures of their 
.1. 1,1eade, E . r:C-;'l,he1f!:.organfza tion of .Ra.l lroads , pl7 Am . Ac . Pol. Sci. 242 
1 9 01. 
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raj.lroads. In most cases the real cause of these condi tions 
vms the resul t of underestimated building costs by . the rail-
road promoters . Thus , the promoters were forced to sell more 
stock or more debenture bonds in order to complete their 
projects . 
The capital structure of railroads during the earlier 
( 1 ) 
part of t h is period consisted largely of capital stock . 
It was not un t i l the late forties t hat mortgage bonds were 
resorted to in order to f inance the railroads . As late as 
18 55 , after over 17 , 000 :miles of line had been built, the 
gross funded debt amounted to sli ghtly less than $3,000 , 000, 000 , (1 ) 
where as the share capital mnolJ.nted to ~1i425 , 000 , 000 . 
On this capitalization the railroad were t hen operating on a 
50~~ ratio, and the net e arnings for the year 1855 amounted to 
over ~~40, 000 , 000 . In other words, that was over 12-~- % of the 
funded debt . It seems . to· .be .·agreed upon ·by rai l road authorities 
that , once built , the railroads were able t o meet their fixed 
charges , so tha t the tater problem of r eorganization, as a 
problem of reduc ing fixed charges , was not paramount during 
( 2) 
t h is period. 
The second period extends from the fa i lures following t he 
panic of 18 57 to those succeeding t he railroad panic of 1884 . 
This period is characterized by several relatively l arge re -
organizations , including some r ailroads extending beyon~ mere 
l . Ripl ey ; vV. z. , Ral-E :;oads-;F'inance and Organization, p374, 19~ 
2 . Swain, H. H. , Economic Aspects of Railroad Receiverships , p68, 1898 
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local bounds, The following list includes some of the larger 
( 1) 
r ai lroads in distress: 
Marietta and Cincinnati 
St .Louis, Alton and Chicago 
New Albany and Salem 
M:l.les 
18 0 
225 
292 
170 
447 
470 
Failed 
18 58 
1859 
1859 
18 59 
18 59 
1800 
Re organized 
1860 
1 8 62 
1 8 62 
Great Western 1 8 62 
New York and Erie 1862 
Pittsburgh,Fort Wayne and Chicago 1862 
The de tails of one railraod, the lTew· York and, Erie, will 
serve the purpose of illustrating tho railroad problem of t h is 
period. It had been completed in 18 51 and suffered severely 
during the panic of 18 57. Low maintenance charges had i n creased 
greatly the mere c ost of operation, and these difficulties were 
a ge;ravated by floods . and l ine washouts, very similar to the 
conditions of the years 1936 and 1938 . In addition to these 
problems, its treasurer, the notorious Daniel Drew, had been 
r unning competitive steamship lines and otherwise aili~inistering 
the road's treasury to his personal advantage . On the financial 
-s-ide the picture was even more disheartening. Unpaid judgments 
for over q~?OO,OOO were outstanding a gainst the company ; it had 
accmmlated a floating and unsecured debt of over ~~8, 000,000 
and an old mortg age of ~S4 ,000 ,000 had matured and remained 
· unpaid. The c ompany defaulted on the interest on all bonds. 
Then receivers were appointed in August ,l859. 
The reorganization plan adopted i n 1862 to remedy the 
situation of the Ne w York and Erie Railroad was neither dras ti c 
nor compreh ensive. The. mortga ge bondholders were required to 
make n o s a crifices whatever, the s mall assessment of only 2-rz% 
levied on the stockholders was used to meet their overdue 
l.Crowell,J. F ., Railway Rece iversh ips in the United States,7Yale 
Review p326 ,1898 . 
. ·I 
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interest. The large floating debt was funded into preferred 
stock, and a s a result the position of the cowmen stock was 
made distinctly stronger, in that the prior claims of floating 
debt nearly as large as the common stock had been per manently 
funded into a t ype o f security having merely a contingent lien 
on e a r ning s . Although probably the ·most di she artening fai lure 
of the tin~s the Ne w Yor k Erie Railroad was almost unique in 
t h e s ma ll a mount of' sacrifi ce demanded fr om any of t h e securi ty 
(1) 
h o lders . 
Later on the Erie failed a ga in i n 1 875 , followin g t h e panic 
of 1 073 . Again it was one of t h e most severe and far - reaching 
failures of t h e time. Yet the reorganization of 1 878 was 
c2-rried out by merely funding into 7;;.'; bonds the overdue coupons 
on certain junior issues of b onds and by levying a s ma ll e.ssess -
men t on t h e stocks . The fun d ing of coup ons into bonds of t h e 
same general tenor was a meth od used frequent l y for securing 
temporary relief from a pressing burden of fixed c h arges , dur -
ing t h e reorganizations of the mi ddle a n d l a te seventies and 
early ei ~1ties . It was , for example , a prominent feature of t he 
reorgani zation of the St . Louis , I ron Tt ountain and Souther n Hail -
( 2) 
road in 1 B7 8 . The assessment on the stocks in the Erie re -
organization were 4 p er c ent on t h e cow.mon anc.l 2 per cent on 
t h e preferred stack s . 'rhe s hareh olders could p ay, if they 
wished , 6 pe r cent on the common and 3 per c ent on the pre -
ferred and r e ce i ve incowe bonds for t he assessment . However , 
most of the sha reho l ders electe c" to pay the s rli.8.ller assessment 
and r e ce i ve no securi tie s . 
l. t=ott , E . H., rrhe Story of Erle , pp~;~5 - I ~O , .L~OI a,. ·--- --- _.--_ , 
o 0 ~ 11 T p q ~ ilway Re ceiversn 1 p s 1n tne U. o . ?Yale Revlew, p324 , 
'-" • '-' ro de , ._ •• , .. ,. o . .l l c)98 . 
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We now nave, for the !"irst time,~n opportunity to compare 
two reorganization plans for the s ame railroad. The significant 
change from the first reorganization of' the Erie in lt$b2 was 
the funding of a.lternate coupons on certain junior bonds, thus 
to a very limited extent reducing temporarily fixed charges, 
whereas in the earlier reorganization no effort was made to 
effect even a temporary reduction in fixed charges. In other 
words, although both failures were severe, neither reorganization 
demanded any sacrifice from the security holders at all com-
parable with the severity of the failure,and the only signifi-
cant difference between the two reorganizations was that in 
l8b2 neither a temporary nor permanent reduction in fixed charges 
was accomplished, whereas in lt$7C:$ there was achieved a small 
temporary, but no permanent lessening of' the fixed cnarges. 
The railroads which failed in the early seventies were not 
(l) 
really reorganized--they were simply regalvanized. 
The third period, lt$C:$4-lt593,f'ound many half-finished rail-
roads, the failure of which was like that of the early railways 
of the eastern Atlantic sta tes following the panic of 1857· 
Types of such failures were the first failure of the Atchison, 
Topeka and Santa Fe'Railway in lt$C$4. The Denver and Rio Grande 
· Railroad in lt$C$4,the Florida Railway and Navigation Company 
in 18C$5, the Houston and Texas Central Railway in l t$C$5, and 
the Houston East and West Texas in lt$C$5. 
l.Crowe.ll, J.F.,Railway Receivership in the United States, 
7 Yale Review, p 32b,lt59t5 
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Another class of railroad failures during this period 
included the competitive roads which were built, in fuliy 
developed territory, for the single and often avowed purpose 
of being bought out by stronger rivals,but wnicl1 were too 
weak even to initiate the struggle, much less carry it to a 
successful issue. Two oi' these buccaneering enterprises did 
much to brlng about and make serious the railroad panic of l bl::$4. 
The old New York, West Shore and Buffalo was built along the 
west bank of the Hudson River for no other purpose than to 
create for itself a nuisance value to the Hudson River Railroad. 
It failed in lbl::$4, with only 4'(5 miles of line out with the 
enormous capitaliz.ation of $40,000,000 of stock and $'(O,uou,uuu 
or bonds. It was reorganized in lbb5 at great sacrifice to 
the security holders--very unusual for the period. The first 
mortgage bondholders were forced to acce pt 50 per cent in new 
bonds. The New York, Chicago and St.Louis Railway was built 
to parallel the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway. It 
(1) 
failed in lbb5 and was reorganized in ll::$1::$7. 
The first of our great American railway systems to throw 
itself into the hands of receivers was the Wabash, St.Louis 
and Paclfic Railway whlch failed in ll::$b4. Tne fundamental 
reason for this t·aLLure was over-extension of branch .Lines. 
This was very clearly stated uy the editors oi Tne Commercial 
and Financial Chronic.Le, 
"The Wabash, St.Louis and Pacific extended its .Lines very 
l.Daggett, S.,Railroad Reorganization , pp35-b0,190b 
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widely in the years lb79 to lbb2 oy the acquisition or 
branch and connecting roads, and thereby assumed heavy 
liabilities. Altnough the earnings increased largely, 
the annual liabilities were stil l far in excess or the (l) 
net earnings.' ' 
At the time o1· failure the railroad had outstanding 
fourteen separate issues or divisional 1"irst mortgage bonds, 
bearing interest averaging nearly 7 per cent, and several 
issues of second, third and g eneral mortgage bonds bearing 
·r per cent interest. Below these senior bonds there were 
$l b ,OOO,OOO of general o per cent bo~ds and some ~o,ouo,ouo 
of b per cent collateral trust bonds. In addition to all 
this debt there were $c3 ,uou,uuo of preferred stock and 
l27,uuo,uuu of common stocK. 
Under the thoroughly justi!'iable excuse ot bringlng i n to 
a close union a nd coherent structure all o1· the Wabash lines 
tne reorganization managers forced the .holders of upwards of 
nine or the old underlying first mortgage bonds, bearing an 
averag e of nearly "7 per cent interest, to accept new 5 per 
cent bonds issued under a blanket second mortgage. In brief, 
the great Wabasn reorganization, a landmark in the his tory 
of reorganization practice, not only collected an assessment 
on stockholders and junior b ondholders and made contingent on 
earnings the interest on two large issues of j unior bonds, but 
l.Commercial and Financial Chron icle,pl30, Mar ch,l888. 
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it al so s olidified into two senior blanket mortg ages, bearing 
a low interest rate, practically all t n e underlying high 
interest-bearing bonds. But, in actual percentages o f total 
charges, the reduction of fixed interest was s mall and the 
treatment of the junior bondholders who were given ir.c ome 
bonds with a mortgage lien was n ot in any sense drastic. 
The point of i mp ortance is t hat i n t nis h istorically 
i mporta nt reorganization of a great railway s ys tem of the late 
eighties there was some permanent as we ll as temporary re-
duction in _fixed cha r ges and a distinct, a lthough slight 
s a crifi ce was required of every one of the security holders. 
The belie f in a very wholesome scal ing of fixed charges was 
gradually coming into the consciousness of railroad promoters, 
though it had not yet reached the understanding of promoters 
of completed sy~tem. 
In the reorganization of the incompleted Northern Pacifi c , 
following the p anic of 1873, all of the bonds were refunded 
in a preferred stock . The First Mortgage Bonds in the New 
York, West Shore and Buffalo reorganization were scaled down 
( 1 ) 
50 per cent. However, the se illustrations in no wise 
affects the strength of the generalization that the early 
reorganization policy for completed g oing rai l roads involved 
little sacrifice on the part of the security holders. This 
principle· is further illustrated by the two Reading re-
organi zations of l b8 2 and l bb7. They bring out,with even 
l.Dag gett, S.,Railroad Reorganizati onp357,190b . 
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greater clearness, the leniency of easy railroad reorganizations, 
when one considers that in the fifteen years between ld80 ana 
1895 the Reading was in the hands of receivers for an aggregate 
(l) 
of ten years. In the reorganization of 1882 the only relief 
afforded the company was the sale of some senior bonds to fund 
upwards of $12,000,000 of floating debt. No sacrifices of 
any kind were demanded of the stockholders or bondholders , in 
fact the fixed charges were absolutely increased by the 
reor~anization $3,800 ,000--a net increase of 50 per cent. In 
the reorganization of 1887 the remedy adopted was the payment 
of the floating debt by an issue of new general mortgage bonds. 
The fourth period, .Lt593-l90o, presented chiefly failures 
of completed, well-estab.lished and highly organized railway 
systems, unlike those arising out of the preceding panics. 
One of the ear.liest and most conspicious of these failures 
was that of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe' Railway in 1894. 
It had been reorganized in 1889 , after a period of abnormal 
and r'ac titious growth, by tne refunding of a multitude of' 
small issues of bonds into two ·blanket issues 'carrying low 
fixed charges. Right after that the road began to acquire one 
rai.lroad after another, without regard to financia.L expediency 
or even future solvency. Later, when an i ndependent expert 
audited the books he found that there had been an average 
deficit of over $1,250,000 for the years from 1891 to 1894, 
1. Daggett, s., Railroad Reorganization,p370,1908. 
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notwithstanding the fact that the company had falsified its 
books so as to represent an ample annual surplus for each 
year. 
A new,broad reorganization policy was drawing upon the 
· consciousness of both bankers and i nvestors,onewnich required 
that a reorganization to be well done must be thoroughly done. 
Wnen the final Atchison plan of reorganization was adopted in 
1895,it expressed fully an understanding of this new financial 
wisdom. What is far more i mportant, it is one of the three 
large r railroad systems, since reorganization, which has been 
able to carry on successfully right down to 1940 and meet the 
annual fixed charges established back in 1895 . It must be 
concluded that a thorough revamping of its capital structure 
(1) 
was accompl ished in the followi.ng plan: 
The old 4 per cent first mortgage bondholders, having 
a prior lion to the entire system, were forced to ac cept 75 
per cent of the principal in new 4 per cent bonds, a reduction 
of both principal and interest by 25 per cent. 'l'o make up 
for the loss,they were given 40 per cent in new 4 per cent 
income bonds. The second mortgage bondholders were required 
to surrender their bonds for preferred stock and t o pay an 
assessment of 4 per cent. 
The reorganization proceedings of the Union l)acific 
started with the a ppointment of r e ceivers in October ,1893· 
1. Daggett,s., Railroad Reorganization,pp 206-211,1908. 
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A committee was a ppointed in l o9 3 to formulate a plan of 
reorganization but abandoned the e ffort in March ld9~,owning 
to failure of Congress to pass a bill providing for the re-
funding of the debt to t he government at 3 % . 
The Congress whose term expire d in March ld97 , also 
attempted to pass a funding bill,but failed, wh ereupon fore-
closure proceedings were commenced. 
I n J anuary,l897 , an agreement was entered into between 
the Attorney-General of the United States and the reorganiza-
tion committee looking to the sale of the property under fore-
closure of the Union Pacific first mortgage and the government 
lien, a syndicate guaranteeing to the goverr~ent a minimum 
price equivalent to the principal of the subsidy bonds with 
interest a t 31/3% from date of issue. 
In October l 895 ,a plan of reorganization was approved by 
a committee of which Louis Fitzgerald of New York was chair man. 
This pla~ oodified in ld9b,and having secured the assent of a 
sufficient amount of the securities in interest, was declared 
opera tive June 24,1897· 
Briefly the Plan Proposed the issuing of: 
$61,000,000 Common 
.75,000,000;Preferred 4% 
6l,OOO,OOO,Is t .Mortgage 4 % railway and l and grant bonds. 
The bonds and preferred stock to be used in retiring the 
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Ist.Mortgage 6's; Sinking Fund 8's; Omaha Bridge 8's; Omaha 
Bridge renewal 5's,of the Union ~acific;together with the 
divis ional Ist.6's;Consolidated Mortgage 6 's; Kansas Division 
and coll ateral 5's; and fragments of' old loans of the Kansas 
Pacific ; while the Common Stock $6o,e6e,soo was issued in 
exchange for the old shares, which were required to pay an 
assessment of 15 per cent. 
No provision having been made in the plan for settling 
with the holders of the several issues of trust bonds and 
notes, committees were appointed to protect the interest of 
those holders and to procure a sale of the collateral trust 
. notes secured by the indenture of September 4,1891 , an agree-
ment was entered into in March ,1e97,between the committee, 
the trustees under the indenture and the reorganization 
committee, which provided that the present notes should be 
deposited with the trustees and new certificates to an equal 
amount be issued therefore, the de posited notes to be used by 
the trustees for the purpose of foreclosing the present trust 
and of purchasing the collateral held t hereunder, The 
securities so acquired are to be administered and gradually 
liquidated by the trustees for the purp ose of redeeming the 
new certificates after paying interest thereon at b % from 
February 1,1897. 
In consideration of the terms of this agreement the re-
organization committee agrees that t he reorganized company 
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shall pay to each certificate holder 15 % par value in new 
Pre ferred Stock. If by February l,l902,there shal l not have 
been realized a sum in cash ,in addition to said pre ferred 
stock,equa.l to the par of the new certificates with interest 
accrued to date, then all the securities shall be sold and the 
proceeds, to the necessary extent, app15.ed to the payment of 
the certificates,or,if the proceeds are i nsufficient f or 
that purpose, then they are to be applied first to pay all 
interest and then a ratable distribution on account of principal. 
This fourth period saw the cnanging attitude toward rail-
road reorganization cry.stalize in the Atchison plan. As !'ar 
back a s the first Erie reorganization there had been a growing 
realization that a r ai lroad r eorganization, to be permanently 
successful, must be drastic and comprehensive. 'l'his realization 
was of slow growth. Lawyers stuck to the legal phraseology 
of bonds and mortgages, insisting that the contractual rights 
of bondholders must be protected at all hazards,_ a nd investors 
were intolerant and obstructive if forced to submit to anything 
more than the most superficial and temporary sacrifices. 
There were several signi f i cant motives to exp lain the 
comparative l eniency with which bondholders were treated prior 
to 1B95· In many cases it was presumed by over confident 
reorganization managers that increasing prosperity might be 
expected to absorb any ordina ry burden of fixed charges. 
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The courts, moreover ~ showed every inclination to protect the 
bondholders, should h e object to any sacrifice of principal 
or interest that a sto ckholder management might wish to impose 
u p on him . Further, by no means least i mportant, there was the 
fact that large proportions of the bonds of our American rail-
roads were held in England and on the Continent. These 
foreign l ·ondholders acted as a unit against any effort to weak-
en their position. Another reason for this leniency was 
possibly due to the fact that many of the mortgages cou.Ld not 
be foreclosed at a.Ll, because the state had endorsed the bonds 
and had the right of foreclosure, which it did not exercise 
because it did not want the road or did not want to sacrifice 
the property by a forced sale in the midst of fina ncial de-
(1) 
pression . 
Forced by the obvious p light in which the railroads of 
the country found tnemselves in the depression from 1C593 to 
l e597, peop.Le gener ally recogniz;ed<. that only through the most 
drastic cutting of fixed charges, accompanied by large in-
vestments of ne w money, could the bankrupt and impoverished 
roads be rehabilita ted. The influence of the l a te J. P. 
Morgan was dominant and worked in every instance for· the dis-
tribution of sacrifices and the casting of the financia.L 
pattern according to actual earnings. Most of all there was 
a common consciousness that . the era of promotion was past 
and that the restitution of confidence in the industry 
.L.Crowell,J.F.,Rai.Lway Receiverships in the United States, 
7 Ya.Le Review ,p342 ,.Lb Yb. 
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required that the railroads be given a definite economic 
stability and their bonds made a secure investment. As a 
result of the drastic reorganizations of such roads a s the 
Atchison, Union Pacific and the Louisville and Nashville dur-
ing the middle nineties, the railroads of the country emerged 
with new life, rehabilitated physically by the investment of 
(1) 
new capital and freed front over burdening debt. .As a matter 
of fact these three railroads are the only larg e systems which 
have weathered the panics and depressions since reorganization 
in the nineties down to the year 1940. 
The fifth period, 193l-l940,witnessed the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1933 . Du:c ing the years 1931 and 1932 rail-
road credit declined to the lowest level since 1~93 and several 
important railroads failed, including the Wabash, Central of 
Georgia, Mobile and Ohio, Norfolk Southern, Florida East Coast 
and Ann Harbor. 
As a result of the indica tions of an epidemic of railway 
failures, similar to 1893, pressure was brought to b ear on the 
76th.Congress. Accordingly, there was pa ssed in great haste, 
in the closing days of that session, certain amendments to the 
Bankrup tcy Act, of which section 77 was concerned with the 
reorganization of railroads. 
l.Lyon, W~H.,Corporation Finance, Chapter VIII,lYlb 
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Tne following Class I railroads nave sought relief under 
( 1) 
Section 77: 
Chicago,Milwaukee & St.Paul 
Chicago & North Western 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pa6ific 
Missouri Pacific 
St.Louis -San Francisco 
Minneapolis,St.Paul & Sault Ste.Marie 
Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Erie 
New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Chicago Great Western 
Western Pacific 
International Great Northern 
St. Louis Southwestern 
Chicago & Eastern Illinois 
St.Louis Southwestern of Texas 
Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf 
St.Louis, Brownsville & Mexic.o 
New York,Ontario & Western 
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville 
Duluth, South Shore & Atlantic 
Rutland 
San Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf 
Missouri-Illinois 
New Orleans, Texas & Mexico 
Akron,Canton & Youngstown 
Spokane International 
Beaumont,Sour Lake & Western 
New York,Susquehanna & Western 
Date 
1935 
1935 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1938 
1935 
193t) 
1935 
1935 
1935 
1933 
1936 
•1933 
1936 
1933 
1933 
1937 
1933 
1937 
1938 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1933 
1937 
Miles 
Operated 
11,025 
8,391 
7,511 
7,177 
4,886 
4,301 
2,5eo 
2;403 
· 2, o2e 
1,505 
1,208 
1,155 
1,011 
927 
695 
627 
602 
577 
573 
549 
407 
317 
193 
191 
171 
164 
146 
143 
Wnatever the course of the development of railroad 
r e organization procedure may have been, the railroad re-
organization may now be described as a compromise between 
conflicting interests. It is a compromise between the strict 
construction of the l egal obligations of the various security 
owners and creditors of the road, and the necessity, from the 
point of view of the public, that the railroad maintain its 
service as a solvent, responsible and progressive corporation. 
It is the balance between private and public interests. 
l.Interstate Commerce Commission,Hearings on Omnibus Transportation 
Bill,p40-4b,l939 
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While pretending to hold to the strict construction of 
the legal contract the courts have been inclined to allow all 
interests,no matter what their equitable rights might be, to 
participate in the reorganization provided an improved rail-
road service could be promised to the public. The parties 
most concerned are encouraged to work out any plan that is 
expedient and approximately just,on condition it is socially 
and economically sound. The resulting compromise between the 
strict rights of the bondholders, the blasted hopes of· the 
stockholders and the welfare of the· publip, is based on 
expediency tempered by justice, rather than justice tempered 
by expediency. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GOVERNMENTAL HEGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
I tNTE RSTATE COMHERCE COMMISSION SANCTI ONS TRAINLOAD R.A.TE 
Recognizing how "economic, indus trial, and transportati on 
conditi ons have materially changed 11 since the last previous 
case involving rates on a quantity larger than a carload was 
decided more than 20 years ago, the Interstate Commerce 
Cor.md ssion has reversed a life-long policy by approving such 
a rate in tr1e I . & s. No.4645 proceeding, the so-called train-
load-rate case wherein the suspended schedules proposed a 
reduced rate on blackstrap molasses when s hipped in 1,800-tons 
lots from New Orleans,Louisiana,and Harvey to Peoria,Illinois, 
and Pekin. Vfui le thus sanctioning the principle of a rate based 
on the 1,800-ton minimum, the commission found the proposed 
charge of 14 cents per 100 pounds "unreasonably low" and 
"therefore unlawful," and ordered the suspended schedu.les can-
celed without prejudice to the filing of tariffs publishing 
15-cent rate. 
The majority opinion (it was an ei ght-to-two decision) 
said in one place that the proposed rate 11is not a trainload 
rate-- it is rather a quantity or multiple-car rate." The 
finding on the principle involved is set forth as follows: 
"We find that there is nothing unlawful in the establishment 
of rai lroad rates on a quantity large r than a carload, when 
moving as a single shipment, wh ere, as here, they are designed 
to meet competition from other modes of transport whose unit 
of transportation is not limited to single carloads, provided 
a just and reasonable relation in rates a s between the larger 
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and smal l er quantities of the same traffi c i s maintained .u 
In the latter connection the condenmation of the proposed 
14-cent rate was based upon a finding that it woul d not bear 
"a just and reasonable relation to the existing carl oad rate," 
as well as upon one to the effect that it re presented a greater 
reduc t ion t han was n ecess ar y to meet t he competition of private 
barge operation. The present c arload rate fo r the movement 
involved is 17.5 cents pe r 100 pounds. 
PORTER HITS "DISCRHUNATORY TENDENCIES 11 
Commis sioner Porter dissented, contending t hat "the 
trainload rate he re adopted is but anothe r step in the further-
anc e of discriminatory tendencies" in rate:making. Previously 
Mr. Port er had identified other "discrimina tory tendenci es" 
v1hic h he had i n mind, listing the practice of maki ng low rates 
betv;een large c enters where competiti on exists, and 11 the recent-
ly devised scheme of all-commodity rates, the mixi ngrule, etc." 
He saw 11 no substantial change in conditions during the l a st 
twenty years that should c ause us to overturn our long l ine 
of prior pronouncements." 
Commissioner Lee agr eed with Mr. Porter, whi le Chairman 
Eas tman, subscribing to t he c onclus ions of the ma jority, wrote 
a separate c oncurring opinion in an endeavor to bring "certain 
as pects of the matter into somewhat s harper relief. 11 In con-
cluding , Mr. Eastman expressed t he belief nthat there are other 
situations where the economy of volume s hi pments, particularly 
if they are expanded to trainload dimensions, would be greater 
- 99-
than that whi ch the recor d i:Qldicates will be realized in this 
case." Other brief' concurring expressions came f:vom Commis-
sioner Miller and Patterson who would have approved the 14-cent 
rate. Commissioner Mahaffie concurred in ~:r. Patterson's 
expression while Commissioner Splawn did not parti cipa te in 
the dis position of the proceeding. 
As the majority report points out the proceeding was 
launched when the 1,800-ton-minimw~ rate was published in 
tariff's filed to become effective June 7 in a move to obtain 
for the rai lroads the blackstrap molasses traffic which the 
Commerc:i.al Sol vents Corporation was s hipping in 1 ts mm barges. 
The report calculates that the 1,800-ton-minimu.rn is equivalent 
to. 3811 tank-car loads~ 1 ) Railroads joiming in the tariff, which 
was suspended pending t he investigat i on, were : Illinois Cent ral, 
Yazoo & Mississi ppi Valley, Missouri Pacific, Texas & Paciflc, 
Chicago & Illinois Midland, Alton, V/abash and Illinois Terminal. 
BARGE MID RAIL COST ESTIMATES 
Noting t hat "there are s pecial ar1d unusual circums t ar.ces 
under whi ch t his trans por t a ti on is performed," the cormni ssi9n 
proceeds to describ e t he competitive set-up which di verted the 
equivalent of' 622 carloads to the river a s compa red with 144 
to the ra:i.ls during the first seven months of' 1939 ; in 1938 
the figures were 909 and 49, respectively. The discussion of 
present barge services refers to the Solvent Corpora tion's 
r epresentation that the cost of' its river operations be t ween 
New Orl eans and Peoria 11 i s less than 12 cent s per 100 pounds 11 ; 
1. Interstate Co~nerce Commission Report, No.4645 
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qut the commlssion goes on tb calculate a barge cost of 15.72 
cents per 100 pounds, calling the latter figure 11 a rough 
approximation based on unsatisfactory evidence." In llke 
fashion it adjusts rail cost estimates offered by railroad 
witnesses and calculates that the Ill :i.nois Central's cost of 
handling the traffic i n 38-car lots would be 11.19 cents per 
100 pounds as compared with 12.32 cents in carloads lots. 
This estimate of Illinois Central costs is accepted as 
the minimum rail cost on the theory that the cost via the longer 
I"Ussouri Pacific route 'lvould n ot be less. In the · discussion 
of rail costs 1 t i s pointed out that the. 1, 800-ton minimum 
was determined upon as the quantity that could be received and 
disposed of within the free time at destination; railroad 
testimony indicated that the 38-car shipments would move in 
trains of up to 38 cars. 
Coming to the position of the protestants, the comrtlsslon 
points out that these objectors "offered very li tt.le evidence 
in opposition to the proposed rate," being in general opposed 
to the establishment of trainload rates. A witness for the 
American Can Sugar League did not object to the establishment 
of a 14-cent charge applicable on carloads; but he contended 
that very few of the mills he represented · could meet the 1~800 
ton minimum requirement. The commission found it "difficult 
to see what disadvantage the Louisiana producers would suffer 
if the blackstrap movement in question were shifted from private 
barge bacl{ to the rail carriers. II Next in turn the report 
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d~s pos ed of the ~1obile Chamb~r of Commerce 1 s protest and the 
con tention that the aggregate-of-intermediates provi sion of 
the fourth section could be Violated if one or more of the 
38 cars were reshipped to points beyond Peoria. Because the 
Cmrunercial Solvent could now r&ship blackstrap coming in by 
barge , "the proposed rate would not increase that possibility." 
RAILROADS HAVE "INHERENT ADVANTJl.GES.L"T9 0 
The Shell O:tl Company's protest is merely noted as one 
founded in a fear that the establisllment of the trainload-rate 
principle will soon bring such rates 11 on petroleum and cotton-
seed oil." The :rviississippi River System Carriers Association's 
contention that the proposed rate was "clearly aimed at the 
destruction of the inherent advantages of water trans portation" 
is answered vd th this assertion: 11 The advantage of handling 
a large single consignment as one ~Ulit is not a natural advan-
tage of water carriers as compared wi th railroad transportation. 
As far as physical operations are concerned, rai ls can handle 
as large a single shi pment as water carriers." 
The remainder of the majority report is devot ed to ci ta-
t i ons and discussions of relevant prior conmdssion decisions 
involving trainload, multiple-car or quantity rates. Although 
Commissioner Porter refers to a 1 918 case, the majority said 
that Miller & Lux v.S/P.Co.,41 I.C.C.617,decided November 9, 
1916,appeared to be t he last previous case nactually involving 
rates on a quantity larger than a carload." 
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"It will be obs erved from a review of the above cas es ," 
says the majority's follow-throug..h. fro~n l t s ci t a.ti ons, 11 t hat 
our refusal to s anction trainload, multiple-car, or quantity 
rates, when the quantities were greater than single carloads, 
was based upon a f i ndi ng of unjust discrimina t ion (using that 
term in a generic sense) in favor of large shippers. Unjust 
discrimination, however, is a question of fact. Economic, 
industrial, and transportation conditions have materially 
changed s ince these cases were decided. In none of the above 
cases dealing with rates on quantiti es larger than a carload 
was it shown that the traffi c in question moved in cargo 
quantities by water, or that the traff ic in question had been 
diverted from coL~on carrier railroad transportation to shippers 
by private barge transportation. The movement here involved 
is a plant-to-plant movement by a private barge which has been 
in successful operation for t wo or three years. What is here 
attemp t ed is that t h e common carrier rai lroads, whose sole 
business is transportation, seek to resume the trru~sportati on 
s ervice which they formerly rendered, and which for the past 
two years has been perfonned largely by the shipper for itself. 
"It is wel l -settled that differences . in quantities shipped 
as a single shipment may afford a fair and reasonable basis 
for differences in transportation rates. In railroad transporta-
tion, these differences are currently recognized e.s between car-
load, less-than-car load, and any quantity lots. In truck 
trans portati on, in addition to truckload and less-than-truck.-
load rates there are so-called volume rates. In connection 
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1vith the latter, there i s no -r -equirement as to the loading 
in a s ingl e truck. Hi ghway load limits and other circwnstances 
often r equire the us e of t wo or more trucks for the trans porta -
t i on of a single shipment." 
Ther e follo·ws ref erence to :nul tipl e -carload rates published 
by t h e Canadian National; the intrastate rate on sand and gravel, 
minimum 15 cars or more, in effect in lvli chi gan; and "nuinerous 
joint rail-barge rates now subject to minimui'll wei ghts ranging 
from 300 to 1,500 tons insofar as the barge portion of the 
movement is concerned." Also, mention is made of the fact 
that the barge lines generally maintain rates applicable on 
cargo quanti ties, whil e pipe lines publi sh "quantity rates." 
Dealing with the contention that the principles of the Robinson-
Patman Act (aimed at discriminatory discounts for large purchasers) 
should be appl i ed to railroad trans portation, the commission 
notes that the Federal Trade Commission, in administeri ng tha t 
act, has found unlawful price discrimination i n nwaerous cases, 
but it has not exercised its powers 11 t o es t abl i sh quantity 
limi ts as to particular commodi ties." 
"It must be bor ne in :nin<l , "the COI1'1l'Diss i on goes on, "that 
discrimina tion is a question of f act, and that, in the instant 
case, the traffic is moving i n cargo quanti t ies by water. 
Furthermore, t h e Illinoi s Centre.l's cost study indic a tes 
on its fact t ha t the cost of the l oaded movement of t his com-
modity in carloads is approximately 25 per cent greater t han 
the cost of movi ng 38 cars as a s i ngl e shipr;1ent . I f' the emp t y- · 
-104-
car movement be included, the excess cost indicated for 
handling the traffic in single carloads is 17 per cent. 
Our restatement of these costs reduces that latter difference 
to 10 per cent. This ratio of carload to quantity movements 
may be compared \Vi th the difference between the present car-
load rate of 17.5 and the proposed quantity rate of 14 c ents." 
That relation ship 11 insofar as it was p ertinent" was considered 
by the commission when it rejected t he 14-cent rate with out 
prejudi c e to one of 15 cents; but it said that the r e cord 
afforded 11 no basis for t he de termination of g raded rates on 
quantities ranging fr01n one carload to the proposed minimum 
of 1, 800 tons, or 38 carloads." 
DOUBTS HATE WOULD BE OF MATEHI AL ADVANTA GE 
That, said the majority report, is a matter 11 that must 
await the presentation of a case in which that issue becomes 
pePtinent .u In the same connection Chairman Eastman expres sed 
the belief that carload s hippers of blackstPap oveP the rail 
routes involved are, 11 if t h ey desire it ," entitled to a Pate 
whi c h does not exceed t he rate on volume shi pments by more 
than the indi c ated difference in the c ost of service, i. e., 
the a bove-mentioned 10 pep cent. Mr. Eastman adds , however, 
t ha t 11 i t is doubtful whether in the circ"Llmstances such a rate 
would be of material advantage." 
Before setting forth its conclusions t h e majority report 
discusses the relevance of the Interstate Commerce Act's 
declaration of policy to 11 fosteP and pPeserve in full vigor 
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both rail and water transportation." "Even if such declara-
tion of policy should be construed to include the promotion 
and encouragement of private transportation on the waterways, tt 
the co:rrlJ:!l..ission says, tti t does not exclude the right of a 
regulated common carrier to meet such competitiqp in a proper 
manner ~:mel to a reasonable extent. Common car riers under 
re gulation should be allowed more leeway to meet the competi-
t i on of a shipper or consignee transporting his own goods than 
in meeting the compe tition of another carrier for hire. On 
the other hand, where competition with a private agency is the 
sole reason for departing from a normal adjustment of rates, 
no.t only should the cost of service be regarded as an absolute 
minimum, but such de:parture should go no further than is 
necessary to meet efi'e ctively the competitive situation. This 
is necessary to avoid the discriminations prohibited by statute 
as well as for protection of re gulated carriers themselves." 
CHAI RMAN EASTMAN CONC:lJ.R§. 
Chairman Eas tman's sepe.rate expression suggests that the 
co:t!lnission 1 s past hostility to multiple-carload rates was 
s' 
based on considerations of public policy rather than on tran 
porta tion conditions, u that is to say, that such preferences 
would tend to concentrate business in the hands of large 
concerns contrary to the public interest." He c ontinues to 
point out, however, that "other forms of transportation which 
compete with the railroads can lawfully, and do, give the shipper 
of large quantities a decided advantage over the shipper of 
-106-
quantities equivalent to a railroad carload . This is true 
of pi pe-line trans portation, by its ver y nature, and it 
is also true of water transportation, where the shipper 
who can fill a boat or a barge can normally have his com-
modities · carried on more favorable terms than the shipper 
of lesser quantities . In recent years , also, these oppor-
tunities for transportation advantage to the large shipper 
have increased continually and rapidly . 
"Such a situation is presented here . This is a preference 
i n favor of large shipments which exists and which is lawful. 
The record also shows clearly that the railroads can move 
molasses in multiple carload quan tities at a materially lower 
cost per 100 pounds , t h an they can move single carloads. 
The question at issue is whether it is lawful for them to 
make rates which reflect this inherent advantage in volume 
sh i pments in order to compete more effectivelY, and profitably 
with existing water transportation . In my judgment it is 
lawful. 11 
The chairman then goes on to discuss briefly the pertinent 
de cisions of the past, dealing at one point with the citation 
of Wi e;ht v . United States, 167 U.S. 512 , in support of the 
argument that 11 compe ti tion ca_rmot be offered as a. valid excuse 
for discrimination." The basis for the discrimination, Mr. 
Eas t man replies, 11 is not the competition, but . rather the 
differen ce in cost of service, which enables the railroads to · 
compete more effectively and profitably through the medium of 
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volume shipments than through the med ium of single carloads." 
On the question of whether the 14-cen t rate had been justified, 
:Mr. Eastman resolved his doubts i n f avor of the 15-cent rate, 
"especialJ_y in view of the known revenue needs of the railroads." 
COh·ilviiSSIONER PORTER DISSENTS 
Lau.YJ.ching his dissent, Commissi oner Porter told his 
colleagues that "we are admonished to 'remove not the ancient 
landmarks which the f.athers have set 1 • 11 He went on to point 
out how the decis ion removes "a landmark set up by tbat eminent 
jurist, 'rhoma.s M. Cooley, speaking for a unanimous commission 
in the first year of the commission's existence." ( Providence 
Coal Company v. Providence & w. R. Go . , li.C.C. 107 ) "The 
fundamenta l principle that the small shipper is entitled to 
have his product carried at the same rate as the large shipper, 
' 
and that to permit the large shipper through any device to 
enjoy a less charge than the small shipper was discriminatory 
and prohibited by the Act, 11 Mr. Porter next asserts, :twas 
adhered to and reproclaimed in no less than 25 cases from 
1887 to 1918, the last definite pronouncement by the entire 
commission on this subject. Everybody, no doubt, thinking 
that the subject of trainload or other species of wholesale 
rates had been definitely settled by us, allowed the subject 
to rest from 1918 to t he present. 
"There has been no substantial change in conditions 
during t he last t wenty years that should cause us to overturn 
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our long line of prior pronouncernents . Competition existed 
when they were made as it does today.. The Mississippi was 
running to the sea as now. In any event, competition 
cannot be offered as a valid excuse for .discrimination. 11 
In the latter connection Mr. Porter cites Wight v.u.s., 
the relevance of which was also discu ssed by Chairman Eastman, 
as noted above. Continuing to other citations, Mr.Porter finds 
his aforementioned 1918 pronouncement on 11 the wholesale theory 
of transportation 11 in Private Wire Contracts, 50 I, c.c. 731,757, 
wherein the unanimous decision was wTittem 11by my illustrious 
predecessor, Commissioner Hall." 
Next comes the dissenting commissioner's expression of 
concern over the addition of the train-load-rate theory to 
other "discriminatory tendencies" in present-day rate making. 
"If, because of economy in transportation and competition, 
trainload rates are good for blackstrap molasses, 11 he asks, 
"why are they not good for the shipment of oil from the 
midcontinent field to Central territory; for the shipment 
of lak e cargo coal to the Great Lakes or for the sh i pment 
of sugar from New Orleans to Chicago? Once embarked upon the 
sea of these discriminatory rates there is no telling to 
what harbor t h ey may lead. 11 
Railway Age-December 23 ,1939 Vol.l07 No. 26 pp 969-971 
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I N'rERSTATE Cm.'11mRCE CONTI'HSSION S~TS NEW . FEE STANDARDS 
A new standar d of fees governing railroad reorganization 
work has b een es tablished by the Inter sta te Conunerce Commis-
sion in th~ Ch i cago and Eastern Illi nois Railway c a~e. This 
road, wh i ch appears lik ely to be t he i ni tia l Class I carrier 
to emerge from Secti on 77 t rusteesh i p, has been the first 
large road on which t h e Int erstate Commerce COI!hlliss i on has 
exercised its po\•rer t o . s e t a ceiling on the fees whi ch may 
be allowed by t he cour t . 
Up to now, fee petitions were pas s ed u pon solely by the 
judge , with opposition possible only from other at tor n ey s 
who, b ecause they were so vulnerable, were . seldom open ly 
critical. The fee maxima set are i mportant, as t hey may 
also a pply to other rai lroad reorgani zati ons before t h e 
corrrmission and the courts. Lar ge fee s paid attorney s in past 
rai lroad receiversh i p case s , prior to enactment of Section 77, 
have been sever e l y critici zed i n vari ous official quarters. 
Couns e l fe es in t h e 1925-1928 St . Pau l reor ganization were 
t er med scanda l ous by t he Wheeler Senate Committee which inve s ti-
gated rai lroad f inances. 
In i ts act i on on the Chicago and Ea s ter n Illinois Rail-
way fees, t h e Interstate Commer ce Commission not on l y d iscard ed 
part s of clai ms on t h e e;round t hat t h e work perf ormed was 
i r r elevant to the r e organi zat i on , but a l s o t er med applica tions, 
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at rates rangin g from (~.25 to ~1;1 40 an hour for services, 
"excessive" when t h e all-inclusive types of work ranging dovm 
to telephone calls and correspondence by junior as well as 
senior associates and partners is taken into account. 
The con~i ssion also laid down t he princi ple that con sidera-
ti on must b e 8iven the financially distressed condition of t h e 
debtor as well as t h e requirement of Section 77 of the ban1:::-
ruptcy Act t hat expenses and fees mus t be reasonable. 
Previously, in the Savannah and Atlanta Railroad case, 
the co~~i ssion sharply reduced claims for fees which had been 
approved by the Federal Court and had been agreed upon by the 
bondholders and equity intere.sts. vTh.ile stating t hat these 
a pprovals were entitled to consideration, the COP.'ll1i ssion 
declared that its duty , under the statute, of fixing maximum 
limi ts within which t he judge may make allowances is an in-
dependent respon s ibi lity that may be neither relieved, relaxed , 
nor circumscribed by reason of agreements of the parties as 
to what may be reasonable allowances. 
The corwd ssion als o maintained that consideration had to 
be given to the contributive nature of the services performed 
and t o the extent to which the activities were due to the 
dictates of self-interest of individuals or groups as dis-
tinguished from the central purpose of completing a plan. 
A maximum of ~p256 , 036.49 for fees and expenses was 
established by the corr~ission for the Chicago and Eastern 
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Illinois r eorganiza tion, covering not only past services, but 
also t h ose servi ces to be performed before t he reorganization 
is consu.rnrnated. This amount is now subject to r eview by the 
United States District judge and to downwar d revision if h e 
shoul d find such a course advisable. 
Claims made and a llowances fixed by t he commission were 
a s follows: 
Claimant 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
Chemical Bank and Trust 
Amount 
Cl a i me d 
~n:: 751 5"' 
'iil G, • 0 
7,651.13 
Wright, Gordon, Zachry and Parlin) 
Burry , Johnstone, Peters and Dixon ) 
Centra l Hanover Bank 
12 ,515.49 
7,790.19 
15,000.00 
9 ,086 .76 
2,723.02 
Reedl5 ,500.00 
Larkin,Rathbone and Perry 
Gilruth , Beck and McConnel 
Gu a ranty Trust Company 
Davis, Polk , Wardwell,Gardiner and 
Tenney, Hardin,Sherman and Rogers 
Irving Trust Company 
Davis, Auerbach ,Cornell e.nd Hardy 
Isham,Lincoln and Beale 
Protective Commi t tee--Gen. Mtg.bonds 
Louis B. Wehle 
Lump sura for future expenses of all 
parties except protec tive committee 
3, 825.00 
650.00 
315.00 
100.00 
77,534.95 
88 ,619.30 
MR.ximum 
Fi xed 
~?4 , '751. 56 
6 , 651.13 
5,515.49 
6,090 .19 
4,500 .00 
3 ,539.26 
2,423.02 
9,000.00 
2,175.00 
300. 00 
365.00 
150.00 
75,000.00 
29,000.00 
Kenneth D. Steere) No s pec:ific amount 
Ernest s . Ballard) cla i med 
$247,062. 40 ~154 ,460. 65 
27 , 008 . 94 
64 , 566 . 90 
;];;256' 036. 49 
Fees actually claimed totaled :/~ 247, 0621 but t h e c ommis-
sian pared this amount to ~>1 64 , 460 . 1-.~aximurn fe es to be 
allowed at t orney s wer e placed at levels ranging from about 
~;; 9 an hour to about :(;il2. 50 an hour, r epresenting an average on 
t h e hour s clai med to have been wor ked and covering compensation 
not only for senior partners and junior associates, but off ice 
overhead, a s well. 
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In the fee hearings before Federal Judge Jo~~ P. Barnes, 
the attOl~neys were mildly critical of t h e level that was 
established by the Interstate Co@nerce Commission. They 
pointed out to the court that the low level t h ey are being 
ask ed to accept in railroad reorganiza tion mi ght affect t h e 
char ges they ·would b e able to obtain from large corporate 
cli ents. They asked that the judge con sider the Interstate 
Commerce Commission's maximum fee recommendations as minimum 
. ( 1) 
recommendatlons, a s well. 
l. Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1 CJ39 
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CHAPTER VII 
SECTIO N 77 OF THE BANKRUFTCY ACT SUJ.SJI'fARI Z!!..'D 
Briefly, under Section 77,the railroad company vol-
untarily, or five per cent in amount of its creditors, 
may i nstitute in a Pederal district court the proceeding 
for invoking the court's custody. On a voluntary petition 
the court will, ~~don a contested involuntary petition it 
may, tak e jurisdiction of the company, not as a bankrupt, 
but as a "Debtor," on the ground eithe r that the company is 
insolvent or is unable to meet its debts as they mature. 
The court, according to Subdivision (c), "may" appoint a 
trustee or trustees whose powers and duties are ak in to t hose 
of a receiver in equity, with this addition among others--
that he must soon file as a public record a list of all 
bondholders and stockholders with their addresses, if known. 
The :i:nterstate Cmmnerce Commission after hearings duly held 
for the presentation of proposed reorganization plans, is to 
recommend a Plan, which, among other things, besides limiting 
allowable reorganization fees and expenses, and being fair as 
between classes of security holders, and safeguarding ( as will 
later be shovm) the rights of non-assen ting creditors or 
stockholders constituting one-third or more of their class, 
must be financially advisable and compatible with the public 
interest. But the Commission may not finally certify its 
approval of a Plan to the court until two-thirds in amount of 
every class of creditors and of stockholders "whose claims or 
interests would be affected by the Plan," shall have accepted 
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such Plan; with thi s f urther· proviso, however-- that such 
acceptance by stockholders is not required for confirmation 
by the court if it finds (a) that the company is insolvent, 
or (b) that the Plan does not adversely affect the stockholders, 
or (c) that they are bound by the company's acceptance of the 
Plan. Subdivision (g),Clause (5) sets forth protection which 
the reorganizers must provide: first, for the non-assenting 
creditors constituting one-third or more of their class, second, 
to the non-assenting stockholders constituting one-third or 
more of their class, whose acceptance of the Plan is dispensed 
with by ap plication of one of the three tests above, and, third, 
to the non-assenti ng stockholders constituting one-third or 
more of their class where their consent is . not thus dispensed 
with, through tests (a), (b), or (c) above. Such protection 
to creditors consists, at least, of either (1) the sale of 
the property subject to their liens,if any; or (2) the sale 
free of such liens, if any, at not less than a .. fair upset 
price set by the Commission, together with payment to the 
creditors at their election of either the amount of their 
old claims or the au.lO'~J.nt offered in exchange for the!Jl under 
t h e Plan. In cases where the stockholders' _acceptance of' the 
Plan is not dispensed with as noted above, the protection to 
the dissenti n3 stockholders cons tituting mo re than one-th:i:t•d 
of t hei r class is sinnlar to t hat accorded bondhol ders; that 
is, they may have a sale at not less than an u pset price, or 
else payment on the basis of an apprai s al by the Com: .. rnission, 
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either for what t hei r old stock ? or the new stock or rights 
offered them, may be worth. 
Two points whi ch will be discuss ed later, are to be 
noted about the court's confirmation of the Plan, under Sub-
division (g ); first, that the court i n confirming the Plan 
n eed not find it to be compatible with the public interest, 
and second, that, by language difficul t to construe other-
wi se, the court seems to be expressly prohibited from confirm-
ing any plan unless the Commission shall have certifi ed its 
a pproval of' it; for, s ays the concluding part of Subdivision 
(f): "No plan of reorganization shall be confirmed in any 
proceeding under this section except upon the approval of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission certifi ed to the court." 
Subdivision (h) provides that "the confirmation of the plan 
shall discharge the debtor from its d ebts except as provided 
in the plann; and that "in the event that the judge should 
disapprove the plan he shall file an opinion stating his reason s 
therefor." 
The Act does not purport to abridge t h e remedies available 
in equity; i t even expressly contempl a tes t hat Equity receivers 
of railroad companies may still be a ppoi nted by federal or 
state courts. Moreover, it provides tha t if there be a failure 
to effect reorganization in a Section 77 proceeding, the 
court (apparently even on its own motion ) may terminate the 
proceeding by dismdssal; and that the court in its order of 
dismissal may provide for direct transfer of the properties 
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to an equity receiver whether acting under a federal or state 
court. On the other hand, it also provides f'or a method by 
whi ch a company in equi ty receivership may take advantage of 
the Act. 
SECTION 77 AMENDEDt(DESIGNED TO SPEED RAIL REORGANI ZATI ON ) 
A new procedure under which antagonistic minorities can 
no longer stall rail reorganization is established under the 
uni form bankruptcy system ·act, passed by Congress in almost 
the exact forin in whi ch it was drafted by the Railroad 
Coordinator's staff. 
A last minute addition placed in the bill by the Senate 
and not yet approved by the House, extends the scope of the 
provision that appointment of a road of ficial as a trustee 
must be matched by appointment of an independent co-trustee. 
In the ori ginal bill this provision was to b e effective from 
the time of enactment of the new legislation. Under the 
· amendment, however, the provision wou l d apply likewise to roads 
whi ch have reorganization plans under way. 
Among important roads which fall among those affected by 
the amendment are the Chicago, Milwaukee, st. Paul & Pacific, 
and the Chicago & North Western. 
M~NDS SECTION 77 
The new law is an amenili~ent to Section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Under provisions of Secti on 7'7, if more than 
one-th ird of the holders of a single class of security dis-
sent or fail to vote on a reorganization plan, it may be 
blocked. 
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Whi le the new runendB.tory l aw provides that the cou rts 
shall confirm a reorganization plan, ~ f creditors and stock -
holders of each class of security holding more than two-thirds 
accept, it is further provided that: 
11If the plan has not been so accepted by the creditors and 
stockh olders, the judge may nevertheless confirm the plan if 
he is satisfied and finds, after heari ng, that it makes adequate 
provision for fair and equitable treatment for the interests 
or claims of those rejecting it; that such rejection is not 
reasonably justified in the light of the respective ri ghts 
and interests of those rejecting it and all the relevant facts." 
A major effect of passage of the new law is this ri ght 
of the courts, and the Interstate Commerce Commi ssion, to 
prescribe plans over the objection of minorities. 
The bill carries a provision leaving the matter of time 
to the discretion of the court, whereas under the old law it 
was the duty of the court to throw cases back into equity if 
there was not prompt reorganization. 
Friends of the new amendatory law anticipate that it may 
well work out as a complete substitute for the equity procedure . 
An important provision of the new law is that which pro-
vides comprehensive regulation by the Interstate Coramerce 
Commission of the activities of protective committees. Such 
committees are required to cornply with rules and regulations 
prescribed by the Colimd ssion. 
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The new law also provides that t he courts order 
investigation of any irregularities OP mi smanagement on the 
part of the existing management of a carrie r in reorganization. 
The Viall St r eet Journal, Washi._ne; t on Bureau, August 22 ,1935 
-119-CHAPTER VIII 
ACTION UNDER ""-SECTION 77 
Altogether, fourteen proceedings had been instituted 
nnder Section 77 up to December 1934, of which one (by a 
small property ) was disrdssed. Of t hose pending, five 
involve Class I roads, instituted on the dates, in Federal 
district courts, in cities, as follows: 
Missouri Pacific Railway Company, March 31, 1933, 
in St. Louis. · 
Chicago and Eastern Illinois, April 18, 1933, 
iri Chicago. 
St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company,May 16,1933, 
in St. Louis. 
Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, June 7, 
1933, in Chicago. 
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville, December 30,1933, 
in Chicago. 
The other eight cases involve minor properties, only two 
having been instituted in 1934. 
The slow rate of progress of these five major Section 77 
cases tmvard a reorganization plan has been in marked contrast 
to what the Act contemplated and what its fra~ers apparently 
(1) 
expected. Under the Act and the special bankruptcy rule 
promulgated by the Supreme Court for practice under it, before 
the Corr~ission can hold a public hearing upon a plan of 
reorganization, the debtor or trustee must have filed in court 
a classification of creditors and stockholders, an act of such 
simplicity that it could in most cases have been easily 
accomplished within a few days after the filing of the petition. 
Yet, in the Missouri Pacific Case, it took the debtor seventeen 
l.President Hoover's message to the Congress, Jan1J_ary ll,l933,Doc. 
No.522, 72d Congress. 
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!.'!onths to file such clnss.l.ficr.~.tl :m ; ln the Roc.{ Ial..: •d Case , 
sc•,:on r:1on.ths; ln the Chlcaco, Indlnna.;}ol~s and Lo 'lsville 
Ct..ne, eleven n:onthn; -nd 11 t~1e Chlc~go e.n<:: .:.uetc:r.n I"':i.ino1s 
Cr se, seventeen uwntha . I'he only pro;>ooed cor..t..;>rei:::.ensl ve :.,lan 
J"ct prflS~.nted in any of the five cu~es ¥ms filed .:..~ ·~he 
Ch .... ca.go ur.d Ba.otern- Illlnois Cnso on Jur.c 27, 100•1 •,. a. bond .. 
holders t protect1vc cor; .1itLeet 
In nut1ber and t "1:po, the steps taken in these five cases 
by the parties ln interest co :uare none too fuvora:Jly \iltl1 
the steps ln the average rD..ill"oa · equity rel.!eiversll.l}> procec6.1ne; 
ovor n sitr.ilnr period; and in ~one of tnen:~ th")re seemed to be 
a slowing-up during the last six l/tonthn in 1934., 
Another significant ff\ct ls that nlthollgh rail earnings 
had been gravely docllning alncc o.bout May ; 1934., .... nd severnl 
co..Jpanies ·Jore ln a wrse cone it1on than were some of the flve 
co .:}ani eo when they brou.t,:l'-t h~'"" selves under occtlon 77 , tLey 
seca-.ed to have avoided fil!.ng und(:jr it. 
Uncertainty in tho face of practical and le0 al problems 
raloed by Section 77 itself largely accounts for the retnrda .. 
tlon of action under Section 77 and of failure to use it . 
Also , .oanar;ers of cor.1~c·,r:nles ;hlcil should have been in co rt 
c ustody b!t l 'J34 \'tere t- O.tJh!g for• an amendl'!lcnt of the J.econstru o-
tion f'innnee Act YThich :ould ret1ove tho adeq:..1ate ue~v.rlty 
restric-tlon from the Reconstruction Finance Corpor~ tl'>n r a 
lending power, since oo.,.t:. o the C·)rlpnnles haC. no s 'bstnntlal 
free assets left to pledge . 
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In this colli~ection, neith er the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation Act, nor the procedure under it in the Commission 
or in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had tak en any 
cognizance of the mortgage bondholders or other creditors of 
the applicant for a loan. At a time when there had been grave 
concern generally among railroad bondholders over pumping 
government funds into the yawning deficits of companies in or 
approaching a state of collapse, the bondholders had apparently 
been receiving no formal notice from 1Vash ington of contemplated 
loans to the companies. Thus, wedge a f ter wedge, in the form 
of senior mortgage bonds issued or fr e e assets delivered in 
pledge to Reconstruction Finance Corporation, had been driven 
between the rails and the intermediate and junior bon dholders. 
Under such condi t ions, companies' officers representing 
t h e stock have tended to gambie away t he position of the bond-
h olders while playing the remote hope of prosperity's sudden 
return, a gamble originally justified in large measure by t h e 
government's exigent and summary poli cies for averting general 
collapse before it had supplied its many emergency props 
beneath the monetary and banking struc ture. There seemed to 
have been no organized or formal protest by bondholders a gainst 
this ex-parte procedure in the makin g of Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation loans; yet it intensified the gravity of the 
reorganization problem, and sh ould be remedied in some. way, 
whether by statute or by procedural r egulation, so that the 
bondh olders may be heard, and allowed to oppose, or to bear 
part of t h e responsibility for loans made by the government. 
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It should be recalled that there were present special 
and unprecedented circumstances, wi t b. which reorganization 
had not ordinarily been faced in the past, and which would 
induce hesitation in any .proceeding whether in Equity or in 
Bankruptcy. First, private credit being paralyzed, there 
was missing the dynamic motivation of the u;nderwriting banker, 
ordinarily the Plan's centralizing impetus. Although he has 
received much justifiable criticism, his work has often been 
highly constructive. It is realized that, unless Reconstruction 
Finance Gorporation 1 s assistance should still be available, 
or bankers' courage should revive, a sufficient sum in actual 
cash reserves may have to be earned by the property itself, 
while under court control, to defray a ll or a substantial part 
of the expenses of reorganization , to pay off dissenters in 
cash where required by the Act, and to start the new company 
on its way with working capital--funds ordinarily in the past 
large ly m1derwri tten by the banker. Second, Section 77, Subdivi-
sion (e), conditions the Commission's final approval of any 
Plan on i ts having first obtained acceptance by two-thirds of 
the securities of each class,"whose cla ims or interest would 
be affected by the . plan"; otherwise the Plan may be c onfronted 
with heavy and u.r:: certain cash burdens. In t h e past it has 
been the banker with h is exclusive possession of bondholder 
lists and his ramifying connections who has herded in the 
bonds to be credited on the reorganizers' bid at foreclosure sale. 
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In the present state of wi despread fear and distrust, the 
existing protective cormnittees are i n general far from having 
enlisted the statutory two-thirds; and the provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933 affecting protective con~ittees have 
had a markedly retarding effect upon the formation of new ones. 
Third, the catastrophic loss of traffic to highways and 
waterways is in some cases necessitating unprecedented programs 
of rail abandonment, ·i•lhich involve much accounting study and 
Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings of unknown duration. 
The results of these prospective abandonments, if allowed, are 
baffling, especially as to their bearing u pon the ' rights, under 
a Plan, of holders of bonds under divisional mortgages on 
properties marked for abandonment. 
Perhaps the sluggish progress of cases under Section 77 
can be mainly accounted for by the new ri ght s and safeguards 
accorded by it t o the stockho lder with which the bondholders 
must reckon either for acquiescence or f or challenge. 
NE'N CONTRACTUAL PATr ERNS FOR RAIL SECURITIES 
The appraisal of Section 77 will be projected against 
the assumption that sound public policy requires the preserva-
tion of Transportation as privately owned industry and that, 
as such, transportation will be depending on private i nvestors 
satisfied with their ri~flts under the railroad securities 
which they must be induced to buy, presumably through bankers 
willing to underwrite them. 
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Let us con sider dire ctly how those ri ghts should be 
reformed; but f irst, for better orientation in our considera-
tion of Section 77, it should be said that from the viewpoint 
of public policy, t h e nature of the l egal ri ghts of the future 
i nvestor in railroads is of distinctly secondary i mportan ce 
as far as the pr e s erva tion of priva te ownership is concerned. 
Overshadowing in t h eir necessity are: first, t he simplification 
by eliminations, and the recasting into integrated coherence, 
(1) 
of the entire rail ser vice; second, the comprehensive and 
consi stent coordination and federal re gulation of all a gencies 
of commercial transportation including trucks, buses, boats, 
aircraft, and pipe lines; and t h ird, the federal . government's 
gradua l withdrawal of all such a gencies from state and local 
t axation except for carrying on l y t h ose expenses of local 
government as are actually due to their presence; since, if 
sound financing of such transportation a gencies under federal 
regulation is to be had, they must be free from irrelevant 
exacti ons i n cident to supporting i n l a r ge measure the varying 
and often i mprovident budgets of the States and their taxing 
( 2 ) 
subdivisions. 
In regard to the problem of safegu a rding private mvnership 
i n the rails by ins uring t he ir .fin ancial support t hrough 
priva te i n ve.stment, we find the greatest single advance achieved 
by Section 77 is in its af fording the Comn1ission's guidance 
from the beginning of the reorganization process, and in its 
1. Sena.te document No. l l9, 73d Con gress, 2d Session lT::J 34). 
2. Bureau of Railway Economics, Special Series No.6l 
Wash i ngton l934, 11 Railway Taxation". 
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requirement that the Plan have the Commission's approval 
before being finally submitted to the Court. But the terms 
of Section 77 would not support the Commission's or even the 
court's insistence upon the new company 's incorporating into 
its certificate of i ncorporation, its mortgages, and its 
stock certificates any substantial part of the definite 
principles of financial and corporate policy which the mis takes 
of the p~st i ndicate to be hi ghly desirable. 
SECTI ON 77 AS THE ST OCKHOLDERS' WEAPON AGAINST THE THUST 
FUND PR.LNCIPLE 
It is apparent that one special objective of this section, 
an ob j ective which a.t first i mpression, as a measure of relief, 
has something to recommend it as an idea for the emer gency, 
could hardly have been incorporated i n a statute to fit into 
Equity railroad reorganization procedure because it is . so 
totally in conflict with the established pr inciples of Equity. 
In Equity, the foreclosure sale ordinarily wipes out the stock-
h older, and hi s only salvation lies in the place offer ed to 
him by the Plan. That place he is apt to purchase with funds 
which, in turn, constitute part of the new company's work ing 
capital. · But in the pending emergency, the stock equity 
s hould not, if a sot.md and valid method could be evolved, suff er 
permanent extingui shment of an inter est which, with recovery 
of general conditions, might re gain at least some of its value. 
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Today the .stock interest in a company in reorganization, 
even when allied with banking support, has hardly been able 
to command funds or credit such as. I'!light salvage its position 
under a plan. Congress was a pparently moved to relieve this 
pli ght of the stockholder. In doing so, it gave to the stock-
holders the leverage of an unprecedented powe r for compelling 
the creditors to accord to them what they might regard as 
t heir proper place in t h e Plan. As the Act was so drafted, 
it requires consent of two-thirds of the stock to the Plan, 
unless the creditors can convince t h e jud~e either that the 
corporation 's assent to the creditors' plan has been given, 
or that the Plan does not adversely affect the stockholders, 
or that the company is insolvent . The two-th irds consent of 
the stockholders is also unnecessary :if the judge finds t hat 
the Plan makes adequate provision f or the protection of the 
stockholder's equity by a sale at a fair upset price, or by 
appraisa l of his old or new securities. 
This condition f or avoiding domin.ance of the stockholder 
is so di f ficult to satisfy under the peculiar and .settled 
de fin itions of bankruptcy law t hat sueh stockholders dominance 
is a strong probability. If the creditors.,; in connection vvith 
t heir Plan, are unable, f or instance, to probe the company 's 
i nso l vency, t hen they must tak e care of non-as senting stockholder s 
amounting to one-third or more-- either by sale of the properties 
at an u pset price as de termined by the Commission, or by paying 
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such stockholders for their stock in the old company , or 
the new, as the Commission may appraise its value. 
Apparently in the hour of t he creditor's decision as 
t o whether or not they will accord to the stockholders the 
positi on t hey demru1.d under the Plan, they may face as an 
alternative t he uncertain burdens eith er of having to meet 
cash payments under an upset price, t o be later f ixed by the 
Commission, or of assuming cash payment s to the stockholders 
in undetermined amounts to b e based on the Co@nission•s future 
appraisal of the value of the properties. In su ch future 
estimate and appraisal, the c~editors will presurr~bly encounter 
the Conwission's hi storical involvement with the concep t of 
"physical value" based largely on cos t i nstead of on earning 
power, which dates from the valuation amendment of March 1, 1913. 
This extreme change_, · whereby it may well be the stockholders 
instead of the creditors who can legally and legitimately 
dominate a r eorganization, is Sec.tion 77 1 s outstanding innovation. 
T}:!...rough it, the banldng interests, which have ordinarily in 
t he past profited largely from stock equities captured out 
of reor ganizati on, have obtained t h eir first formidable weapon 
of offense a gainst t he principl e that 11 t he properties of a 
corporation constitute a trust fund for t he payment of its 
debts 11 , as repeatedly app:J_ied by the Supreme Court. In 1868, 
Justice Clifford in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad 
( 1) 
Company vs. Howard, c ame to express t h is principle for the 
1. 7 Wall 392 u. S. 1868 
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court in a ca.se where, the railroad being in financial 
difficulties, stockho lders had effected an arrangement with 
bondholders for a sale of the properties which would have 
been advantageous to the stockholders but prejudicial to 
unsecured creditors. In upholding t h e contentions of the · 
(1) 
latter, Justice Clifford declared that; 
11 Equity re gards the property of a corporation as held 
in trust for the payment of the debts of the corporation , 
and recognizes t he right o'f creditors to pursue it into 
whosesoever possession it may be. transferred , unless it 
has passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser; and 
the rule is well settled that stockholders are not 
entitled to any share of the capital stock nor to any 
divid~nd of the profits until all the debts of the 
corporation are pa id. 11 
In 1934, the principle had an i mpressive reaffirmat ion 
' ( 2) 
in Pirst National Bank of Cincinnati 'ITS.Flershern, where 
the court, through Mr. Justice Brandeis, condemned both an 
u pset price.and a plan of reorganization which had prejudiced 
the ri ghts of the non-assenting credi t ors. 
DUE PROCES S AND TI~E ... 1HNORITY NON-ASSElJTING BONDHOLDER 
Let us first consider, from the due process standpoint, 
the effect of the Act upon the minority non-assenting bondholder 
vis-a vis the majority alone, and assun1ing -that the Plan provides 
nothing for the stockh olde.rs. The Plan, if typical, -yields 
to the minority bondholders, for exruaple, only the ri~~t to 
receive securities in a new company in lieu .of his old bonds 
and, alth ough a dissenter from the Plan,. he has no optional 
alternative right, as under Equi ty procedure, to receive cash 
1.7 Wall 409 u. S. 1868 
2.290 u. s. 504 1934 
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at the hands of the court in satis fa ction of his old interest, 
whether as his proportionate par t of proceeds of a sale of the 
property, or as t he appraisal value of his interest. The 
question never seems to have been directly dealt with by a 
federa l court as to whether such treatment of the minority 
bondholder pursuant to a federal or state statute would 
constitute a violation of due process. 
Under Section 77, a Plan, after being accepted by two-th irds 
of a class of bondho lders, may be apr..:-roved by the Commission, 
and confi r med by the Court. That Plan may allot securities 
to the minority non-assenting bondholders and may withhold 
from him, as a alternative to the allotted securities, all 
ri gl1.t to cash whether from a sale or otherwise. 
DUE PROCESS AND THE ST OCKHOLDER 1 S NEW P01IffiR OVER THE BONDHOLDERS 
It is obvious that Section 77's coercion of the minority 
non-assenting bondholder into the Plan at the hands of the 
majority of his class could give rise to a serious due process 
contention. But a far more serious question of due process 
seems to b e raised by the m1.precedented power given by Section 
77 to the stockholder over the reorganization, not only c ontrary 
to the trust fund principle as developed by the Supreme Court 
in the interest of all creditors, but also inconsistently with 
the. Anglo-American traditional exclusive right.of a secured 
creditor to the whole value in his security until h is debt be 
paid. The test would come especially where a non-assenting 
minority creditor would be forced by the Act to accept securities 
under a Plan negotiated between the majority and the stocl\:holders. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE CHANDLER ACT 
The Chandler Act, making capital readjustment plans 
binding upon small minorities, was signed by the President 
during the closing days of the present session of Congress. 
Abandonment of the major part of the railroad legislative 
program for the year 1939 is indicated. 
As finally passed, the Chandler Act is a compromise 
between the House and Senate bills. I t provides that if a 
plan is approved by 25 per cent of the affected creditors, 
the balance of deposits may be sought during Interstate 
Commerce Commission consideration. If it is approved by 
the Commission within six months and by two-thirds of the 
affected creditors, including 50 per cent of each class, it 
may be filed with the Federal district court within a year 
of enactment of the legislation or before July 31,1940. If 
approved by the court and by 75 per cent of the creditors 
affected, including 60 per cent of each class, it becomes 
effective. 
Interstate Commerce Comn1ission a pproval is necessary 
pursuant to Section 20A of the Transportation Act of 1920, 
dealing with issuance and modification of securities.· The 
Commission must pass upon the practicability of the voluntary 
proposals, judging whether earnings of the debtor are suffi-
cient to cover the reduced fixed charges, and also certify 
that the company is not in need of reorganization under 
Section 77. 
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As a result or the Chandler Act, the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad Company has riled its plan with the District Court 
at Baltimore. It was able to secure assents rrom holders or 
87.82 % or the bonds affected, and also from the Interstate 
Commerce Comnussion. When declared operative, fixed interest 
charges will be cut by $11,837,063, or from $31,421,742 to 
~pl 9 , 644,697. The greater part of the contingent interest 
will be paid, in whole or in part, if earned. The plan is to 
be operative f or eight years, with unpaid interest cumulative 
and payable in full before preferred dividends can be declared. 
Interest reduction.s proposed: 
Secured Unsecured 
Fixed Contin~ent Contin~ent 
Secured 5-year notes 4t •s 4% 
l~'irs t Mortgage 5's 4 r at /0 
Southwestern Division 5's 3ta 1! 
Refunding and General Mortgage: 
Series A 5's 1 4of /0 
tl c 6's 1.2 4.8 
ff D 5's 1 4 
ff F 5's 1 4 
II B and E 6's 1.2 4.8 
Convertible 4ta's 41 2 • 
Buffa1o,Rochester & Pittsburgh 
consolidated 4i's 3 1! 
Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western 
5's 3 2 
Tn addition, maturity of the Pittsburgh, Lake Erie & 
West Virginia lst.4's, 1941 would be extended ten years; 
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maturity of the Secured 4-! .% notes, due August 1, 1939, 
would be extended five years and interest reduced to 4 %; 
maturity of the Lincoln Park & Charlotte lst.5's,l939, would 
be extended ten years; and the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion and Public Work Administration loans would be extended 
five years. Court hearings on t he plan began September 18 
and final approval to debt adjustment plan was given on 
November 8, 1939 by t h e three-judge Federal Court, Baltimore. 
The Lehigh Valley also obtained the requisite number of 
assents · as well as the Interstate Commerce Corrnnission approval 
of its plan and filed with the court shortly after the Chandler 
Act became l aw. Its plan provided for a ten-year extension 
of the following maturities: 
Pennsylvania & New York Canal & Railroad lst.4's,4¥t 's and 5's 
due 1939. 
Lehigh Valley Railway lst.4i's due 1940. 
Lehi gh Valley Terminal Railway lst.5's due 1941. 
It would also extend for five years from due dates 75% 
of each of the five coupons maturing from November 1,1938 to 
November 1, 1940, on the General Consolidated Mortgage bonds. 
The Lehigh plan, under which i nterest requirements will 
be greatly i ncreased in 1943, 1944 and 1945, is more hazardous 
than that of the Baltimore & Ohio Plan. A relatively high 
level of earnings will be necessary if the road is to escape 
further difficulties four years hence. 
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CF.._.(I.PTER X 
THE BOSTON & li~INE PLAN TO REFINANCE DEBT 
.An opportunity for New England to lead the way in amicable 
financial reorganization of a railroad without the usual de-
lays, lawsuits, r e ceiverships and uncertainties was made possi-
ble in the Boston & Maine's plan :for reorganization January 3, 
(1) 
1940. 
Local bankers and financial institutions are supporting 
this voluntary plan of' reorganization of' the Boston & Maine 
Railroad, believing that the present bondholders will secure 
through t his plan just about what would be derived from bank-
ruptcy proceedings without the loss of several years' time. 
They described a peaceful and voluntary settlement as in-
finitely better than the slow and profitless progress in the 
courts. It was pointed out that receiver ships can be of' long 
duration. For instance, the Pittsburgh, Shawmut and Northern 
Railroad has been in receivership since l 905 and the Minneapol i s 
and St.Louis Railroad, since 1923, while the plain , garden varie-
(2) 
ty of receiverships run up to ten years. 
:Ln a letter to the bondholders on December 30,1939 , Mr. 
French, President of' the Boston & Maine Ha.ilroad pointed out 
that for some time, much concern had been expressed about the 
ability of the Railroad to avoid _reorganization under Section 
77 of the Bankruptcy Act or in other court proce edings. Further-
more, the Railroad had been advised that the Reconstruction 
..::-- -----------l~ New York Herald Tribune, Jarruary 4, 1940,pl. 
2 . Boston Chr i stian Science Monitor, J anuary 5, 1940 , p l. 
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Finance Corporation would n ot advance further funds unless 
it r earr ange its debt structure and reduce its fixed char ges. 
The Rai lroad's maturing obligations in the pe rio d Octobe r 
31,1939 to December 31,1944, both inclusive, amount to 
$63 ,300,486 consisting of: 
Mortgage Bonds •••••••••••••••••••• $31,925,000 
Equipment Obligations............. 5,999 , 8 56 
Secured Notes issued to Public Work s 
Administration ......•.......•....• 3,339, 000 
Secured Notes issue d to Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and to banks... 16 , 527,630 
Guaranteed and othe r l e ased line 
obligations •••••••••••••••••••••••• 5,507,000 
Of t h is total amount, ;ipl2,660,885 of obligations mature 
in 1 940 alone. Mr. French g oe s on to say: 
'' In these circumstances , i t is essential that steps be 
i mmediately taken to anticipate the early maturities and 
to improve the financial condition of t he Railroad . The 
experience of other railroads indic a tes that p roce edings 
under Section 77 of t he Bankruptcy Act or in receiver-
s h ip woul d be long and expensive, with resulting c on-
fusion and decline in mar k et values of securities and 
might r e sult i n suspension of all interest payments for 
i n def inite perio ds. On the o ther hand, with the co-
operation of holders of t he Bonds and Secured Notes, 
a p lan may be effected by voluntary agreement among such 
h olders . This a lt ernat ive seems so clearly in the inter-
ests of all holders of Bonds and Secured Notes and of 
the public t h at t h e Railro a d fe els that it is under duty 
to propose and to en deavor to c arr y out a voluntar y p lan 
whereby such holders may obtain the benefits of a 
p rompt and orderly reorg ani zation." 
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"To this end and after consultation an d negoti ation with · 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with representa-
tives of holders of large blocks of Bonds, and wi t h the 
banks t hat hold Secured Notes, the following Pl an of 
E.."'{change, dated De cember 15, 1939, is submitted by the 
Railroad. 11 
PLAN OF EXCHAl'TGE 
Basis of Exch~ge and Cash Option 
1. Bonds 
Each holder of Bonds (other t han those held as c9llateral 
for the Secured Notes) who assents to t h is Plan vdll, if it is 
consUJnmated, receive in exchange for and in payrnen t of e ach 
$.a, 000 principal amount of such b on ds (accompanied by s.ll clai ms 
for unpaid inter est) ; 
(a) $ 500 principal &.-nount of new First Mortga ge Bonds, 
Series R. R., 4;~, due 1960, or, at the holder's election, 
$ 500 in cash (subject, however ,to adjustment as pro-
vided below); and 
(b) ~$500 princ~pal amount of new Income Mortga ge Bonds, 
Series A,4~%, due 1970 . · 
If the amount of cash required to compl y with elections 
under (a) should be in excess of the 1;:26,000,000 which the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation has a greed to put into the 
Railroad for t his purpose, each h older who shall have elected 
to take cash shall be entitled to receive his pro rata share 
of the cash so available. 
(a) Reconstruction Finance Corporation will , if the Plan 
is consu..'":lrnated, receive i n payment of the Secured Notes held 
by it cash equal to the principal amount of such Secured Notes, 
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plus accrued interest. New First Mortgage Bonds, Series R. R., 
4~0,due 1960, of a principal amount equal to the principal 
amount of such Secured Notes are to be sold for cash, and the 
proceeds of such sale will be used towards making this pay-
ment t o the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
(b) Each banl{ holding Se cured Notes t h at assents to the 
Plan will, if it is consu~nated, receive i n exchange for and 
in pa~rment of the Secured Notes held by it a pr incipal amount 
of new Pirst Mort gage Bonds equal to the principal amount of 
such Secured Notes, with appropriate adjustment f or . interest 
accrued to the date the Plan is declared operative, but with-
out option to take cash. 
Some of the more important provisions of the i nr1entures 
under which the new Pirst ~/Iortgage Bonds , Series R. R., 4%,due 
1 960 will be issued i nclude the establish~ent of a sinking 
fund i n the amount of one percent of the maximQm amount of 
bonds of the seri es issued, payable only i f and to the extent 
that there is Available Net Income for such sinking fund 
purposes. 
The Avai lable l~et Income for each calendar year shall be 
applied to t he following purposes and in the following order: 
1. $ l,OOO ,OOO.to the · Capi t al Fund. 
2 . 1% t o t he Sinking Fund for the First r:1ortga ge Bonds. 
3. Contingent interest on the Income Mortgage Bonds. 
4 . 1% to the Sinkin g Fund f or the Income Eiortga ge Bonds . 
· 5. Any t hen remaining _Available Net Income may be applied 
to any proper corporate purpose. No divi dend on stock 
of the Rai lroad of any class shall be paid ex cept out 
of e arnings subsequent to December 31,1939 . 
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The New Income l'vTortgage Bonds, Series A, 4i%, due 1970 
will bear contingent interest at the rate of 4!% per annum, 
of which 4% per annum shall be cumulative. Contingent interest 
on these Income Morts age Bonds will be payable if and to the 
ex tent that .Available Net Income is sufficient therefor. A 
sinki ng fund is to be established for the benefit of the Income 
Mortga ge Bonds, Series A, in the amount of 1% of the maximum 
amount of such Series A Bonds issued, payable if and to the 
extent that there is Available Net Income for such sinking 
fund purposes . 
The Boston & Maine Plan does not affect either equipment 
obligations or guaranteed and other obligations of leased lines. 
It make s no readjustment in, and does not affect the voting 
righ-ts of, any of the sever~l classes of stock of the Railroad. 
It does, however, allocate earnings and restrict the pa-y-:ment 
of dividends. -Fur t hermore, the Plan does not contemplate or 
provide for any change in the present management of the Rail-
road. 
Acceptance of the Plan by holders of substantially all 
of the Bonds he ld by t he public and by holders of all o.f the 
Secured Notes will be necessary in order to consUll1Illate the Plan 
on a voluntary basis. 
-138-
CHAPTEH XI 
RAJLHOAD REORGANIZATION PLAl'TS APPHOVED BY 
I NTERSTATE COMMEHCE COMMISS I ON 
THE MI SSOURI PAC I FI C PLAN 
Finding , as it has in numerous other railroad reorganiza-
tion cases, that the common and preferred stock of the Y.Ii s souri 
Pacific has no value and should be accorded no representation 
i n the new company, the Interstate Commerce Commission, on 
.January 1'7, 1940, placed its stamp of approval on a final plan 
of reor ganization for this road which will reduce the total 
capitalization from f;~671,205,664 to i~560,4'78, 9 00 and the total 
annual fixed and contingent charges from ~ 29, 108 ,019 to 
( 1) 
~~21, 695 ' 499 . 
The Commission condemned the debtor's proposed plan as 
calling for too large a capi talization and reaffirme d the fact 
that in this case, as in others recently decided, i t was follow-
i ng the philosophy of the Boyd case in which the Uni ted States 
Supreme Court had held that in a rai lroad reorganization the 
claL :s of all the creditors must be satisfied in full before 
t he equity holders could legally share in the assets of the 
(2) 
new company. 
Despite the f act t ha t many of the creditor groups were 
vfilling to go along with the debtor 1 s modified plan the Com-
mission finds it is n ot in the public interest, since it would 
l. New York Times, January 18 ,1940 . 
2. Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. Boyd, 228 United States 482. 
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result in an excessive capitalization of the nevr company with 
too great a proportion of the capitalization represented by 
debt havi ng a fixed maturity date and does not give reco gnition 
to that part of the creditors' claims representi n g interest 
which has not been earned by the debtors. 
The following table gives a comparison of the annual 
charges of the new company i mmediately upon reorganization 
under the approved plan with the annual charges of the present 
system: 
Annual 
· charges 
after 
Fixed interest 
Capital expenditure fm1d (est.) 
Cont ingent interest (including 2% 
on Plaza-Olive Bldg . Bonds 
Reorganization 
~~7' 286 , 804 . 
2 , 700 ,00 0 
Sinking Fund payment on conti ngent 
interest debt 
Total charges prior to dividends 
on stock · 
Preferred Dividends : 
5 , 330 ,340 
603,305 
1 5 , 920.449 
Prior- preferred 
Second- preferred 
f~l,959,475 
-~~81~575 
-- 5!775,050 
~p2l , 695,499 Total annual charges 
Annual 
Char ges 
of Present 
System 
8 28 ,462 
25,598 ,514 
_3 , 509,505 
f2 9 ,108 ,019 
The plan provides that the board of directors of the new 
company shall consist of fif teen members, and shall be elected 
by the voting trustees and the holders of the common stock so 
long as the voting trust shall be effective and thereafter by 
the holders of the prior-preferred, the second-preferred, and 
the common stock, all being entitled to one vote per share. 
Th e members of the first board of directors will be desip;nated 
as follows : Nine by the -protective co:mmi ttee for the J\'::issouri 
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Pacific first and refunding mortga ge bonds, one by the pro·-
tee ti ve cornmi ttee for the Missouri Pacific genera l mort ga ge 
bonds, t wo by the pro tee ti ve COIJIDli ttee for New Orleans firs 'c 
mortga ge bonds , and two by the trustee under the first mortgage 
of the International Great Northern. The remaining member will 
( 1) 
be the president of the new company . 
Provision is also made for the sale of the property at an 
upset price if the court sb()uld see fit. Upon any such sale 
or sale s , the property and assets offered for sale may be pur-
chased f or the benefit of the new company by t he r eorganization 
managers, and in that e vent there shall be applied on a c count 
of the purche.se price the distributive share of the proceeds 
of such sale of all securities the holders of whi ch shal l have 
assented to the plan , and of the securities, though not a:ss ent-
ing to the plan, of a ll classes wh ich shall have accepted the 
plan . If the propert y is sold t o others than the reorganiza-
tion managers, the plan shall be deemed inoperative except 
in so f a r as provision is made therein for the sale of the 
properties at such s a les as may be ordered by the court. 
l.Railway Age, January 20 ,1940 , pl 68 . 
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CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILWAY COMPA~~ 
This is the first major Class I Railroad Reorganization 
Plan under Section 77 to be approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Federal Court, and affected security 
holders, and subsequently confirmed, and made effective and 
binding on all parties. 
The following chronological steps leading up to the 
confirmation on January 10,1940 by Federal Judge Barnes at 
Chicago illustrate the reasons for the long drawn out pro-
cedure in railroad reorganization work: 
April 18,1933 
June 27, 1934 
September 16,1935 
February 15,1937 
September 17,1935 
March 15,1937 
May 15,1937 
December 27,1937 
January 17,1938 
November 4,1938 
Filed petition to effect a plan of 
reorganization under Section 77 of 
Bankruptcy Act. 
Protective Committee for 11 general 11 bonds 
filed a plan of reorganization. 
Debtor filed a plan of reorganization. 
Debtor filed an amended plan of 
reorganization. 
Hearing begun before Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
Hearing ended. 
Briefs filed on debtor plan . 
Interstate Commerce Commission Examiner's 
proposed pla,n . 
Exception to Examiner's plan. · 
Interstate Commerce Commission Plan of 
reorganization approved. 
January 20,1939 
February 20,1939 
March 31,1939 
April 10,1939 
June 5, 1939 
June 9, 1939 
June 16,1939 
August 25,1939 
November 7,1939 
November 22,1939 
January 10,1940 
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Interstate Commerce Commission Plan of 
reorganization approved as amended. 
Interstate Commerce Commission Plan of 
reorganization approved as amended and 
modified. 
Briefs filed at Federal Court at Chicago. 
Hearing before Federal Court at Chicago. 
Interstate Commerce Commission report 
on maximum counsel fees. 
Second Hearing b~fore Federal Court at 
Chicago. 
Approved by Federal Judge Barnes at 
Chicago. 
Interstate Commerce Commission sent 
ballots to affected security holders for 
vote on the plan. 
Date ballots, either accepting or reject-
ing the plan,rnust be returned. 
Interstate Commerce Commission certified 
that about 98 % of those voting had 
accepted the plan. 
Federal Judge Barnes at Chicago confirmed 
Plan, thus making it effective and bind-
ing on all parties. 
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CHICAGO & El~S'l'ERN ILLINO IS RAILWAY COMPANY 
PHESENT CAPI TALIZATION 
Rent of Leas ed Roads •••••••••••• $ 3 ,160,000 
Equipment....................... 1,306 ,000 
Ot:her Fixed Interest Obli ga ti?ns . 41_, 1 93.....! 084 
Ol d Fixed Interest Obligations 
Present Income Bonds ••••.••••••. 
' . Ol d 6;·s c·um. Pfd . par ~i:>lOO •.•....•. 
Old Capital Stock- Par Value 
Ol d Capi tali zation 
Unpaid Interest and Dividends 
Total Ol d Clai m 
:]:;22 ' 046 ' 1 00 
23, 845,000 
PROPOSED CAPITALI ZATION 
Rent for Leas ed Roads •••••••.•• 
Eq11i IJrnen t . .................... . 
New Fixed Inter est prior lien 
4's/l967 
New Fixed Interest Obligations 
New Genera l Income 5/1997 
~~ 3 ,160 ' 00 
1,306 , 000 
11 159 000 , J. __
New ~2 Pf d .of $40 par 1 5 ,354 , 500 
New Eo Par Co::m10n Share s 342., 882 shares 
New Stock Capitalizat ion, Pfd.plus 
343 ,297 shs. no. par common . 
New Capitalization, Par value plus 
343,297 sh s.no par common. 
" ~Jj) 45 , 659 , 084 
45 ' 891, L~QQ_ 
~?91, 550 ' 484 
24 ,733, 367 
d'·11c 28'7. 851 ~? o , o , 
15 , 625 , 000 
15 ,354,500 
1 5,354 ,500 
~2 49 , 334,000 
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Pli.ESEN'E ANNUAL CHARGES 
FIXED 
Rent for Leased Roads •.•.•.••• $ 158,000 
Fixed Interest................ 2,122,345 
l,Tone ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Total Old Char ges (Fixed) 
Annual Dividend Requirement 
Old Pfd.--6% $100 par (220 , 461 shares) 
Total Old Deduction Before 
Dividends on Old Co~non 
PROPOSED ANNUAL CHARGES 
FIXED 
Rent f or Leased Roads ••.•••••••• $158,000 
Interest on Other Assumed 
Obligations..................... 47,301 
Fixed Interest on new prior 
Llen 4s/l967 •••••••••••.•••..•• ~ 446,360 
Total New Fixed Char ges 
COfYEINGENT 
Additions & Betterr1ents Fund... • • 281,000 
Sinking Fund for ;Priors and 
Incomes •••••••••••••• ; ••••••••••• 150 , 000 
General Mt g . Inc. Conv . 5s/l 997 
Interest •.•.••••••.•••••.•••••••• 76~-~?5 
01
'2 280 345 ~p ' . , 
1,322,766 
~!~ 3 ' 603, lll 
;;~: 651, 66J. 
r:eota l New Contingent Charges _b 1 9._?._,__2?.5 
Tot a l New Charges( Fixed and Contingent) 
Annual Dividend Re quirement 
New ~:; 2 Pfd.- :~f;40 Par (383 , 86 2-~- shares ) 
Total New Deductions Before 
Dividends On New C omrnon 
;jill, 850, 386 
__ 76_7~~ 724 
~ji2, 618,110 
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-c;-r ICAGO & :tWH'l'E WES'l'EHH PLAN 
Expressing 11 re l uctance 11 that su c h ac t i on wa s n ecessary, 
a ma j ority o f t h e Interstate Commerce Commission on Dec ember 
1 5 a pproved a f i nal p l an of reor ganization for t h e Chicag o & 
Nor t h Western whi ch wou ld reduce the road 's capitalization by 
nearly ~100 , 000 , 000 and com9le te l y wip e out t h e equities of 
the co@non and prefe r r ed stockholder s. In adop ting s u c h a 
dras t ic p lan of r e organi zation which some ob servers have 
calle d the 11 per fect i on istn type wh i le other have terme d it a 
:tdepression- proof 11 formula, t h e cormni ssion is following a 
c J n sis t e n t j.Joli cy which has b ecome i n creasingl y e vident as 
( 1) 
each of t h e larger reorganization cas e s is decided. 
Commissione r Mille r ~.rrote a d issenting opinion in whic h 
h e as serted that the capitalization of the road s h ou ld b e fix ed 
at at least ~;i l OO , OOO,OOO more t h an t h e ma .j ority allowed so that 
the present equi t y h o l ders mi c;ht receive either with or with-
out a c a s h pa yment new n o-par c ommon stock for t h e ir interests 
in t h e old compa ny . Com.mission er Splavm c oncurred with the 
ma j ori t y , but express ed 11 mise;iving s" t h at t h e permitted 
c a p itali zation would be s upp orte d by t h e earning s of the road . 
'J.'h e p lan , as a pproved by t h e conuni ssi on, p rovide s for a 
total cap italization of ~j~449 , 974 , 309 as compared with a cap-
italization as of December 31, 1~38 , of ~~ 53'7 , 567 , 847 . Fixed 
i n terest requiremen t s wou ld be reduc ed i'rom a 1938 f i .e.;uPe of 
1. Int erstate Commerce Commission , Finance Docke t No. 10881, 
:Oec. 1 2 , 1 9 39 
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~16 ,549,740 to $ 3,382,079. The plan also provides for ad-
d i tionalcontingent interest charges of $5,988,529. 
After deciding t hat t he preferred and common stock had 
I 
no valu e and sh ould not participate in the allocation of new 
securities, yet admitting that the company's capital stock 
was once, with good reason, regarded as an i nvestment of 
ere a t value, t he corrn:L ssion said: 
"Re grettably, the conditions relied u pon to continue by 
these i nvestors when they subscribed for or bought the stock 
at h i gh prices, do not longer exist. Competing forms of 
transportation, loss of export trade and sh ifts in sources 
of traff ic appear to have brought about a continuing ch ange 
f or the worse as regards any reasonable expectation of the 
ability of t his property to produce earnings sufficient to 
support a capitalization in which the present stockholders 
mi ght be r e co gnized as possessing equities of any value. 
Definitely a short - haul carrier, and one looking to passenger 
traffic for a lar ge part of its business, results sh ow the 
debtor has proved particularly vulnerable to hi ghway competi-
tion. Capture of traffic by pipe lines ha s also been a serious 
factor, and t he p ipe line system is expanding . " 
CAPITALIZA'l' I ON EXCEEDS 11 NOHMAL 11 EARNI NGS 
The commission's decision went on to point out that the 
capitalization approved by it exceeds by more than 50 per cent 
t hat which can be supported by the earnings of 11 the normal year ." 
The commission has computed -che earnings for a prospective 
llnormal year" at ~pl4, 625,000. rtrn order to pay a six per cent 
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dividend on the new preferred stock, and a six per cent 
dividend on the new common stock whi'ch would have to b e 
issued to creditors before present stockholders could be re-
cogni zed , annual earnings wou ld have to amount to ~~)28 , 568 , 000 , 
a figure approximating predepression record earnings, 11 the 
coi!lnlission said. 
Under the plan as promul gated by the commi ssion, equip-
ment trust , 1 • -!-. oo+l ga..,J..ons totaling ~~11, 678,000 and a Public Works 
Administration loan of $1,020 ,000, assigned to the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, would be left undisturbed. The only other 
special treatment meted out in the plan was to give t h e h olders 
of Sioux City & Pacific and Des Plaines Valley bonds closed 
issues of new divisional ::nortgage four per cent bonds on a par 
for par basis. 
In passing u pon the final plan of reor ganization for the 
road the commission decided that a leas e by t he Chicago & 
North Western of the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha 
would not be in the public interest at this time. 'r h e plan 
as approved contempl a tes the retention of the Omaha by the 
reor ganized . company through the ownersh i p of the Omaha secur-
ities and its separate and i ndependent oper~tion as at present 
until oth erwise authorized b y the commi ss ion. 
CAPITAL STHUCTD1-\E OF NEl.nJ COMPANY 
The capitalization of the reor gan ized company will consist 
of the following securities: 
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Equi pment trust obligations, :li>11,678 ,000; Public ~ orks 
Admini stration loan , :;1,020 ,000; Sioux City divisional 
mortgage f our per cent bonds, $4,000 ,000; Des Plaines division-
al mortgage four per cent bonds, ~~2, 500,000; notes to the 
Rai lroad Credit Corporation at four per cent, ~j-;663,000; notes 
to banks at 2-~ and l fJ· per cent, $3,296,000; notes to Re construc-
tion Finance Corporation at 2l and l l per cent, $25,000,000; 
first and general mortgage 2l and l l per cent bonds, ~;:> 55,762,556; 
first and general mortgage four per cent bonds, ~pl2, 100,000; 
second mortgage, convertible 4l per cent income bonds, 
~:~105,058 , 904; perferred stock, five per cent, ~~106,996,0'7 6 ; 
and common no-par value stock at ~~100 a share, :aa20, 899 ,773. 
The plan provides tha t the notes to the banks, Re con struc-
tion Finance Corporation and to the holders of the ~1 55, 762, 556 
of first and general mortgage bonds should receive 2l per cent 
in fixed interest and 1·~· per cen t in contingent interest. 
The l ft per cent would be c ont1ngent for the time being u pon 
earnings and would become fixed when and if a stabilized 
level of earnings warranting it is reached. It is also provided 
that the comnrut~tion shall take effect wh en the cowJnutable 
interest s hall have been earned and been payable for three 
succe s sive years. 
The following table gives the treatment accorded the 
various mortga ge issues under the final plan of the commission: 
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New 
bonds 
General mort gage 3~% bonds ••••• $1 98 
fl II 4-~~; II o 0 0 0 0 20 5 
II II 4 %_ II ••••• 202 
II II 43/4/~ II o o • • • 207 
II II 5 , .f II 208 jo • • • • • 
Se cured 6l •s ••••••••••••••••••• 250 
Milwaukee & State line bonds ••• 311 
Manitowoc bonds •••••••••••••••• 375 
St. Paul Eastern bonds •••••••••••• 
Sparta bon ds ••••••••••••••••••• 
S t.Louis- Peoria bonds •••••••••• 
First and refunding mort gage 
4 l -/ b d 1!/o C>Tl S • • • • •••••• • • • • • • • • •• • • 
First and r efunding mort gage 
5 "'.f b ~ /b onas ..................... . 
First a nd r e funding mortg a g e 
~~ d b d v ;o on s . ... . ................ . 
Debentures and unsecured claims 
I\ULLER VffiiTES A DISSENT 
240 
428 
152 
1 54 
159 
••• 
l~ew 
i n come 
bonds 
,!;.46"-
'W v 
478 
470 
481 
485 
582 
445 
399 
. . . 
271 
3 88 
230 
233 
241 
New 
pr e -
ferr ed 
stock 
;;?427 
440 
434 
444 
447 
537 
384 
36 6 
. . . 
330 
384 
302 
307 
316 
. .. 
New 
no - par 
c ommon 
stock 
shares 
0 . 40 
0.42 
0 . 41 
0.42 
0. 43 
0.51 
.... 
11. 80 
3 .12 
.... 
4.77 
4 . 8 5 
4 . 99 
6 . 34 
Commissioner Miller , in his dissenting opinion, said that 
measuring the value of the investment by the original cost less 
depreciation:, which in h is opinion is clearly j u s tified, the 
capitaliza ti on of t he nevv c ompany should be increased by at 
leas t ~~100,000,000. llrrhe issuance, under such i n creased c.api-
talizati.on , to t h e present e quity hol der s of a subordinate 
clas s of no par value common stock , with or without a cash 
contribution as mi ght be appropriate, would give them an 
· opportuni t y to participate in future earnings of the company, 11 
he wrote . 
He went on to say t h at : 11Although it is true that there 
would be little, if any , prospect that such stock woul d be of 
any v a lue whi le the company is operating in competition with 
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other r ai lroads, I feel confident t hat such stock wou ld prove 
of substantial worth if and when the railroads of t h e country 
a re c onsolidated into one sy stem or a few large systems. I 
bel ieve t hat consolidations are necessary to the future wel-
fare of t he railroads, as well as of the country . While pro-
phesy i ng, as we are compelled to do in regard to fut ure earn-
ings in these r eor 8anizations, I have the temerity to predict 
that unless c onsolidations are made on a lar ge scale, n1any , 
if not all, of the rai lroads will drift into government owner -
ship.11 
Commissioner IVi ller also t h ought that the charge s and 
dividend requi rements prior to t h e common stock 11 have been 
set too h i gh .tt Other features of t he plan with which he 
expressed disagr e ement ·were t he mandatory capital fund and 
the desirability of setting up sinking fund payments in terms 
of a percentage of earnings and a participation provision rather 
t p an a cmnulative re quirement for imcome bonds and t he use of 
no par value preferred stock. The undesirability of t h ese 
provi sions have b een discussed at lengt h by the commi ssioner 
in recently-decided r e organization· cases. 
SPL..A.',-lN THI NKS I NTEHSTNrE CONJ:IERCE COI/ii'.USSI ON 11 0VER-OPTIMISTICu 
Coinmissi oner Splawn, i n a concurring opinion, expressed 
doubt that t h e earnings of the property would support the 
capitalization fixed by t ht; majority . Il'ir . Splawn thought the 
commission sh owed 11 cons i der able optimism as to the future 
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earnings of this road. 11Af t e r citing the changing conditions 
in the transportation field, the commissioner concluded his 
dissent by ass~rting that,'in the light of present conditions 
and of anything that might be considered as definite, the 
estimated future earnings of this property is over-optimistic, 
so much so that -the common stock will have only a speculative 
value. It is possible, however, that American genius for 
organization and enterprise may soon effect change s so favor-
able to transportation a s to overcome existing deficiencies." 
Under the procedure of section 77, the plan goes to the 
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
Eas tern Division, for its approval, after vn~ich it will be sub-
(1) 
mitted to the creditors for their approval _or rejection. 
PROGRESS MADE I N I NDIVIDUAL RAILROAD READJUSTlvillNTS 
'• Although progress in railroad reorganization has been 
tediously -slow, a great deal of effort has been expended on 
capi tal readjustments since the Seaboard Ai r Line led the pro-
cession of railroad insolvencies in December, 1930. Among the 
roads operating under section 77, as of January, 1940 , the plan 
for the Chicago & Eastern Illinois has been approved by the 
Interstate Comner ce Comnission, the Federal Court and 
security holders, and now awaits final confirmation by the Court, 
following which the new securities will be issued. Of the roads 
operating in equity receivership , the Norfolk Southern has 
l.Inters tate Commerce Commission, F'iEance Docket No.l0881, 
December 12 ,1939. 
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already had its plan approved by the :Federal court and is now 
awaiting the Interstate Com.."nerce Conuni ssion authority to issue 
new securities for the reorganized r oad, following which the 
necessary foreclosure action will be · taken. The merger of the 
Mobile & Ohio with the Gulf, Mobile & Northern has been approved 
by the Interstate Com:rnerce Corn...rnission and stock.h.olders of the 
latter system, and awaits approval of the Mobile & Ohio security 
holders, t o be followed by foreclosure action. 
SECTION 77 REORGANI ZATIONS 
In section 77 proceedings, the various steps which must 
be taken before a plan can be put into effect include: 
1. plan formulated by security holders or trustee, 
2 . plan promulgated by Interstate Commerce Co~~ission 
examiner, 
3. f i nal plan issued by Intersta te Conmerce Commission, 
4. final plan approved by Federal Court, 
5. final plan approved by secur1ty holders , 
6 . c oni'irmation by the court, 
7. issuance of new securities. 
The table below lists major class I railroads awaiting 
reorganization under section 77, to gether with the present 
stage of reorganization proceedings. 
Name of Road 
Akron, Canton & Youngstovm 
Central Railroad of New Jersey 
Chicago & E~ tern Illinois 
Chicago Great Western 
Chi ca go & Nqrth West~rn 
Ch icago, I ndi anap0li s & Louisville 
Chicago, Mil.,St~Paul & Pacific 
Ch icago, Rock Island &- Pacific 
Progress in Reorganization 
Final plan approved by 
Federal Court 
No plan yet formulated 
Final plan approved by 
security holders 
Fin al plan approved by 
Federal Court 
Final plan issued by I. c.c 
Plan promulgated by I . C.C.exami ner 
Plan promul gated by I . C.C .ex~~iner 
Plan promulgated by I.C.C. examiner 
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Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Erie Rai lroad 
Final pl an issued by I.C.C. 
Plan promulgated by I.C.C.examiner 
Part of M. P.reorganization plan International Great Northern 
Minn.,St.Paul & Sault Ste . Marie 
Missouri Pacifi c 
No p lan yet formulated 
Plan promulgated by I.C.C.examiner 
Part of M. P.reorganization plan 
Plan promulgated by I.C.C.examiner 
Plan filed by security holders 
Plan filed by security holders 
Final plan issued by I.C.C. 
New Orleans ,Texas &Mexico 
He\7 York, Ne w Haven & Hartford 
New York, Ontario & Vves tern 
New Yor k , Susquehanna & Western 
Spokane International 
St . Louis San Francisco 
St .Louis Southwes tern 
Western Pacifi c 
EQUITY R!!:CE IVERSHIPS 
Pl an promul gated by I.C.C.exruniner 
Pla..YJ. promulgated b;; I. C. C. examiner 
Final plan issued by I.C.C. 
A number of railroads, particularly t hose whi ch became 
i nsolvent before section 77 was enacted by Congress early in 
1933, continue to operate in e quity receivership. Hajor steps 
in this procedure are: 
1. plan formulated by security holders or receiver, 
2. plan approved by the Federal Court, 
3. issuance of new securities approved by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 
4. foreclosure sale of property, 
5 . issuance of new securities. 
Th e following table contai ns major roads now operating 
in equity receiversh ip, and progress made i n reorganization 
to date. 
Name of Road 
Ann Arbor 
Central of Georaia 0 
Florida East Coast 
Minneapolis & St. Louis 
Mobile & Ohio 
Norfold Southern 
Rutland Railroad 
Seabo ard Air Line 
·wabash Railway 
Wisconsin Central 
Progress in Reorganization 
No plan yet formulated 
No plan yet fo rmulated 
Pl~~ filed by security holders 
Plan filed by security holders 
Merger plan approved by I.C.C. 
Plan approved by Federal Cour t 
No pian yet formulated 
Plan filed by security holders 
Pl an filed by security holde rs 
No plan yet formulated 
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RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE COHPOHAT I ON TO BE CHIEF SOURCE OF 
NEW CAPI TAL 
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is playing a 
prominent part in the financing of railroad reorganizations, 
replacing stockholders' assessments as a means of raising new 
funds. This is one of the many instances in which government 
capital is being substituted for pri VEtte capital. I-To doubt 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation will dispose of t he 
new mortgage bonds it is purchasing from the reorganized 
carriers when mar ket conditions permit, but unless there is 
sustained i mprovement in the competitive position of the in-
dustry , it is doubtf11l whethe r the Reconstruction Finance Corp-
oration will be able to re a lize full face value on all of these 
obli gations . \tVillingne ss of the Peder al lending agen cy to 
supply new capital will do much to hasten read justments , al-
thouc;h at the same time it will give the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation a considerable measure of control over the re-
organized proper t y so long as the road is indebted to it. 
Influence of t he Re construction Finance Corporation in 
the formulation of reorgani za tion pl ans , however, is apt to 
be less pronounced if the new law is enacted than under present 
proced11re, except i.n those instances where a large amount of 
new capital is required . It is quite like ly that the Federal 
Court wi l l show a greater de e;ree of independence toward the 
lending a gency than the Interstate Commer ce Commission . 
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On several occasions there have been unmistakable indications 
that the Commission has been strongly influen ced by the 
Eeconstruction Finance Corporation in formulating its final 
reorganization plans, and prin ciples of equity have somet imes 
given way to the insistance of the lending ae;ency on preferred 
treatment in reorganj_zations. 
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CHAPTER XII 
DIV:J:RGENT VIB.vifS ON TEE HEORGAN IZATION OF ROC K ISLAliD 
It became evident wh en the Interstate Commerce Corn.mission 
con cluded hearing oral ar gument on Examiner Conway's proposed 
p lan of reorganization for the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
on December 8 after a t wo-day session tha t the area of dis -
a greement b etween t h e lllany parties is so broad that to 
reconcile the differences would virt ually mean the Wr i ting of 
a new p lan. None of the bondho lder or creditor group s nor 
even the deb tor corporation, itself , a greed with the examiner , 
and s ome i nterests went so far as to threaten extended l itiga-
tion if they d id not receive better treatment at the han ds of 
t he commi ssion when it dre.fts its final plan. Pr nctica lly 
every attorney a ppe a ring protested t hat the exa.mine r d id not 
do j u stice to t h e corpora te structure of the Rock Island when 
he pared the total c apitalization f rom the old fi g;u.re of 
$ 4 60 , 000 , 000 to a new low of $ 306 , 000 , 000. 
Marcus L . Bell, general counsel for the road and app earing 
as counsel for the stockholders of the debtor corp oration, 
be gan h is hour-and-a half a r gument by asserting t ha t section 77 
of the ·Bankrup tcy .Act g ives the commi ssion no p ower t o scale 
down t he total capita lization when there is rea l v a b1.e :L n the 
property v..-hi ch woul d support a hie;her figure . It wa s rAr. Bell 's 
v iew that the comr.1ission' s p ower is l iml ted to prescribin g 
fixed charges and to finding that t he tot a l c apitalization is 
compatible with the pub l i c interes t. 
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Assailing the examiner's proposal, Mr. Bell urged the 
cmmnission to accept the debtor's plan which would have 
permitted the present preferred and conmon stockholders to 
share in the securities of the new corporation. Mr. Bell 
pointed out to the commission that it had authorized all the 
road's securities since 1920 and that now the examiner proposed 
to wipe out all the common and preferred stock. He called the 
examiner's plan "destructive of railroad credit" and urged 
the comraission to accept the principles of the debtor's plan. 
It was his belief that the real value of the road is much 
greater .than the qp306,000,000 set by the examiner and that 
such a thesis could be proved in court if the debtor is forced 
to contest the legality of the commission's decision. 
Wilkie Bushby, appearing as counsel for the first and 
refunding committee, informed the connnission that except for 
the amount of the total capitalization , his clients accepted 
the examiner's plan. He further said that his group believed 
that their proposed capitalization of $381,000,000 was 
conservative, as was their figure of ~p55,000,000 for the amount 
of fixed interest obligations. In Mr. Bushby's opinion,examiner 
Conway's plan does not have enough securities to take care of 
all the .bondholders, let alone providing anything for any of 
the equity holders. He said that the examiner's plan failed 
by some ~~65,000,000 to provide enough new securities to make 
a fair allocation to the present creditors. 
-15 8-
It was at tn is point t ha t h e pr edicted the low amount 
of capitali zation of the examiner's plan would doom it to 
failure. Mr. Bushby accused some of the other parties of 
using what he termed a "tri al and error methodrtfor allo-
c a ting new securi ties. According to t his procedure, ''you 
start out with a definite fixed conclusi on :i.n mind that you 
desire to r e ach, and if you f ail, you try aga in unt.:.. l you 
reach it, re gardless of how much injus t ice you may do to the 
formula you are us i ng." In Mr. Bushby's opinion, no one has 
done a comprehensive job of allocating new securities in this 
case. 
E. VJ . Bourne, representing the general mortgage committee , 
sta ted it to be the position of his commit t ee that they should 
h ave new securities up to the value of their claims i f the 
value exists in the property. He also ob j ected to the treat-
ment given his group. 
Thomas Epstein, appearine as counsel for the Marine Midland 
Trust Company of New York City in its capacity as trustee of 
the Kansas City Short Line bonds, criticized the treatment 
accorded the holders of these bonds in the proposed report. 
Despite the fact that they have no . l i en on t h e property, 
Frederick w. Wood, counsel for t h e Ch ase Nations_l Bank of New 
Yor k City as trustee of the convertible bonds, clai med that 
these bonds are secured by free assets totaling $17, 000,000, 
as contrasted with the examiner's finding that the free 
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unattached assets amounted to s ome $14,000,000. He urged the 
commission to give better consideration to his cl:lents. 
Another counsel joining the chorus f or more b enefic i al. 
treatment was E . c. Bailly, couns el f or the Burlington, Cedar 
Rapi ds & North ern bondholders comrni t t e e . lie demanded t h e 
allocation of more new secur:i.ties for h is bonlli"lolders. 
E · L. Williams, re presenting bondholders of the Choctaw 
& Memphis and the Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf, told the commission 
that unless 11 something 11 was done quickly, his clients would 
have to t ake t heir property and go elsewhere. His main complaint 
was that only one interest coupon has been paid on the bond 
issues, des pite the fact that it has been earned sever al t l r1e s 
over. By e;oing elsewhere, Mr. Williams expl ained t h !?.t t h ey 
wou ld have to sell their property to the Louisiana & Arkansas 
; 
or to some other road. The Choctaw gives the Rock Isl fu~d its 
access to Memph is, Tennessee. 
Mr. Williams also asserted that his group would not acc ept 
the examiner's plan, and he placed the responsib1l i t y for t h e 
:formulation of a plan on the shoulders of the :first and refund-
ing and the general mortgage cornmi ttees, s aying that nothing 
could succeed until these t wo largest groups got together. 
"We should be ashamed of the sloV~~ness with which t his c~se h as 
been handle~ 11 h e concluded. 
Cassius M. Clay, assistant general counsel f or the 
Reconstruction Fi nru1ce Corporation, accused the general mortga ge 
and the first and refunding committees of "doi ng everything 
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they could to defeat the interest of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation." The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
according to Mr. Clay, wants only the pi'incipal and interE;;st 
on its loans and no more. 
E. K. Hanlon, representing the Rocl[ Island, Arkansas 
& Louisiena bondholders committee, urged the cormni ssion to 
ayprove a separate reorganization of' that propert y so that 
it might be sold to the Louisiana & Arkansas. The Louisiana 
& Arkansas, Mr. Hanlon asserted, has offered these bondholders 
much more than they can hope to get as a part of the Rock 
Island system as it comes out of bankruptcy. 11Either let us 
go with the Louisiana & Arkansas," he said, 11 or give us a fair 
rental so that we can pay our bondholders the interest on their 
bonds. n Exa>'1'liner Conway had decided agal.ns t dismembering the 
Rock Island system to the extent of per mitting the Louisiana 
& Arkansas to purchase the Rock Island, Arkansas c'3c Louisiana. 
That the Louisiana & Arkansas is still willing to make 
good its offer to purchase the Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana 
was made clear by J. R. Turney, who appeared as counsel for 
the Louisiana & Arkansas. He told the conunission that the 
Rock Island has no real monetary interest i n the Rock Island, 
Arkansas & Louisiana any more, if it ever had any, while his 
company has purchased in the open market some $3,000,000 of 
the Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana's securities and has a 
real interest in buying the road to complete its system. He 
also accused the Rock Island of taking a rebate on all its 
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own material that it ships over the lines of the Hock Island, 
Arkansas c~ Louisi ana. Nir. Turne y denied the charee that 
railroad labor on the Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana was 
opposed to the consolidation because of inferior working 
conditions on the Louisiana & Arkansas h y- saying that the 
Louisiana & Arkansas had agreed to abide by any labor con tracts 
now i n force on the Hock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana and would 
live up to the provisions of the so-called Washington Agreement. 
Railroad labor, represented by Ezra Brainerd, Jr., oppos ed 
all .proposals which would separate the Rock Island, Arkansas & 
Louisiana from the Rock Island. 11 The employees ,11 Mr. Brainerd 
said,tt felt that work j_n g conditions were preferable on the Rock 
Island, Arkansas & Louisiana and t hat they did not wan t to be 
affiliated with the Louisiana & Arkanse.s ." If the cormnission 
should decide that the public interes t re quires t hat the two 
roads be consolidated, then, according to I1!ir. Brainerd, the 
employe e s want the comrr~ssion to attach the same labor condit~ons 
to the merger order as it did. rec ently when it authorized the 
Rock Island to merge its Texas subsidiary, the Cll.ic ago, Rock 
Island & Gulf. These conditions, which provided for .severance 
pay for five years for displaced employees and for compensation 
in case employees sustained losses in moving from :B,ort ·worth, 
Texas, to Chicago, were detailed ~n the Railway Age for Novem-
ber 12, 1938, page 717 • .A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the s e provision s ecgainst an a t tack bv 
" 
t he carri er. 
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The proposed separation of the Rock Island,Arkansas & 
Louisiana from the Rock Island was opposed by B. F. Batts, 
general attorney and commerce counsel for the St.Louis South-
western; Elmer A. Smith, general attorney for the Illinois 
Central; and H. H. Larimore, general attorney and Interstate 
Commerce Comnission counsel for the Missouri Pacific, mainly 
on the ground that it would create a new north-south trunk 
line which would divert traffic from existing lines. Mr.Batts 
feared that the combined Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana 
and Louisiana & Arkansas would be . in a position to bargain 
for excessive divisions from the Illinois Central, the Missouri 
Pacific, and the Cotton Belt. He accused the Louisiana & 
Ark ansas of "injecting itself into a case which it should never 
have been in." 
Mr. Larimore told the · commission that the new combination 
contends that it will take 7, 000 cars o.f traffic froln the 
Missouri Pacific yearly. Mr. Smith took the position that the 
commission should not permit the creation of a new north-south 
line and that the public interest would not support it. 'i'What 
the Louisiana & Arkansas really is interested in, "he said, 11was 
getting a chance at the traffic from New Orleans andBaton 
Rouge." 
L. C. Fritch, a retired vice-president of the Rock Island, 
a ppeared briefly in behalf of certai n employees of the road 
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who purchased preferred stock in 1923 at the behest of the 
management. rle adva.n.ced the hypothesis that the mileage of 
the system should be reduced from 8,000 to 6,000 miles due 
to unprofitable lines, and he concluded by saying that at 
least 1,500 miles should be taken under scrutiny before it 
is taken back i nto t he new system. 
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CHAPTE XI I I 
THE RAILR OAD PROBLEJ~ 
Durin ~ the y ear 1 938 t h e railroad problem be c ame increas -
in l y a cute . There we re j_n sistent demands that the Government 
( 1) 
do someth ing to .solve it . As the commissi on viewed the situa -
tion the p roblem i n t h is country is t h e p r oduct of rai l road 
poverty , just as true in 1 939 as i n 1 938 . A. r ai l r oad problem 
is no t pe culiar to ou r 0\'m time or our ovm l a nd . The y differ 
i n character and intensity , but our ovm problem is paralled 
today in Great Britain , and s i milar pr oblems exis t all ov ·r 
t h e world. The curtailment of railroad purch ases has been 
one of the i mportant f a ctors tending to intensify and pro-Jn b 
gen eral i ndus trial de pression . ~Lese conditions have generate( 
the wi des pread demand that the Government solve the problem. 
For the disorder the Commission po i n ts out c ert ain pr ima-
ry c auses a re res p on sible , a ggrava ted by con tribu torv- factors . 
First , r ailroad ills have been precip itated by an abrupt and 
conti nued de cline in demand for rai lroad services, u nparallelec 
in severity and dura tion . For an illustration , take t on - mi les 
and passen er- miles as the measure, use the ave rage of 1 9 23-
1 925 a s the bas e(lOO), the ton- mi le i n dex reached a low point 
of 49 i n u gust, 1 932 , and the passen ger- mile i ndex , a low 
( 2) 
point of 36 i n Ma rch , 19 33 . 
l . I n terstate Commerce Comr,1ission, 52nd . , Annual Heport , pl , 1 938 . 
2 . House Document No . 58 3, 7 5th Con ress , 3d . Session . 
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The general i ndustrial depression was the primary cause 
of t h is fall in demand, but to the great depth of the fall 
anoth er cause contributed heavily, the great increase in re-
cent years in competition from other forms of transportation. 
Other adverse influences which have operated a gainst railroad 
traffic have been a tendency toward the decentralization or 
spreading of industrial operations, with consequent decrease 
in the amount of transportation required for inbound raw 
materials and outbound manufactured products; the substitution 
of natural gas, hydro-electricity, and fuel oil for coal and 
the i mproved use of coal itself; the substitution, particularly 
in building operations, of products requiring short hauls , l ike 
cement, for products re quiring long hauls, like steel, stone, 
or lumber; and the decline in tonnage of our exports and i mports . 
What has happened to the railroads with respect to traffic 
is strikingly illustrated by the fact that in 1 936, when the 
i ndex of industrial production averaged 105 per cent of the 
19 ~~3-1925 base and reached 121 in December, the ton-mi le index 
was 8 3 . 8 and the passenger- mile i n dex , 61 .1. In 1 9 3 6 the 
railroads handled somewhat less frei ght trai'f'ic and much less 
passenger traffic than 1 916, although in the twenty interven-
ing years the investment in their properties has i ncreased by 
( 1) 
more than eight billions of dollars. 
1. Inters tate -commerce_ .. Commission, 52nd Annual Report, p3, 1 9 38. 
------- ---
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The ch ief contributory factor to railroad distress, as 
distinguish ed from pril1ary cause, has been the great volume 
of i ndebtedness. From its be gin n ing the railroad industry 
has used borrowed funds in large proportion in the creation 
of its properties, with the r e sult that the return pai d to 
investors has to a very considerable e x tent tak e n the form 
of fi x ed i n terest on bon ds instead of dividends on stock. 
F i xed interest is a contractua l obligation , and failure to 
pay it ma y result in bankruptcy or receivership proceedings. 
rrhe large amount of r ailroad debt and fixed charges is n ot 
the s rune t h ing a s over-capi talization. Over-ca pitalization 
is ofte n used to describe an e x cess of cap italization , that 
is, amount of stock and evidences of indebtedness outstand-
ing , ove r cost of properties, a situation caused ordi narily 
by t he i ssue of wa tere d stock . The railroad s in tho a gc;regate 
are n ot overcap i talized in that sense . 1~e word is also used 
to describ e an excess of capitalization over value of p ropert ies. 
Using as a measure 11 rate-makine; value '1 , that is, the arnount 
on which the railroads are entitled as of ri ght unde r the 
Cons t i tu t i on to an opportu..'Yli ty to earn a re as onable return, 
they are no t overcapital ized. If con:rrnercial value T based 
u p on present e a rning p ower, be used as the measure, they are 
ove r capi talized, a s suming the apparent estima te of that value 
in the present stock -a n d bond mark et to be correct. However, 
t his has not always been so, and such estimates fluctua te 
con t inually and rap idly Yvi t h changing con ditions. 
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In view of the relatively large vol1rrne of their indebted-
ness; many railroads have been driven into receivership or 
bankr uptcy , and many more :):lave curtai led expenditures drastic -
ally , often to the detriment of their properties, to escape 
such pro ceedings. This action has been the most demoralizing 
.feature of pres e n t railroads ills , and the one t hat has par-
ticu l arl y attracted the attention of the country. 
Another contribu tory factor to railroad distress has been 
f inancial exploitation or abuse in the past . The Frisco and 
t he Seaboard Air Line have alway s suffered, among other t hings , 
from overcapi t alization in the worst sense of the word . The 
New Haven has suffered from ill- advised investments at ex-
travagent prices i n the securities of trolley , s teamship and 
other rai lroad properties during the Morgan-Mellen re gi me. 
Another illustration of financ ial abuse i s t h e ex travagent 
use of capita l funds by certain eastern rai lroads i n the 1920 's 
i n the purchase of stock s of other railroads, i n an endeavor 
to build up large s y stems or to forestall such efforts on the 
par t of oth ers. Had the railroads established s inking funds 
for all of their bonds, outstru~ding funded debts would have 
been much less than i t now i~ . Such .funds could only have 
been accumul a ted out of earnings. 
Other factors contributory to rai lroad i lls were the fail-
ure of t he managements for some time to apprec i ate the danger 
i mpendi ng from t he compet:rtion of other forms of transportation , 
-168-
and to adjust service and rates to forestall or meet it; t he 
fact that owing to their lack of credit in recent years, most 
of the railroads have been unable to modernize their equipment 
and f aciliti es to the extent desirable; the construction of 
expensive passenger stations, such as those in Cleveland and 
Cincinnati; and the underlyin g fact that many railroad l ines 
in the past were i mprovidently planned and projected, and s ome 
of them should never have been built. 
F II\ Ai\CIAL REORGAHIZATION 
The Corrm1ission contends that many people ente r tain the 
view that the great trouble with the railroads is their h eavy 
load of indebtedness and fixe d charges, whi ch precipitates or 
threatens bankruptcy and destroys or. i mpairs credit. 'Therefore , 
they believe that an adequate solution of the railroad problem 
will be found if t h is burden can be removed or at least greatly 
reduced. 
The people who particularly regard "going through the 
v.rringe r 11 as t he means of railroad salvation c ontend that the 
new capitaliza tion of a reorganized railroad compan~; should 
be b ased primarily on the commercial or market value of t he 
property, dependent on present and prospective earning power; 
that such value will now usually be found to be much below 
the recorded investment in the property and well below its 
rate-making value; that the new fixed charge s should n ot 
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exceed an amount which it is reagonable to believe could be 
paid in a period of depression; and that no securities of any 
class, bonds or stock, should be issued, unless it is reason-
able to believe that in a normal period a return would be earned 
there on . In most instances such a process of reorganization 
would wipe out t he present stock equity , and perhaps the interests 
of some junior or creditors. 
If raiJroads are to be opera ted successfully under private 
O\vnership t hey must have earnings sufficient to mru~e not only 
t heir bonds but also their stock attractive to investors . 
Otherwise debt will mount until the bonds lose their attrac-
tion and the carriers will again be on the road to bankruptcy . 
The system of private ownership and operation is de pendent 
on the profit mo tive and will not work well unless , soorier or 
later, profits are forthcomi ng. 
AC'l1IO N UNDBR SEC'r i ON '77 
There has been dissatisfa ction with the slowness of rail-
' 
road reorganizations under S~ction 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Before that section was enacted several railroad companies 
had gone into equity receivership , where they still remain in 
March,l940 . Not one of them ha~ been reorganized. This , 
however, is not a sufficient answer to the criticisms of the 
ope ration of Section 77, for it was enacted in the expectation 
t hat it ·would, a..mong other things , result in speedier reorganiza-
tions than had been customary under t he equ ity procedure. 
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Three principal reasons account for the slowness in 
( 1) 
effectu ating reorganizations: 
First, t h e f i nancial structure of most large railroad 
coLJ.pe.nies is exceedingl y complex. There are usually many 
classes of creditors with widely varying claims variously 
secured by liens or collateral. To do justice in a re-
organization to t h ese numerous classes of creditors and to 
such classes of stockholders as may exist is a very difficult 
undertaking , and when a public tribunal has that task , much 
time is inevitably con sumed in giving en adequate hearing 
and in assembling all the pertinent facts, in addition to the 
time whi ch the security-holders themselves require in pre-
paration for the presentation of their claims. The act requires 
t h e debtor to file a p lan of reorganization with the Commission 
and permits other p l ans to be filed. After sach filing of p lan s, 
t h e Commission is required to h old public hearings, at which 
opportunity is g iven to any interested party to b e h eard. 
Second , s ince the beginning of t hi s depression the future 
earning s of the railroads have been so i mpos s ible to forecast 
that the preparation of j u st and reasonab l e p lans of reor ganiza-
tion h as been extremely difficult. This factor may b e illustrated 
by the events prior to 1 937. Af ter e a rnings reached the low 
p oin t of 19 32 t h ey began a gradual ascent whi ch cont inued un t il 
the middle of 1 937 . The reor e anization p lans filed with t h e 
Com:r;_ission wei'e prepared in the li ght of t h is a pparent trend. 
1. I nterstate Cornmerce Commission , 52nd . Annual Report,ppl0-12,193 8 . 
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The i ncrease in t axe s, wages and other expenses i n 1937 , h owever, 
combin ed with the precipi tate drop of traffi c in the l a tter 
part of t hat year, had so disastrous an eff ect on net earnings 
that many of the carefully wr ought plans virtually became 
obsolete over night. 
Third, in the initial administration of any new l aw, legal 
questions ar i se which hinder .progress un t i l t h ey are determined. 
Time is cons equently con sumed in the decision of the early cases, 
and of t ti mes in subsequent litigati on, whi ch is not required 
once stable precedents have been established. 
FINAN CTAL EXPLOITATION 
Some p e ople vo i ce the opinion that the under l y ing cause 
of t he railroad troubles has b een fi nancial exploita tion, and 
that if they can be freed from 11 banker con trol,u t hey will b e 
on the way to recovery . It is true t here have been grave 
fi nancial abuses i n the past fro m whi ch various railroads have 
suffered. However, the Cowmission does not regard such abuses 
as a primary cause of present railroad distress, alth ough in 
( l) 
some instances t h ey have been an important c ontributory factor. 
Banker . influence on ra i lroad managements has e.t times 
been mar ked, but not always bad , and there is little evidence 
that it i s now dominant. Por the time being the great rail-
road bank ers is t he Reconstruction Finan ce Corporation. One 
means of protection a gainst financial abuses for the future is 
con sta.nt vigilance on the par t of t he re gulating authori ty . 
1. Interstate Commerce Coil11.'1issi on , 52nd~Annual R~port, pl l ,l 9 38 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OP THE I NTERSTATE COMMEHCE COMMI SSION 
The railroad problem is t he product of economic c on d ition s. 
It is not the same prob lem today a s in former yea rs, because 
t h ese condit ions continually ch ange. Some of t h e presen t con -
ditions, especially t h e g eneral industrial depression, are 
of rec ent origin and doubtless are temporary in char a cter. 
Others, such as t h e extraordinar y growth of oth er fo r ms of 
transportation, have developed over a period of y e a rs, are 
per manent, and may be expected t o wax rather t han wa ne . Still 
oth ers , l ike the heavy burden of railroad indebtedness, have 
t heir r oots i n a di stan t pas t. It is quite idle t o be lieve 
that a situation whi ch has been created i n thi s way c an be 
solved out of hand , lik~ a prob lem i n e;eometry. 'I'he Govern -
ment h as n o magi c wh ich enables it to sweep back the tide of 
economic ch ange and reverse t h e resul t s. Basical l y , t he 
financ ial condi 'cion o f t he ra i lroads can b e improved, a par t 
from a Government subsidy , only by an increase in revenues 
or a decrease in exp enses, or both . 
The reorganizations of t h e bankrup t railroad s must 1J e 
pre ssed to c ompletion as rap i d l y as possible. 'rhey must be 
of s u ch ch aracter t hat t h e reorganized companies can h op e to 
withs tand recurrences of industrial de pressions and b e ab le 
to market even new i ssues of s t ock under normal conditions. 
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Every reasonable effort sh ould be made to protect existing 
security- h olders, but not v~1ere t h eir securities have clear l y 
lo s t all value. The financial structures of railroads wh ich 
cont inue to escap e bankrup tcy may to some extent b e improved 
by voluntary readjustments, and there is a furth er possibility 
of improvement in connection with subsequ ent cons ol idat ions. 
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CHAPTEn XIV 
PRESENT TRENDS IN RAILROAD REORGANIZA'riON 
The present day approach to reorganization seems realistic 
enough insofar as the broader concepts are concerned. There 
would seem to be considerable latitude for opinion as to whether 
these general principles are being applied in the most logical 
way. It seems reasonable to question whether, in the effort 
to produce a pretty idealistic picture as respects the rela-
tionsh ip of debt to stock, some of the more fundamental aspects 
of the problem are not being overlooked. 
The permissible amount of fixed charges should and proba-
bly does receive the maximum attention of all those concerned 
with the present-day reorganizations,including the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Fixed interest requirements are oeing 
kept well within what would appear to be the minimum earning 
power of the properties in depression years. 
The amount of contingent interest income bonds seems to 
be subjected to a more severe attempt to attain a theoretical 
ideal than consistent with stern realities. Certainly any 
element of error in the reports of the examiners or the 
Commission as to the amount of income bonds which it would 
appear could with propriety be authorized does not fall on 
the side of liberality. 
It would appear reasonable to question the longer range 
advisability of the ~imits proposed for this type of security 
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in at least s ome of the reorganizations which have been passed 
u pon by the Commission or its examiners. It is doub tful, for 
example,whether a d equ ate recognition has been g iven i n a ll 
cases to the part t l.:e relatively heavy maintena nce expendi -
tures of some of the bank ruptcy roads have played in shap ing 
the net earning s which a re used i n greater or less degree as 
the starting point from which to con struct estimates of p ro-
s pective future earning power. 
The significance of any increase over normal maintenan ce 
becomes all too a pparent when you stop to reflect the n i g h 
rati o that railroad maintenance bears to net railway op eratin g 
1n c ome. Over the l a st deca de a n d a ha lf mai n tenance expendi -
tures of Class I roads a v e rag ed just double the re ported net. 
From what ever angle the pro blem is a pproach ed it seems a pparen t 
that t he net of the bankruptcy roads considered collectively 
is supersensitive to and wil l reflect sha r ply any apprec iable 
change in maintenance expenditure. 
The question is n o t one of whether the maintenance expendi-
tures of the ba nk ruptcy period may h a ve be e n required by p re-
vious neglect. The hea rt of t he p ro blem i s whe ther t h e amount 
of ma intenance charged to operating expenses i n t he period for 
whi ch t he net is ac c e p ted as more or less i ndica tive o f p ro-
s pective minimum e a rnin g s, was i ~: excess of the normal current 
requirements und e r the volume of tra ffic a nd cond itions t hen 
existing . If it wa s, the earn i ng p ower of t h e property under 
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the conditions then prevailing was understated by the excess 
of the expenditure over normal current maintenance require-
ments. 
~"Tnile failure to accord adequate recognition to this 
f a ctor bears initially on the amount of fixed interest bonds 
the Interstate Commerce Commission is willing to app rove, it 
also bears on the amount of income bonds which it deems ap-
propriate. It is in this categ ory that tne greatest danger 
to the future of the industry appears to lurk . 
Here we find a Government body, in a laudable effort to 
strengtn en the financial status of the railroad industry, 
undertaking to reduce the proposed amounts of contingent inter -
est bonds u p on the p remise tha t prospective earnings, a f ter 
deducting the so called cap ital funds , are not sufficient to 
warrant a l a r ger amount. It may well be contended that not 
all of t he cap ital between a conservative a mount of fixed 
interest bonds and commo n stock s hould be issuable in the form 
of c ontingent income obligations and that some p ortion thereof 
might better be rep resented by a preferred stocK. 
Conceding t hi s fact as p robably true, es pecially if vot-
ing p ower is to be limited to stock o1liy and n ot extended to 
t hr income bonds as p erha ps it should be,a nice degree of dis-
cernment is necessary in determining the dividing line. Any 
undue l eaning back ward a s respects a reasonable a mount of 
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income bonds, as against an amount of preferred stock in lieu 
thereof, has very serious consequences. It is not merely a 
double edged sword but, in this instance, it actually cuts 
a hole in both directions in the c ompany 1 s !'uture pros pects. 
The higher rate called for by a preferred stock as against 
an income bond is not all that is encountered in tne substitu-
ti on . The question of taxation enters here and carves out a 
nice slice of the earning s which in the mind of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and its examiners are already inadequate 
to warrant a more liberal amount of income bonds. 
FINAN CING BY COMMON STOCK 
W.tlile the uncertainties of railroad earning power may, 
coupled wi th conservativeness, necessitate stringency in the 
authorized amount ot· !'ixed . intere.st de bt, it is not clear that 
a parsimonious attitude should be followed with respect to the 
amount of income bonds authorized. To lay undue stress on 
income bon~s as constituting debt versus preferred stock as 
in the nature o!' equity capital, is a poor excuse f or f urt11er 
prejudicing the outlook for a recovery in ~ailroad credit in 
its large r sense. Ultimate assurance of the latter involves 
a reasonabl e prospect of ability to finance with common stock, 
in g ood times at least. 
Substi tut.ion o1; a f'ive per cent preferr·ed stock requiring 
earnings of approximately ~6.2~ per share, before income t.axes, 
to permit full dividend payments, a s against a requirement of 
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onJ.y $4.~0 per $1.00 oi' capital in this form of income bonds, 
is not conducive to the building up of an earning power on 
the new common stock to make it available for financing or 
appealing for conversion of b J nds. Wnen the tax liability is 
incurred, it b ecomes a charge ahead of interest and thus re-
duces the coverage on even the first mortgage obligations. 
From the public policy sta ndp oint, no question of tax 
evasion or improper avoidance is involved. The creditors are 
not endeavoring to reduce any previously existing tax liability, 
and the Commission has received no mandate frorn.Congress to 
reconstruct the railroad industry financially in such a way 
as to subject it to taxation which Congress did not elect to 
impose upon it when it crea ted the tax laws. The unavoidable 
substitution of stock in some part for de b ts increases this 
tax liability and corres pondingly decreases the available net. 
It would seem that the Commission should take full cognizance 
of the consequences of this and not push the process of sub-
stituting stock for bonds furti1.er than absolutely necessary 
to attain some fundamental objective. And abstra ct theories 
of idealistic ratios of debt to g ross capi talization scarcely 
fall within this ca teg ory. 
It should n ot be assumed that tne substitution of' a larger 
amount of preferred stock in lieu of income bonds in the first 
instance accomplisnes the same purpose as would the subsequent 
conversion of income bonds into common stock. Quite the con-
trary. The larger t h e amount of preferred stock issued in 
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lieu of income bonds, the less the amount of earnings avail-
able for the common, with a corresponding impairment of what-
ever existing or potential values the latter mignt otherwise 
possess. Consequently, t he prospective financing ability of 
the common is decreased. On the other hand, the substitution 
of common stock through conversion of income bonds bui~ds up 
the substance behind the stock and lends stability, as reflected 
in earning power and price of the common stock,as against in-
stabi l ity when the latter is subject to a large amount of senior 
requirements. And if the income bonds are of a long maturity 
and limited as to intere-st a~cumula tions, they impose no great-
er structural burden than a partially cumulative preferred 
stock with its higher dividend requirement plus the tax burden 
on earnings otherwise applicable to distribution. The issuance 
of a larger amount of preferred stock in lieu of income bonds 
is not a move in the direction of rehabilitating railroad 
earning power, credit and prospective a bility to finance with 
equity stock. 
Clearly the line between preferred stock and income bonds 
needs to be drawn with a nice degree of discrimination with 
due regard to the consequences. Perhaps this could not be 
driven home more forcibly than by the following summarization 
of the wide difference between the cost of servicing four and 
one-half per cent income bonds and · an identical face amount 
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of five per cent preferred stock after taking into considera-
tion the Federal Income Tax liability to which earnings other-
wise applicable to dividends are subject. For this purpose, 
the prospective income tax is assumed to approximate one-fifth 
of the applicable earnings. 
The cost of servicing the preferred stock is almost 40 
per cent more than that of servicing an equal face ~uount 
of income bonds. A specified amount of earnlngs would there-
fore service almost 40 per cent more capital in the form of 
income bonds than if. in the form of preferred stock. The 
saving between the income bonds and preferred stock, if appiied 
to a live sinking fund on the bonds, would retire the entire 
issue in less than 30 years even if no b~nds were acquired 
below par. Giving recognition to the discount at which a 
large proportion of the bonds presumably would be acquired, 
the period of time for the complete retirement of the issue 
would be much shorter. 
This brings us to the subject of sinkin g funds but before 
leaving the income bond versus preferred stock phase of the 
reorganization problem, it seems appropriate to add the follow-
ing as respects the future. The income bond mortgage should, 
it would seem,be left open for future financing under proper 
restrictions. It is far more likely to be serviceable in 
this respect than the preferred stock. Dependence upon the 
latter might well involve recourse to the first mortgage fixed 
interest bonds under circumstances where the income bonds, 
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with possibly a five per cent coupon and an attractive conver-
sion rate into common stock,might suffice. 
Any assumption that railroad preferred stocks are going 
to constitute a successful financing medium in the future 
seems unduly optimistic. Investors may have short memories 
but they will not soon forget what happened to preferred as 
well a s common stocks in this depression, and consequent re-
orgnaizations. 
In any event, the amount of earnings necessary to provide 
first for taxes and then for dividends is too great to offer 
the prospect of appeal to the investor who wants something 
senior to plain common stock. On the other hand, the latter 
does offer a speculative appeal to a large class of in_vestors 
who are willing to purchase common stock with its potentialities 
as well as risks. . Neither can the problem be covered by giving 
to the preferred a part icipating privilege. Unless the pre-
ferred is a small issue or the participation subject to the 
ri ght of the common to a liberal return before participation 
by the preferred, the potentialities of t he common are so 
diluted that it is apt to become just so much paper. 
SII'·JKI NG FUNDS 
From what has been said and written about railroad sink-
ing f unds, one might infer that to provide a panacea for all 
the financi a l ills of the railroads; the only thing necessary 
i s t h e formal adoption of a sinking fund on debt. Little 
thought seems to have been given to the problem of the finan-
cial cost to the carrier. 
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There can be no eriticism of a subscriber to an issue of 
bonds demanding such method of liquidating his debt. But to 
contend that the carrier in every instance, benefits correspond-
ingly requires shutting one's eyes to the facts. In the in .... 
stance of those railroads which even in the 20s were not able 
to finance through the sale of' stock any part of their capital 
requirements in excess of surplus earnings, but had to resort 
to the incurrence of additional debt to provide necessary 
additions and bettermemts, a sinking fund provision would only 
have required the incurrence of' so much more new debt to go 
through the motion of paying off part of the old. It wou~d 
merely have been borrowing from Peter to pay Paul with no 
effective accomplishmemt. 
Of courset Paul might have benefited if the redemption 
· price of his obligation were higher than what the market might 
otherwise have been wj_thout the benefit of the sinking fund. 
But this very thought carries the i mplication that a ~arger 
amount of new bonds would have had to have been sold at a dis-
count to pay off a smaller amount of old bonds at a hi gher 
price or that the new issue would have had to carry a higher 
coupon rate. 
In the light of hindsight, the real fault with the rail 
financing of the 20s would seem to be the failure to have 
utilized stocl~ to a greater extent when the price, in the case 
of individual roads, did mak e its use possible. This,with a 
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larger resort to an attractive conversion privilege on the 
debt incurred, would have improved the position of' many roads. 
In the absence of fina ncing ·with stock directly or through 
conversion privileges, sink ing funds alone, during that period 
of expansion, might c onceivably have operated in large degree 
to effect a mere substi tution of one debt for a nother. 
Sink ing funds may serve a useful and legitimate p urpose 
but let there be no mistaking the fact that tney absorb funds 
from some other applieation which may be of equal importance 
to either the carrier or the investor or both. Take the pres-
ent re organizations, for instance. 
Broadly speaking ~ the trend is toward splitting up pres-
ent large mortgage issues into a modest percentage of fi xed 
interest bonds, some fleemingly ultra-conservative percentage 
of contingent interest bonds, with t he balance re presented by 
preferred or possibly preferred and corr~on stock. The deduc-
tion of' a sinking fund. from income ahead of dividends on the 
new preferred stock g iven an old bondholder, constitutes the 
application of part of t h e income due the latter to a retire-
ment of the principal of that portion of his allotment of new 
securities carrying the label of bonds. More bluntly,it 
constitutes the application of income owing to and due an old 
bondholder to the cancellation of part of his debt. To the 
extent that the holder of the old bonds deems this desirable 
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or advisable, well and good. But the essential character and 
effect of the sinking fund in this instance is not altered 
even though it may be obscured by concentration of thought 
on the chara. cteristict3 ·of the several new securities. 
This is not intended as an indictment of sinking funds, 
but merely an effort ·to emphasize their true character and 
effect on the position of' existing creditors. Of course, 
where the new preferrE~d s t,ock or a large part of it goes to 
creditors otHer than t l1.e class receiving the bul.K of the in-
come bonds, this crit:lcism does not hold . In currently proposed 
plans, however, the recipients of the greater part or tne p.r·e-
ferred stock are not infrequently the same creditors who receive 
the bulk of the incQmE::~ bonds. 
The foregoing discusses the sinking fund problem only from 
the standpo i nt of the holders of the income bonds and preferred 
stock collectively . . The fac t that the interest of the security 
holders individually 1s not always identical should ·not be 
.. 
overlooked. The operation of a sinking fund in itself tends 
to sustain the marketability of an issue and thus aids in pro-
viding a market f or those bondholders who may desire to liqui-
date. And if the bonds can be retired at an appreciable dis-
count, the operation may so strengthen the position of the 
remaining b onds and of the preferred stock which follows, that 
the recipient of the latter, as well as of the income bonds in 
a reorganization, can well afford to have part of the earnings 
applicable to the former diverted to the retirement of income 
bonds held by others willing to sell at a discount. 
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CAPITAL FUNDS 
The so-called capital funds which have apparently become 
an integral part of present day rail reorganization plans a re 
worthy of t he most careful consideration. Their need largely 
arises by reason of the f a ct that certain more or less routine 
maintenance involves, under the Commission's accounting practice, 
some charges to additions and betterments. 
Prudence makes it inadvisable, even if it were practicable, 
to capitalize all of these by the issuance of securities. To 
the extent that these are not financed through the issuance 
of new securities, they have to be provided for out of earnings. 
But not being charged against the latter in an accounting sense, 
the income account indica tes a larger amount available for in-
teres t distributions on the income bonds than is represented 
by the available cash from earnings after providing f'or the 
additions and betterments. The so-called capital funds have 
been devised to bridge this gap. To make income bond interest 
a charge ahead of theEie additions and betterments might tend 
to strangle the property if earnings should not exceed the in-
come bond interest charges by an amount sufficient to cover 
the additions and betterments. 
The question may properly be asked as to why such items 
as the Commission requires be treated as capital expenditure 
instead of maintenance expens e should not be fina nced by the 
sale of securities. The answer he re is simpl e enough. 
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Experience has taught that the .~e routine addi tiona and 
betterments expenditures such as increased weight of rail, 
like many larger scale additions and betterments expenditures 
such as grade crossing elimination,etc., taken together with 
the previously existi!lg investment, are not as a whole pro-
ductive of additional earning power. 
It is not particularly material whether this is primarily 
attributable to the non-productiveness of the new additions 
and betterments or to the eroding effect of' various economic 
and social changes on the earning power of the existing invest-
ment. The net result is that the maintenance of a railroad's 
earning power, insofar as t h is is possible, requires the expendi-
ture of substantial sums of money currently for what the Com-
mission labels additions and betterments. 
This answer bring s us to the question of why expenditures, 
which in the aggregatel do no more at best than assist in main-
taining earning power, should not be absorbed in operating 
expenses rather than pyramided on an investment base upon which 
the railroads as a whole, even in predepre~sion days, failed 
to earn a fair return as a result of the inability or unwill-
ingness of the Commis:::.ion, in the exercise of its r a te regula tory 
functions, to provide an adequate rate structure. The best 
answer to this would appear to be that the Commission would 
undoubtedly object to letting down the barrier of refined 
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distinctions developed over a long period of years between 
what, under its accounting theories, is deemed additional 
investment, even if provided out of cash derived from earnings, 
and what it considers to be pure replacement maintenance charge-
able to operating expenses. 
Is there no remedy for this situation? Cannot the Com-
mission's refined accounting distinctions between .principal 
and income be brought into harmony with present day realities 
in the railroad situation? May not the answer to t hi s p roblem, 
and such proposals as the capital fund provisi ·;ns · in present 
reorganization proposals, lie in the specific au thorization 
of permissible but not mandatory charges against earnings 
credited to a special reserve? 
The character and purp ose of this reserve is of much 
greater importance than the title which might be assigned to 
it. Without attempting here to define its breadth or scope, 
the thought is that i t should at least p ermit provision for 
that accelerated obsol escence which results from the social 
and economic changes not to mention the advancement in the 
science of railroading now so rapidly taking place. Although 
in the nature of a supplemental reserve for amortization of 
investment, it should not be confused with depreciation. 
The latter, including the normal or foreseeable obsolescence 
embraced therein, is reasonably susceptible to advance com-
putation whereas the f orm of accelerated obsolescence for which 
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t h is account would attempt to prov i de is varia ble and larg ely 
a ma tter of individua l judgment as to future trends. 
But because the degree of this accelera ted obsolescence 
or the extent to which provision therefor is desirable may 
not b e reducible to ma thematical determination, is no res-
son why the p roblem s h ould not be g iven careful consideration. 
It would seem tha t s ome re as ·Jnable provision might be ma de 
for it in the i n come account even thoug h the a mount of the 
charge and credit to the reserve be left, within p rescribed 
limits, to the discre tion of individual managements. And when 
property is a ba ndoned., that p ortion of the · cost for wh ich no 
deprecia tion reserve has been set up, s h oul d presumably be 
charg ed to t h is reserve instead of as now to profit and l oss. 
The resu~t would be to provide in advance, ou t of earning s of 
prosp erous times, for those abandonments which fre quently tak e 
p~ace in periods of d.e pression a nd are ch a rged out, throug h 
profit a nd loss, after the fact. 
Such a reserve a s here suggested would tend to k eep the 
income account and bal a nce sheet more in line with real ities. 
It would not interfer e with the present practice of cha r ging 
to the property account all those items wnich the Commission 
clas s i fies a s additions and betterments instead of operating 
expenses. But tho se roads wh ich voluntarily elect, and tnose 
which under t h e terms of reorgan iza tion pla ns proposed by 
bondh olders mi ght be re quired, to p rovide such reserve, wou~d 
by this p rocedure br i ng t he ir stated earning s more nearly in 
-189-
line with the amount currently available to the investor. 
There would, of course, be no direct accounting relation 
or connection between the additions and betterments and the 
reserve. But the latter, averaging one year with another, 
would provide out of revenues the cash from which such addi-
tions and betterments could be made, even though these addi-
tions and betterments be charged to the investment account. 
The procedure here would parallel that whereby depreciation 
of equipment reserves provide cash which becomes applicable 
to the purchase of new equipment or other property as weJ.l as 
to the retirement of E~quipment trust obligations. And paral-
leling the latter, the reserve would likewise provide the 
cash for such sinking funds as may be deemed requisite. 
There is no reason to assume that within carefully pre-
scribed limitations the Commission would not countenance and 
approve provision in re organization plans for reserves of this 
character. This method of providing the casn for,and indirectJ.y 
an offset in the income account to, the cost of those additions 
and betterments contemplated by the reorganization plan capital 
funds, might even meet the approval of those members of the 
Commission who have gone on record as against the so-called 
capital funds. 
What these members of the Commission have said against 
a mandatory provision for an appropriation from earnings for 
additions and betterments would scarcely seem applicable to 
permissible charges, within -specified limits, against earnings, 
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for reserves. The record ·of the Commission is replete with 
n loss 1· n the in~ome producing capacity of rail-assertions of c:;l. 
road property considered collectively. The Commission has 
attempt to write-off in the proposed 
even gone so far as to 
or the properties undergoing reorganiza-
capitalization of some 
tion, a portion of t ,he physical values indica ted by its own 
valuation of the property. If there is obsolescence or other 
incurred l·n the value of the railroad plant, diminution being 
there is no valid reason why the Commission should not specific-
t , carr1·ers to provide for it, at .Least within ally autnorize ne 
prescribed limits, out of current earning s or income. 'I'his 
would seem to be good public policy both in the. interest of 
conservative accounting and indirect provision for improved 
technique i nvolving an advanced scrapping of old facilities ( 1) 
for new. · . 
'I he following provision for a Capital Fund is well illus-
trated in the reorganization plans of the Chicago & North 
(2) 
Western Railway Company: 
The first and general mortgage and the second mortgage 
will contain -covenants substantially to the ei'fect ·t.i:lat in 
each calendar year there shall be paid into a cap ital fund 
such amounts charged against overating expenses as this Com-
mission sha.L.L require tor depreciation and retirement of 
property or, if no specific deprecia tion shall have oeen re-
quired, then a reasonable a mount there!or within the maximum 
l.Warner,Joseph R.,Railroad Reorganization Practice and Policy 
' Savings Bank Journa.L,Decemoer,.L939 p~(2-~l 
2.Interstate Commerce Commission,Finance Docket No.lU~~.L, 
pp.L~ 2-l57,December 12,.LY39· 
"' I 
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p ermi tt ed b y t h is C on~ission. The f unds so d erived , to c e t h er 
with s u ch a mounts-. as w.ay be rec e ive d f rom t h e additions a n d 
better men ts f u n d her ~ :lna..Cte r provided for, wi ll b e se gre ga t ed 
from t n e general fund o f the reor ga n ized company and wi ll b e 
u sed only f or the follovri n g pur p os es in t r1e ord er of their 
p r i ority ; 
1. Pa s ment of prlnci pa l _of equipme n t -trust ob li gations 
a nd sinkin g funds on b onds issued a ga i nst t he pur-
ch ase of equip~nent, a s they mature; 
2 . Cos t of rep lace ment of property retired , to the extent 
ch argeab le t o capital acco lmt , required t o raa i ntain 
effi c :L ency o f t h e s y s tem cm:L F1.pai red; 
3 . Pa yment i n c n s h f or addi tional e qu i pment o f t hat part 
of cost no t financ ed under e qul pmen t tru s t s or by t he 
i ssu e of b ond s; 
1 . Sh ould an emer t ency exi st re s ulti n g i n i nsuff i c ient 
earning s f rom wh ich to meet f ixed char ges, s e r ial d e b t 
maturi t i es , nnd uncondi tional s i nki n g fund r e qui r ements, 
t h e board of direc t ors will be p ermit ted in i t s di s-
cretion by a p propria te action to u se t h e f unds in t h e 
cap ital fun d to t h e extent n ecessa r y to ma k e g ood t h e 
deficiencies and, t hereu;;on and t h ereafter, no con-
tingent char c;es or dividends s hall be paid unt i l t h e 
cap i t al fund has b e en reimbursed for the funds used 
to p a y fixe d c h ar ges and t h e b alance in the f "L:md 
res t ored to v 3 ,000,000 ; 
5 . The unappropriat e d b alance not in exc e ss o f ~~3 , 000 , 000 
·will b e s e t apart and h eld in c ash or inve sted in 
Uni ted States Government securities, and will b e us a b le 
for any of t :1.e p urp os es s p ecified i n subpara t-raphs 
( l) to ( 4 ), l nclu si v e , i rnmedia t ely above; 
G. ~IDY unappro1)riated balan ce i n exces s of !:p3 , 000 , 000 
wi ll b e u s a b le to p a y n ot to exc e ed 2 5 per cen t of t h e 
cost o f i lilpr ovements or be ttermen ts funded or f u n d , b le 
int o b onds f or t h e rema-inin g '7 5 p er cen t o f s u ch 
co s t , pa yment being mak e b efore t h e end of t h e c a lendar 
year nex t succeedine t h e d a t e o f a c qui s i t ion o f such 
lr.1provel'i1ent s or b ett e r ments; 
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7. Any unappropriated balance i n excess of $3,000,000 
which at the end of the calendar yea r had not been 
used fcir any of the purposes prescribed above will 
be used for Dnprovements or betterments of a nature 
against which additional mortgage bonds could other-
wise be issued or for the retirement of debt up on 
which there shall be no accumulation of unpaid 
interest other than fully cumulative contingent 
interest. Any improvements or betterments or re-
tirement of d13bt used as a basis for the withdrawal 
of cash in accordance with t he provisions of sub-
paragraph (7) will not t he reafter be usable a s a 
basis for the issue of additional securities other 
then common stock. 
An additions and betterments fund will be created by 
appropriate covenants in the first and general mortgage and 
the second mortgage . There will be pa id into this fund out 
of net income available therefor as hereinafter defined an 
amount of $3,000,000 a year for each of the first three years 
after reorganization, and thereafter an amount each year equal 
to the smaller of the following amounts: (a) $2,500,000,or 
(b) 2.5 pe r cent of r a ilway operating revenues. 
The funds so der:Lved will be ·segregated from the general 
funds and will be used eithe r to provide for, or to reimburse 
the treasury of the reorganized company for, all or any part 
of the cost of improvements or betterments chargeable to capital 
account and not otherwise financed; · but such i mprovements or 
betterments will not t hereafter be us ed as the basis for the 
issue of securities ot her than common stock. The funds may 
als6 be used to pay not to excee4 25 percent of the cost of 
i mprovements or betterments which are f unded or fundable into 
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bonds for the remaining 75 percent of such co s t, payment 
being made before the end of the calendar year next succeeding 
the date of acquisition of such improvements or betterments. 
Any moneys remaining :"L n the additions and betterments fund 
which shall not have been applied to or appropriated for the 
purposes as above provided by Decembe.r 31 of the year in wh ich 
the moneys are pa id into the fund, will be transferred to the 
capital fund, to be held and used in accordance with the 
( l) 
provisions thereof. 
l.Interstate Commerce Commission,Finance Docket No.l088l, 
December,l939· 
-194-
CFJ~PTER XV 
REPORT OF CQI<ll:MITTEE-OF-SIX 
Recormnendations calling for adoption of a definite 
national transportation policy, revision of the rule of rate-
making, creation of a transportation board and a railroad 
reorganization court, elimination of subsidies to agencies 
competing with railroads and enlargement of Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation lending powers are among the proposals 
embodied in the report submitted to President Roosevelt on 
December 23, 1938 by his railroad committee-of-six. The 
committee's own sumrn.ary of its recon:nnenda tions follows: 
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY 
Adoption by the Government of a definite national 
transportation policy providing for fair, impartial regula-
tion of all modes of transportation, so aili~inistered as to 
preserve the inherent advantages of each one. 
JURISDICTI ON OF INTEHSTATE COIVIMEH.CE COIV1MISSION 
Responsibility to be placed in the Interstate Commerce 
Conwission to administer all regulatory provisions with respect 
to rates, services, valuation, and accounting as to all modes 
of transportation, together with powers of i nvestigation limit-
ed ~o its jurisdiction. 
REVISION OF RATE-l\IJAKING RULE 
Repeal of the present provisions of Section 15a of the 
Interstate Commerce Act and substitution therefor of a new 
rate-making rule applicable to all modes of transportation, 
with suggested wording of the rule. 
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LONG-AND-SHORT HAUL CLA SE 
Repeal of the so-c lled long-and short haul clause 
of Section 4 of the Act 
REPARATION 
Amendment of Secti n 8 and 16 of the Act relating to 
reparation in accordanc with recommendations heretofore 
made by the Interstate: omr.1e1"'ce Commission. 
I NTERSTATE RATES 
Extension of wer of the Commission with respect to 
intrastate rates in con ection with general readjustments of 
interstate rates. 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD 
A new and nt agency to be created, charged with 
the duty of investigati g and reporting to the Congress con-
cerning the relative e:c fitness of the several modes 
of transportation and t e extent to which any of t hem is now 
being subsidized, with ts recommendations for further 
legislation. Thereafte to be charged .with responsib ility 
for administering as to all modes of transportation re gulatory 
provisions relating to ertificates of convenience and necessi-
ty covering new constru tion or operations and abandomnents 
of facilities or opera t"ons, and the approval of the issuance 
of securities, consoli.d tions, mergers, leases, acquisitions 
of control, interlockln directorates, and to exercise all 
functions of or promotional nature relating 
primarily to any mode o transportation now vested in other 
agencies or bureaus. 
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TOLLS FOR USE OP I IViPHOVED WATERWAYS 
A fair and reasonable sy stem of tolls for corlli~ercial 
use of certain i n land waters, the elimination of the Inland 
Waterways Corporation and disposal of its properties. 
TAXATI ON AND orrHER GOVERNMENTAL I MP OSITIONS 
Legislation , national and state, relieving the railroads 
of certain unjust tax burdens and providing t hat Government 
bear the expense of eliminating grade crossings. 
RECONSTRUCTI ON OF BRI DGES AND OTHER FACILrrr i ES 
Adoption of policy that whenever, in connection with the 
i mprovement of navigable waters or t h e carry ing out of flood-
con trol or similar projects, a railroad is required to alter 
or reconstruct bridges or other facilities, it be reimbursed 
by t he Government f or all costs in excess of any direct benefi t 
accrui n g to it. 
LAND- GRANT RATES 
Repeal of the reduced rates provisi on s of the so-called 
land-gran t sta tutes. 
REORGANIZAT I ON C OUH~ 
E stablishment of a single court vested with exclusive 
jurisdic t i on over ma tters connected with railroad reorganiza-
t i ons and composed of judges selected with especial reference 
to t h eir experience i n and qualifications for t h is hi ghly 
specia lized service. The Federal district courts are to 
retain juri sdiction over a ll matters not connected with re-
organization. The Interstate Commerce Commission is to be 
relieved of all responsibility in railroad reor ganizations. 
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CONSOLIDATI ON PLAN 
Repeal of provisions of the Act which make the Commission 
responsible for the prescription of a general plan of consolida-
tion for railroads, thereby restoring to the carriers all 
initiative, but requiring approval by the Transportation Board 
of any proposed consolidation. Such a pproval is to be granted 
or withl~eld in accordance with the considerations set forth 
in our recommendations, including protection of the public 
interest and a fair and equita?le arrangement to protect the 
interest of employees affected. 
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION LOANS 
Legislation enlarging the powers of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to purchase or guarantee obligations of 
and to make loans to railroads or to receivers or trustees 
thereof and modifying the requirements with respect to the 
approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission of any s~ch 
purchase, guarantee, or loan. 
The report was an unanimous one, signed by all six 
members of the committee: 
Carl R. Gray, Vice-Chairman of the Union Pacific R.R. 
M. W. Clement, President of the Pennsylvania R. R. 
E. E. Norris, President of the Southern R.R. 
George M.Harrison, Chairman of the Railway Labor 
Executives Association 
D.B.Robertson, President of the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen 
B. M. Jewell, President of the Railway Employ ees 
Department, American Federation of Labor 
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In concluding its summary, the committee stated that it 
is 11under no delusion that our recommendations., if given 
effec~, would dispose of all the problems of the railroads." 
It does feel, however, that "they would remove some of the 
major causes that are dlrectly respons i ve to the principal 
task assigned to the committee of developing recommendations 
calculated to be helpful in creating stability in the field 
of transportation." 
The committee's "Final Word 11 points out how the railroads 
could aid in reviving ousiness, suggesting that "an average -
of a billion dollars a year can justifiably be expended in 
further modernizing and improving their properties, including 
acquisition of new equipment." Meanwhile, if the committee's 
recorrunendations in connection with the equalization of 
competition be adopted, nthere will remain matters with which 
the industry itself can and should deal." For one thing, the 
report goes on, 11 they should give more accelerated activity 
and effort to the matter of adjusting t heir services and 
pricing to the requirements of the traffic. There must also 
be a realization on the part of management that many of the 
corrective measures to which we have called attention require 
the active, intelligent and united support of the entire 
industry for their accomplishment." In closing, the committee 
said that it suggested no "policy of retrogression, to the 
contrary, we urge the adoption of a progressive policy which 
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will recognize the chru1gin~ condltlons nnd wtll shape future 
legislation accordingly." 
Mr. J.J. Pelley, President of the Association of tuaorlean 
Ho.llroads, snld thnt the report appeared to be the ".:1ost 
comprehensive and .constructive that has ever been made a& to 
the trans .ortation problem and proposals for 1ts solution. " 
Mr. A. F. Whitney , President of the Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen, culled it '*just another smoke screen to 
tickle the ohlna of the public, give the railroads a little 
relief and poasibly to tako something from the public a.s well 
ns employees . " 
The report JT.a.kes virtu.nlly no reference to the high 
labor costs due to high wages and.expena1ve working rules 
which are among the most lnportant factors in tho problem. 
The no.t1on has had :-:. r&i:ilrond :vroblem for many years .. 
It caused the adoption of gqvorninent operation in 1910 and 
the l' t:tul .. n of the railways to private operation in 19aO. 
Passage of tho Tranaporta:tion Act of 1920 \m.s the most con-
structive effort ever made to solve the proplem. It has been 
greatly cha.nged by the deprossion, the increase of competition 
by other carriers largely due to governmental aid, nnd the 
policies of the Hoosevelt administration regarding prices , wages 
and tn:;:cs . Thoro ~lust be leglsla.t1on even more com~·rehensive 
than the Trs.nsportation Act of 1920 and, also, much more unified 
o.nd courageous actlon by rz.il"Jo.y management, 11' the rallrroad 
problem or today is to be solved . ( l) 
I . Rallway Age , December 13, 1938 
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CHAPTER XVI 
RAILROAD L:SGI SLATI OE PENDI NG IN 1939 
Th e outlook for railroad l egislati on by the present 1939 
Congress is ve r y unimpressive. Despite the p romise i mplied 
by ap~ointment of the Splawn corrillllttee a year a go and ~ more 
r e cently, the "Committ ee of Six, 11 t h e Ach11inist r ation has not 
publicly supported any major railroad legislation. The 
political atmos phere is g enerally much less friendly than it 
was l a st fall after the railroads had a ccepted t heir fai lure 
to obtain a wag e r eduction . 
A summary of t he p r incipal bills follows: 
CHANDLER BII,L 
Th is bill has already passed the House and is awaiting 
Senate action, with fairly g ood pros pects of a favorable vote 
t h ere. Senator Wheeler, ori ginally r eported to have been 
hosti le, has withdrawn his objections with the proviso that 
the life of t he law be limited to a year or t vvo. 
Under the Chandler bill, any railroad desiring to effect 
an interest adjustment or postp onement of interest or principal 
payn1ent could prepare such a plan, and, after having obtained 
assurances of acc eptance from holders of 25 ~ of the claims 
affected thereby, submit it to the Interstate Commerce 
Cow nission . After Commission approval is given, the railroad 
would have to obtain assents from c reditors hblding more than 
tvvo-thirds of the a ggregate c~aims affe cted and a majority of 
each affected class of claims. 
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The plan may then be filed in the United States District 
Court having jurisdiction, and a special court of three judges 
would be convened to hold hearings and exercise jurisdiction 
over the petitioning railroad and its property. If the court 
finds that the plan is 11fair and equitable, is in the public 
interest, affords due recognition to the rights of each class 
of creditors and stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly 
in favor of any class of creditor or stockholders, and will 
conform to the requirements of the law of the land regarding 
the participation of the various classes of creditors and 
stockholders,n it shall confirm the plan. 
If the plan, as submitted to or modi fied by the court, 
has been accepted by creditors holding more than thre e-fourths 
of the aggregate runount of the claims af fected, including at 
least three-fifths of the amount of clai ms of each affected 
class, it then becomes binding upon the petitioner and on all 
creditors and security holders. fi1e ent ire proceedings could 
take not more than one year, during which time interest pay-
ments would be made on the basis proposed in the plan. Equip-
ment trust certificates, taxes, operating expenses, wages, 
employment contracts and unllquidated claims would not be 
af f ected by such plans. 
WHEELER-LEA HOLDING COMPANY BILL: 
Thi s bill is understood to be politically preferred over 
any other railroad measure, except perhaps the Chandler bill. 
It would authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
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examine the books of holding companies and subsidiaries of 
railroads and to regulate expenditures of railroad funds 
for the purchase of securities in railroad and non-railroad 
properties. 
WHEELER OMNIBUS BILL : 
For t he most part, this bill i s constructive in purpose, 
from the standpoint of both the railroads and the larger public 
good. Jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission would 
be broadened to cover all common carriers by rail, water, motor 
vehicle, exp ress, pipeline and sleeping car, as well as, for 
.rate-making only, transport by air, in addition to contract 
carriers by air, water and motor vehicle. 
The Commission would be asked to determine the service 
for which e ach type of carrier is esp eci ally fitted and for 
which its use s hould be encouraged i n or der to avoid wasteful 
and destructive competition. It would als o i nqu ire i nto the 
extent to which the various types of ser vices a re subsidized 
out of public funds. Its findings would be reported to Congress 
within a year, together with recommendations for corrective 
le gislation. 
This bill would be generally ap proved in railroad circles 
were it not for its Commodities Clause, which would m~~e unlaw-
ful the transportation by any interstate carrier of articles 
produced or consume d by subsidi ary, affiliated or controlling 
interests. 
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LEA OMNIBUS BILL: 
This bill would enlarge the Interstate Commerce Comrnds-
sion and bring under its control all transportation agencies 
except deep sea and co.astwise shipping, as well as many of 
the other reforms proposed by the so-called "Committee of Six". 
WlffiELRq REORGANIZATION BILL: 
This measure represents an effort to expedite bankruptcy 
procedure. A special court would be set up to handle rail-
road reorganizations. Functions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in such .matters would be reduced to prescribing 
the limi ts of feasible capitalization, the special court pass-
ing upon plans devi .sed within those limits. 
No class of new securities could be issued in a reorgan-
ization unless probable future earnings would provide some 
earnings . applicable to such securities; and, further, it shall 
be rebuttable presumption that the expec t ed future average 
annual earnings of the property will no t exceed t he annual 
average earnings of the property during the six calendar years 
preceding the date of the closing of the hearing by the Commis-
sion. 
Drafters of this proposal have adopted an extremely bearish 
view in the outlook for the country. If it should be passed 
as written, reorganizations under it would be even more drastic 
than the outlook for the railroad seems to require. 
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THE CONNALLY BILL: 
In view of recent Senate confirmation of the appointment 
of Mr.Alldredge to the Interstate Commerce Corrunission, this 
measure assumes added unfavorable significance. It is intended 
to remove inter-territorial freight rate differentials, a 
cause that Mr. Alldredge as head of the Transportation Economics 
division of the Tennessee Valley Association has ardently 
advocated. 
The effectiveness of any of these measures in aiding the 
railroads depends upon the extent to which and the direction 
in which they are amended before enactment. The Chandler Bill 
would delay the evil day of bankruptcy for several margi nal 
railroads. From the standpoint of the investor, it would 
detract from the appeal of their junior securities and streng t h en 
the position of their senior bonds. If i ts Cowaodities Clause 
were deleted, the Vfileeler Omnibus Bill would be mildly con-
structive. 
PROPOSED HEVISION OF SECTION77 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 
A new bill r evising Section 77 of the Railroad Bankr uptcy 
Act will be introduced in the 1940 session ot Congress. The 
new legislation wa s written by Representa t i ve Chandler just 
prior to h is retirement. It will be a substitute for the 
\'Vheeler-'l,ruman railroad r eorganization bill whi ch a roused 
considerable opposition because it set up a special court for 
r a ilroad r eorganization cases and provided for severe lin1itations 
upon the capi t a l structure of reorganized properties. 
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The major change which the new law would effect is that 
of eliminating the dual responsibility of the Interstate 
Commerce CorMaission and the Federal Court, vesting authority 
for approving reorganization plans entirely with the Federal 
judiciary. A special three-judge court is created consisting 
of the distr i ct judge administrating the bankrupt estate and 
two circuit judges. Appeals must be t aken directly to the 
Supreme Court. Preliminary hearings would be held before 
the Federal district judge, but authority for final approval 
of a p lan as well as decisions with res :t.)ect to fees and the 
appointment of trustees and counsel is g iven to the three 
judge-court. 
The Interstate C01mnerce Commission would act in an advisory 
capacity. It could hold hearings on a plan submitted by security 
holders, \"vri te a report of its own and pass it along to the 
Court within a specified p eriod. If the Commission failed to 
act on time, the Court could proceed independently. Thus the 
present shuttling back and forth between the Court and the 
Commission would be eliminated, with ultima te responsibility 
placed in the new three-judge court. f 
Deadlocks would be less likely under this new procedure. 
Long delays in Section 77 proceedings ha.ve been due primarily 
to the many steps required by the Interstate Corilmerce Commission 
before final p lans are promulgated for insolvent carriers. 
These plans often differ vddely from the ideas of security 
holders, thus creating a deadlock in the proceedings. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission is already burdened with multiple 
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duties and is u.'1.able to devote suff icient time to railroad 
reorganization procedure to insure rap id progress. 
In many ways the proposed act is sLmi lar to Section 10, 
covering industrial reorganizations. The latter authorizes 
the Securities Exchange Connnission to act in an advisory capacity, 
but vests ultimate authority in the Federal Court, and prevents 
retention of control by the former management of the property. 
The new law would prevent the appointment of trustees or 
counsel who have had affiliation of a personal, political or ' 
family nature with any of the judges, or the a ppointment a~ 
sole trustee of anyone vvho is a creditor, employee, attorney 
or officer of the debtor. 
The proposed legislation places some restrictions on the 
cap italizations of r eorganized railroads, but these restrictions 
are much milder than v1ha t was recommended in t he Whe eler-Truman 
Bill. They merely state that prospective future earnings must 
provide some coverage for i mcome bonds issued in r eorganization, 
and that such future earnings be given due consideration in 
setting a total valuation on the property. However, there is 
noth ing which specifically limits the amount of stock which 
mi ght be issued. 
Debt retirement through sinking funds is made compulsory. 
The bill provides that secured debt assumed by the reorganized 
road shall be retired during the ~seful life of the property, 
and that unsecured debt be retired within a period not exceeding 
forty years. Foreclosure sa±e is provided for, but where such 
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sale has bad the approva 1 of holders of two-thirds of t h e 
affected securities, minority holders would be bound by the 
p lan. Provision f or searching investigation of frauds commi tted 
by the debtor's management is also made in . the new bill, and 
the ~pterests of emp lqyee~ are protected by per mi tting inter-
vention in reorganiza,tion proceedings by thei.r representatives • 
. r , ' . 
VV"ELL DIRECTED CAMPAI GN "WILL CURE RAILROADS 1 ILLS 
The country's r ai lroad problem will not be solved "out 
of hand like a problem in geometry or a cross-word puzzle", 
but · it will succu:.mb to a 11 well-direc ted, weli-organized .and 
continuing compaig n11 , according to the view expressed by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission as it undertakes in its fifty-
second arinual report to Congress to indicate 11 the opportunities 
which exist f or improve~ent and wha t must be done if these 
oppor tunities are to be utilized." 
LEGISL!\ TIVE REOlVIJ'.ffiNDATIONS 
In the report, there are no recommendations f or legisla tion 
dealing with the rehabilitation of transportation agencies; 
the commission anticipates in that connection that various 
proposals will be presented to Congress, and thus opportunity 
will be afforded for thorough consideration of the general 
subject. Except for t wo minor ones, the specific legisla tive 
reco~endations are carry-overs from last year's report of 
matters upon wh:i.ch Congress failed to act. The recommendations 
are as follows: 
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1. That non-carrier railroad subsidiaries be brought 
within Interstate Con~erce Co~~ssion jurisdiction, at least 
as to their accounting and issuance of securities, and that 
restrictions be imposed on the expenditure of carrier funds, 
incurring obligations, or acquiring property by a carrier 
or its subsidiaries, except for the operation or legitimate 
i mprovement of its property. 
2. That section 15 (1) and (3) of Part I of the "Interstate 
Commerce Act be amended "so as to enable us to prescribe 
minimum as well as maximura joint rail-water rates. 11 
3. That section 15 (4) of Part I be amended to perrn t 
the establishment of through routes regardless of the 1'short-
bauling11 of any carrier. 
4. That Congress legislate to cover completely the 
standard time zone field. 
5. That section 20 be amended to strengthen the commission's 
power to require answers to questions upon which it may need 
- ' 
information. 
6. That provision of law be made for imposing a "reasonable 
fee" for admission to practice before the commission. 
7. That provision of law be made so that members of state 
regulatory bodies, when participating cooperatively with the 
commission in proceedings under Part I shall receive the same 
expense allowance as are now provided with respect to similar 
participation in proceeding under Part II, the Motor Carrier 
Act. 
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Numbers 6 and 7 are the two r ecommendations which did 
not appear in last year's report. Throughout the report, 
the cormnission has expressed its opposition to changes ln the 
Interstate Commerce Act which have been agitated by others. 
In this connection, it makes caustic r eference to railroad 
proposals for changes in section 15 . (a) 11 for the purpose of 
limiting our discretion in passing upon rate increases, so 
that upon proof of lm•1 earnings, approval of such increases 
would necessarily follow." The commission does not favor 
such amendment claiming that "the simple way to accomplish 
t he real result desired would be to lim~it our authority to 
the fixing of minimum rates and the removal of unjust dis-
crimination, leaving maximum rates to the discretion of the 
railroads. 11 If such were done, the co:mJnission ventures to 
believe that the railroads 11would make limi ted use of the 
freedom so accorded-- it is one thing to increase r ates .. Vl'here 
government through this commission shares the res ponsibility, 
and it is another t hing for the managements, under competition, 
to accept sole re s ponsibility.~ 
The corMI1ission does not favor giving the railroads a 
free hand on consolida tions; it does not believe that there 
is anything in their record which at all warrants a conclusion 
that they can be depended upon . to do what should be done 
wholly on t heir own initiative. The r eport also asserts 
that there is gross exaggeration to the idea that every act 
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of the railroads is subject to r egulation. It maintains that 
the carriers have a large degree of initiative in rate-making 
and cites the commission's limited power over freight services 
and lack of power over pas senger services. The carriers enjoy 
freedom with respect to the selection and pay of offi c ers, the 
purchase of equipment and supplies, operation of shops, main-
tenance of tracks, erection of stations or other buildings, 
awarding of construction contracts and the management of affairs 
in many other ways. 
All in all, the cor®d ssion thinks the pattern of railroad 
r egulation is in no way unique, but is substantially the srune 
as is now applied g€m.el"ally throughout the country by the 
states or the federal government to other public utility 
companies. 
CAUSES OF RAILRO.L\.D PROBL EMS 
The commission maintains that the railroad problem bec~~e 
increasingly acute during 1938 and as a result there have been 
insistent demands that the goverm'lent solve it. While all 
mEcrU~er of solutions have been proposed, public opinion has not 
as yet concentrated upon any course of action. The problem, 
according to the report, is the product of railroad poverty 
and it emerged in its present phase with the beginning of . the 
general economic depression about eight years ago. Dealing 
with the causes, the report finds it clear that railroad ills 
have been precipitated by an abrupt and continued decline in 
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demand for railro ad services, unparalleled in severity and 
duration . It further finds that the depression vvas the primary 
cause of this fall in demand, but increased competition con-
tributed heavily to the situation. Another adverse influence 
has been a tendency toward the decentralization or spreading 
of industrial operations. In statistics cited, this plight 
of the railroads is strikingly illustrated in 1936, the rail 
carriers handled somewhat less freight traffic and much less 
passenger traffic than in 1916, although in the twenty interven-
ing years, the investment in their properties had increased 
by more than eight billions of dollars. · 
The chief contributory factor to railroad distress, as 
distinguished from primary cause, has been the great volume 
of indebtedness. The large amount of railroad debt and fixed 
charges is not the same thing as overcapitalization. Railroads 
are not over-capitalized on the basis of the cost of their 
properties or on the basis of their value, but only on the 
basis of earning power. In view of the relatively large volume 
of their indebtec1.J.ess, many railroads have been driven into 
r eceivership or bankruptcy and many more have curtailed 
expenditures drastically, often to the de triment of their 
properties, to escape such proceedings. This factor has been 
the most demoralizing feature of present railroad ills, and 
the one that has particularly attracted the attention of the 
country. 
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runong other factors contributing to railroad distress, 
the commissi on includes financial exploitation of the past; 
the failure of the managements for some time to appreciate 
the danger impending from the competition of other forms of 
tr~~sportation, and to adjust services and rules to forestall 
or meet it; the fact that lack of credit has pr ecluded moderniza-
tion of equipment to the extent desirable; the construction 
of expensive passenge r stations , such as those in Cleveland 
and Cincinnati; the "Lmderlying fact that many railroad lines 
in the past v1e re i mprovidently planned and projected, and 
some of them should never have been built; and finally, the 
coincidence of an i.ncrease of about eight per c ent in railroad 
wages in the latter part of 1937 with an unanticipated 
pre cipitate fall in trai'fic aggravated and magnified the un-
favorable fi nancial results of that fall. 
It will b e well to ma1{e a review of r ate-increase movements 
since 1920, begi1r~ing with the unprecedented increases in ~ates 
and f'ares allowed in that year on top of the already heavy 
i n creases whi ch had been made during federal control. Almost 
immediately, there came a business depression, and the railroads 
t h emselves began to r educe many rates, while i n l92l,industry 
with practically one voice, asked a general reduction on the 
ground that the existing rates ·were stifling trade. In 1922 
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the commission reduced the increased rates by ten per cent 
wherever they had not been voluntarily reduced by that much 
or more; but it refused to reduce passenger fares, and it is 
now generally agreed that the managements were guilty of a 
grave error in judgment in maintaining these h i gh fares for 
more tha n a decade thereafter in the face of continually 
falling passenger tra ffic. 
After 1922, no general increase in railroad rates was 
sought until 1931, although an a pplication of Weste~n roads 
for a horizontal increase of five per cent was denied, but 
onl y on the ground that an indiscriminate increa se in all 
rates had not been justified in view of the manifest need fo r 
a discriminating readjustment of the rate structure. 
In its proceedings since 1931, t he commission did not 
attempt to compens a te for the abnormal drop in traffic, but 
did undertake to compe nsate for what a ppeared to be permanent 
i n creases in expe nses. Meanwhile, it did not order Eastern 
roads to cut fares until the success of Western and Southern 
experiments with lower passenger rates had been demonstrated; 
and in July, 1938, it permitted Eastern roads to increase coach 
f a res from two cents per mile to two and one-half cents for an 
experimental period of eighteen months, with results which so 
far, seem unfavorable. The Interstate Commerce Commission has 
recently ordered the eastern railroads t o return to t he two 
(l) 
cent maximum basic coach rate, effective March 24, 1940. 
The decline in the average ton-mil e revenue has been 
l.Standard Statistics Company, Inc., February 24,l940. pl765 
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caused largely by voluntary reductions to meet competition, 
while rates on the traffic which still is affected little, if 
at all, by competition have stayed up. It is of these non-
competitive rates tt1a t shippers complain. The railraods have 
without protest permitted wides pread publicity indicating that 
averae:;e ton-mile revenue is lower in this country tha..Yl in any 
foreign com1try, and drawing the conclusion, expressly or by 
implication, that American railroads are superior in economy 
and efficiency. Such a conclusion, according to the commission, 
cannot properly be drawn from such data, as average ton-mile 
revenues vary widely with the length of the haul and the 
character of the traffic. In foreign countries, the average 
haul is usually much shorter, more low..,grade freight is carried 
by water, and the distinction which we make between express 
and frei ght is not maintained. 
The commission does concede that its procedure is in some 
respects more cumbersome than it would like, but it is bound 
by the law and has learned by experience to take care in making 
records which will stand up in court. In this connection, those 
seeking rate reductions have suffered more severely from delays 
thru~ have the railroads when seeking increases. The latter 
proceedings 11ave been expedited at the expense of other work; 
but they cannot be heard in the twinkling of an eye, and the 
evidence subLti tted must be considered. 
After noting the existence of a considerable body of 
opinion to the effect that t he railroads are suffering from 
-215-
labor conditions that are arbitrary or unreasonable, the 
report of the commission by-passes that matter as a subj e ct 
beyond its province. As to the suggesti on that financial 
r e organizations vv-ill bring the solution, the report reiterate s 
that 11ea vy indebtedness, vvhile an i mportant contributory factor, 
has not be en a primary cause of railroad ills. It is recognized 
that some of the load must be dropped, but the commission 
n evertheless lists many reasons ·which make it clear that the 
wringer of drastic fin ancial reorganization is not a complete, 
adequate or wholly just answer to the railroad problem,necessary 
as ~- t may be in many i nstances. If the railroads are to b e 
operated successfully under private ownershi p , they must have 
earnings sufficient to ma..."t{:e not only their bonds but, also, 
their stock s attractive to i nvestors. The system of private 
ownership and op eration is d ep endent on the profit motive and 
will not work unless, sooner or l a ter, p r>ofits are forth coming . 
The commission further contends that no one can contemplate 
the wi pi n g out by reorgani zati on of the equities of large 
groups without keenest r egret. 
Discussing delays i n reorganiz a tion, the com_mission pointed 
out how, in such proceedings, it must deal with exceedingly 
complex capital structures, and how, under recent unpredictable 
business conditions, reorganization plans pr epared :tn t h e 
li ght of an apparent trend virtually bec&~e obs olete over night. 
Nevertheless, it has endeavored to expedite proceedings in every 
feasibie way, often against the objection of many interested 
parties, and, sometimes, when all objected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Most railroads i n bankruptcy operate either in receiver-
ship under old equity proceedings, or in trusteeship under 
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. So long as Section 77 
remains on the books, railroad reorganizations will probably 
be based on its provisions. 
Time Element.--From a study of the fourteen advanced 
Section 77 reorganizations it is develop ed that the average 
time between the "filing of the trusteeship petition" and the 
"Interstate Commerce Commission Examiner's report on a proposed 
plan 11 is about three years and .nine months. Before drawing 
conclusion from this fact, it should be noted that one large 
Eastern Road with g ood earnings received an examiner's plan 
about twenty one months after filing petition. This fact 
adds weight to the reasoning that low e arning s of the Middle 
Western roads is probably the reason for the long delay in 
reorganization progress. Between the examiner's report and 
the Interstate Commerce Commission approved plans, the average 
time was about one year and eight months. For t he three roads 
with Federal Court approval of the Inter state Commerce Commis --
sion plans, the average time before Court approval was about 
seven months. The Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway is the 
only one of the fourteen-with a plan confirmed and the time 
between Court approval and confirmation was a little over 
six months. 
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It is perfectly clear that it would be most desirable 
to improve Section 77 in p oint of the functions of the Inter-
state Commerce ~ommission. In the p resent law there is a 
comflicting duality of responsib ility between the Commission 
and the Court, causing unavoidable delays in completing the 
reorganization proceedings. It is important to speed up and 
finish the cases, in accordance with right standards defining 
the capital structure, and without wasting what has been done. 
Proposed L~gtslative Relief.--A bill to be known, if passed, 
as Chapter XIV of the Bankruptcy Act was suggested late in 
~939 by Re presentative Walter Chandler. Under this bill a 
s pecial three-judge court would be convened for each case, 
similar to the court now provided for i n junction suits, and 
consisting of the district judge and two circuit judges. The 
admini stration of the property would be left with the district 
judge . The judgment of the three judges, however, would be 
requ ired, in addition to the approval o f plans, on appointment 
of trustees and thei r counsel; on the c onfirmation of p lans 
where not a pproved by the requisite votes of the creditors 
and stockholders; on the a l lowance of compensation and expenses; 
on the upset price where there is a sale of assets; and on the 
other issues upon which the district judge asks he~p. 
All shuttling h a s been eliminated under this p roposed 
bill. There need be no referen ce back to t he Commission for 
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any purp ose. If the Commiss,ion fail promptly to approve a 
plan the court shall proceed independently of the Con~ission. 
Therefore, there can be no obstruction to the p roffipt administra-
tion of the law. 
Capita.l Funds.-- 'I'he so-called cap ital funds which have appar-
ently become an integral part of p resent day rail reoganization 
plans are worthy of the most careful consideration. Their 
need largely arises by reason of the fact tha t certain more 
or less routine maintenance involves, under the Interstate 
Commerce Commission's accounting practice, some charges to 
additions and bett erments. 
Prudence makes it inadvisable, even if it were practicab~e, 
to cap italize a l l of these items by the issuance of securities. 
To the extent that they are not financed through the issuance 
of new securities, they have to be provided for out of earnings. 
Not being charged against the latter in an accounting sense, 
the income account indicates a larger amount available for 
interest distributions on the income bonds than is represented 
by the availa ble cash from e a rnings after providing for the 
additions and betterments. The so-called capital funds have 
been devised to bridge this g a p . To mak e income bonds interest 
a charg e ahead of these addition and betterment items might 
tend to strangle the property if earnings should not exceed 
the income bond interest charges by an a mount sufficient to 
cover the addition and betterment expenditures. 
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The question may proper..Ly be asked as to why such items 
as the Interstate Commerce Commission requires be treated as 
capital expenditure instead of maintenan ce expense should not 
be financed by the sale of securities. The answer seems obvi-
ous. Experience has taught that these routine addition and 
betterment expenditures, such as increas ed weight of rail or 
exp enditures for grade crossing elimination, taken together 
with the previously existing investment, are not as a whole 
productive of additional earning power. 
It is not particularly material whether this is p rimarily 
attributable to the non-productiveness of the new additions 
and betterments or to the eroding effect of various economic 
and social changes on the earning power of the existing invest-
ment. The net result is that the maintenance of a railroad's 
earning power requires the expenditure o f substantial sums of 
money currently for what the Interstate Commerce Co~n ission 
labels additions and betterments. 
This reasoning s ..Leads up to the question of why expendi-
tures, which in the agg regate do no more at best than assist 
in maintaining earning power, should not be absorbed in operat-
ing expenses rather t nan pyramided on an investment base upon 
which the railroads as a whole, even in p redepression days, 
failed to earn a fair return as a result of tne inability or 
reluctance of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the exer-
cise of its r a te regulatory functions, to p rovide an a dequate 
rate structure. 
- 220-
The best answer to this question would a ppear to be 
that the Commission would undoubtedly object to .letting down 
the barrier of refined distinctions developed over a long 
period of years between what, under its accounting theories, 
is deemed additional investment and what it considers to be 
pure rep lacement maintenance chargeable to operating expenses. 
The ~~w Barurer,Reconstruction Finane~ Corporation.--The Re-
construction Finance Corporation is playing a prominant part 
in the financing of railroad reorganizations, replacing stock -
.t.LOlders' assessments as a means of raising new funds. This 
is one of the many instances in which government capital is 
being substituted for private cap ital. No doubt the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation will disp ose of the new mort-
gage bonds it is now purchasing from t he reorganized carries 
when market conditions _permit, but unless there is sustain ed 
improvement in the competi tive position of the industry, it 
is d oubtful whether the Be construction Finance Corporation will 
be able to realize ful ~ f a ce value on a.l.l of these obligations. 
Willingness of the Federal lending agency to supply new capital 
will do much to hasten read justments, although at the same time 
it will give the Rec onstruction Fina nce Corporation a consider-
able measure of c ontrol over the reorg anized p rope rty so long 
as the road is indebted to it. 
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It is very like~y that the Federal Court wi~l show a 
greater degree of independence toward the .lending agency than 
the Interstate Commerce . Commission. On several occasions there 
have been unmistakable indications that the Commission he,s been 
st~ongly influenced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
in formulating i ts final reorganization plans, and princivles 
of equity have sometimes given way to the insistence of the 
lending agency on preferred treatment in reorganization. 
For the seventeen railroads with advanced plans proposed 
or approved by substantial and neutral authorities, present 
fixed debt is $3,032,389,000 and 1939 gross revenue was about 
$746,370,000; thus fixed deb t was 407% of 1939 gross. Under 
the new cap italizations fixed debt would total $1,036,301,000, 
a 66 % reduction, and new fixed debt would be about 139 % of 
1939 gross. 
Present fixed charges for these seventeen roads now 
amounts to $136,529,000 annually, or 18.2% of the 1939 gross 
revenues. The s ame railroad under the various plans will 
have new fixed charges of $40,279,000 ,or 5·4% of the 1939 
gross. This would indicate that once these roads in bankruptcy 
a re released from the Courts the operating ratio ever With 
the present gross revenues could come down. A 5i% reduction 
in the operating ratios of these seventeen roads in 1939 
would have been sufficient, if tak en down into net railway 
operating income, to cover ~all new fixed interest chare,es at 
least once. 
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The sooner the railroads are released from the Courts 
the better, not only for their own benefit· but for the g ood 
of the country. Forty or fifty millions of dollars in bond 
interest yearly is a lot of . money in any language. Currently 
withheld from bondholders results in just that much less 
potential business for other industries at large. 
The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company.--In the case of the 
Los Angeles Lumber Products Company the Supreme Court held 
that stocks had no equity in a corporation unless there were 
asset values over and above those necessary to satisfy the 
creditors. Another aspect of the decfsion merits attention. 
The plan of the lumber products company was upset even though 
it had been a pproved by 92.e1 % of the face amount of the 
bonds,99.75 % of the Class A stock and 90 % of the Clas s B. 
This phase of the ruling obviously will be interpreted as 
meaning that security holders' approval is secondary to the 
court's opinion that a plan is fair and equitable. 
Interstate Commerc~_Commis~1on Ya~dstick~.--The yardsticks 
which the Interstate Commerce Commission is using in pa s sing 
judgment on submitted plans are now becoming well known, as 
the result of written and oral opinions in current cases 
before it. 
These yardsticks embody five points: 
1. Fixed charges which have been comfortably earned with 
at least a 25 per cent margin during the average depression 
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years, usually 1932,1933 and 1934, though not so in the case 
of every road, are likely to be approved. 
2. Some provision for gradual retirement of debt. 
3· Provision for a reserve fund to cover extraordinary 
expenses, usua lly described as the "Improvement and Betterment 
Fund. 11 
4. Limiting of c ontingent charges to the difference be-
tween fixed charges and the maximum earning s contemplated by 
estimates for the "constructive normal year," whicn are required 
to be prepared in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section 77 
of the Bankruptcy Act. 
5. Limiting of the total cap ital structure to an amount 
not in excess of the valuation of the property which had been 
determined by the Comm ission in accordance with the La Follette 
Act and the 1920 Admendrnents to the Interstate Commerce Act. 
The valuations themselves will r epresent a ''ceiling 11 
which the new capitalization, including total bonded indebted-
ness and stock, must not exceed. The earnings for the worst 
three years of the depression will represent a "cellar" below 
which fixed charges need n ot be cut, and below which bond-
holders need not be r ,::c:;J i 'e d to forego their fixed interest. 
Outlook for Rail~i sla Lior1 l<.,avorable. --Generally speak ing, 
the outlook for constructive r ai lroad legisla tion is favorable. 
It is too much to hope that the r a ilroad problem can be solved 
by an act of Congress, but its solution mi ght be made less 
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difficult if the prospective legislation tends to smooth out 
competitive inequalities~ 
Congress is at work on transportation legislation that, 
if it lives up to its best potentialities, could definitely 
improve the competitive position of the railroads. The Senate-
House conference committee now is engaged in compromising 
differences between the Wheeler bill, passed by the Senate in 
1939, and the Lea Omnibus bil~, passed by the House. 
The principal aims of these two general transportation 
bills are similar-to place a l l forms of transportation on an 
equal competitive footing by bringing them under Interstate 
Commerce Commission jurisdiction, and to expedite consolida-
tions, by restoring merger initiative to the railroads. 
Major controversial points in the proposed transportation 
legislation are whether the barge lines should be regulated 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and whether railroad 
mergers that work a hardship on labor should be perrnitted. 
Powerful lobbies have represented both the barge lines and 
labor. 
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